Now is the time to talk - Haaretz - Israel News

 

Not withstanding the recent threats of military action against Iran, all parties still remain formally committed to diplomacy as the preferred track for dealing with the Iranian nuclear challenge. But so far all negotiations and offers to negotiate have failed to yield results-Iran has fooled the West into thinking it is sincerely negotiating on the nuclear issue, while in reality it has had no intention of halting its nuclear program. Iran has used negotiations to buy time, which it has used to push its nuclear program forward. But as Iran gets closer to achieving its goal, the recent intensified threats of a military strike could ultimately become reality. So if the West is serious about negotiations, it needs to think hard about what to negotiate and how. The time for smarter diplomacy - preferably back-channel - is now.
The major challenge on the diplomatic track is to get Iran to negotiate for the purpose of actually reaching a deal. There are three essential preconditions: First, Iran must be in a very uncomfortable place -facing real pressure and/or threats of pending attack; second, there must be the prospect of a deal that Iran is interested in pursuing; and third, Iran must be talking to the party that can deliver on the deal. In all respects the United States is the key.
Economic sanctions have not yet made Iran uncomfortable enough to get serious about negotiating, but the escalation in war rhetoric is convincing its leaders that a military attack is a distinct possibility. Their near-hysterical reactions to recent threats indicate that they are feeling the heat.

Regarding a prospective deal, it should be clear that Iran's interest in nuclear activity is primarily a function of its regional ambitions. For this reason, the focus of a deal must shift to the regional sphere. Over the past five years, Iran has made it a priority to enhance its regional power and influence -through increased support of radical elements in the region, as well as stepped-up efforts to improve political relations with its neighbors in the Gulf and Egypt.
There is little doubt that Iran is trying to prepare the ground for becoming the regional hegemonic power, and securing nuclear status has been part of the plan. Yet while it has strengthened its ties with Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran has been less successful in improving relations with "status-quo" Arab countries, such as Egypt or the Gulf states. Moreover, Iran's nuclear activity in the interim, developmental stage, is already backfiring. It has scared moderate states and increased their suspicion of Iran. As a strong power, and influential regional presence, the U.S. is uniquely positioned to assist Iran in securing its regional status in a more positive way. This is the price the U.S. would have to pay for a deal with Iran.
The natural arena for negotiation on Iran's regional role is the Gulf. The U.S. is due to pull out gradually from Iraq, and the terms of its departure can be discussed with Iran. Conditions for a regional security dialogue with those Gulf Cooperation Council states that recognize Iran's prominence can also be negotiated. For its part, Iran must desist from enhancing its influence elsewhere in the Middle East, and end its active support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Peace talks between Syria and Israel would help such a deal by reducing tensions.
For any discussion to begin, the West needs to get past the precondition it has set until now for negotiations: namely, that Iran must cease its uranium-enrichment activities. While the logic of this demand is sound, repeated disregard by Iran has weakened the condition to the point that it has become a liability. Indeed, the precondition works doubly against Western interests: It has had absolutely no effect on Iran's continued drive to pursue uranium enrichment openly and energetically, and it is keeping the West - especially the U.S. - from engaging with Iran in order to explore more realistic options. Maintaining this precondition and focusing exclusively on nuclear activity will unfortunately lead nowhere.
Obviously, this does not mean that the nuclear issue should be left out of the negotiations themselves -far from it. Serious and comprehensive restrictions on Iran's nuclear activity must be part of the deal. But the matter needs to be placed within a framework of wider regional issues that most likely are more important to Iran.
Many other issues must be carefully considered, first and foremost Israel's security. But beyond that, there is the question of how to talk to Iran. It would be best to proceed with very low-profile talks, and negotiating with Iran on equal footing should have better prospects for success.
There are some (albeit sketchy) hints that this kind of dialogue might already be under consideration. Iran's foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said last week that the possibility of the U.S. opening an American interests section in Iran "can be examined." Moreover, according to a recent media report, while the U.S. still insists on the precondition for pursuing full-blown negotiations with Iran, it has not ruled out "less strict pre-negotiations." And with regard to the Israeli-Syrian peace prospects, the U.S. and Iran- both potential spoilers - are allowing this dynamic to move forward. Could positions have been coordinated indirectly at some level?
The window of opportunity for much-needed back-channel diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran will be open during the coming months. Even in the final stretch of his presidency, George W. Bush can and should move in this direction. It won't be easy, but it just might work.

Now is the time to talk - Haaretz - Israel News