altmuslim - “The people of Iran have chosen the path of reform”

 

“The people of Iran have chosen the path of reform”

Human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi speaks to Wajahat Ali and Omid Safi about her native Iran, the looming threat of war, and the aspirations of the Iranian people.

By Wajahat Ali and Omid Safi, July 13, 2008

Between two worlds

For Americans, an Iranian human rights activist seems like the greatest oxymoron since military intelligence. However, Shirin Ebadi was awarded the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize precisely due to her unflinching and indefatigable commitment in advocating human rights and progressive reform on behalf of women, children and political dissidents. The 61-year-old Ebadi was the first Muslim woman and first Iranian to be honored with the prestigious prize. Recently, she was named one of the top 100 public intellectuals alive by Foreign Policy, and their reader poll, which brought in nearly 500,000 global votes, placed her at number 10 on the same list. Despite her international influence and highly effective advocacy, Ebadi remains a controversial figure in Iran, primarily earning the ire of the current government due to her human rights complaints on behalf of political dissidents and minorities, such as members of the Ba’hai faith. Despite threats and some hostile opposition, Ebadi soldiers on.
Interestingly, she fiercely retains her identity and remains proudly “Iranian” and “Muslim” suggesting the proper interpretation and application of Islam is compatible with human rights, and that the Iranian people, unlike some notable personalities in the government, are yearning for progressive reform and enlightened change. In this exclusive interview, we discuss her most recent work with refugees in Iran, her reaction to hostile rhetoric against Iran by the United States, her uneasy relationship with the Iranian government, and how a correct interpretation of Islam can usher forth both democracy and human rights.
You just published a new book about the rights of refugees in Iran. Can you talk about the main issues discussed in your book?
EBADI: Refugee Rights in Iran is a book that I had written in Persian and that had already been published in Iran. The book was brought to the attention of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In particular, this is the first book written in Persian dealing with the rights of the refugees, a comparative study of the rights in Islam with individual human rights, and the legacy of refugees in Islam. It is the first and only book in the Middle East written on this topic. The UN High Commission for Refugees had this book translated into English and published it.
A celebration for the release of this volume was held in London, under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and I was there to introduce this volume. The problem of the refugees, which I have discussed in the book, is that Iran has a large number of refugees. The bulk of our refugees are Afghan, and to a smaller extent Iraqi. The Afghan refugees are more numerous. The reason for the large number goes back to the beginning of the Iranian revolution (1979), which was at the same time that the former Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan. A large number of Afghans sought refuge in Iran. Since the Iranian government was of the opinion that Islam recognizes no [national] borders, and that Iran is an Islamic homeland, it decided that we should open our borders to Muslims. Therefore, the Iranian government permitted many Afghans to come to Iran.
In a short amount of time, many Afghans, about 4 million, came to Iran. The Iranian government had in reality given them permission to enter the country, but issued immigration cards to only a very, very small number of them. As a result, a large number of refugees lived in Iran, and continue to live in Iran, but without having all the legal papers and identity cards as refugees or legal residents of the country. This has resulted in a large number of legal problems for these refugees—refugees that had come to Iran with the knowledge and implicit permission of the Iranian government.
However, since they had no residency cards or legal documentations related to their refugee status, they could not obtain any legal, wage-paying jobs. For example, they could not open a bank account to deposit their money. They would get married, but had no way of officially registering their marriages. They were living in the country, but in an illegal way, which has caused them a great deal of problems.
In the United States we also face similar issues, particularly with Mexican and other Chicano refugees to the U.S., who have often bore the additional burden of racial prejudices directed at them. Is there a similar challenge of racial prejudice faced by Afghan refugees? How would you characterize the treatment Afghan refugees have received from the Iranian government and the Iranian people?
As I mentioned, the problems that confront the Afghan refugees arise from the improper behavior of the Iranian government. For example, they could not enroll their children in Iranian schools. This has resulted in the growth of poverty—both economic and cultural—among the Afghans who reside in Iran.
However, the sentiments of the Iranian people towards the Afghans are different: they have sought to be of assistance to the Afghans. There are a number of NGOs in Iran which try to defend the rights of the Afghan refugees. For example, after the Iranian government had started to exile Afghans, the Iranian people and the defenders of human rights in Iran held large-scale demonstrations against this policy.
It seems like we are in a delicate situation: on one hand when we look at the problems of the refugees, or consider the many criticisms that you yourself have made of the Iranian government, there are real challenges there to deal with. On the other hand, we see that the American government continues to speak of “regime change” in Iran. How do you think cultural, political, and social changes and transformations in Iran can take place in the midst of these opposing discourses?
Before I look at the type of the government and the name of the government, I examine how it treats people. The correct treatment of a country’s citizen is conveyed through the upholding of human rights norms. Therefore, from my perspective, any government that seeks to uphold the norms of human rights in terms of its dealing with people meets the criteria of being legal and acceptable. And likewise, if any government, whatever it calls itself, whether secular or religious, seeks to trample human rights, then that regime does not meet the criterion of being legal or acceptable in my eyes. The name of the government is not important for me: the government’s upholding of the standards of human rights is.
In the recent United States presidential nomination campaigns, some, such as Senator Clinton, have spoken harshly against Iran, stating that if Iran continues to develop atomic energy, she would seek to “completely obliterate” Iran. At the same time, we saw the military operations on behalf of Israel preparing for a strike against Iran. In the meantime, we have also heard the comments of Elbaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, stating if the military plans from Israel move forward, it would be catastrophic for the whole region. What do you think is the best possible set of relationships between Iran and United States at this time, being an election year in the United States? As a representative of the Iranian people, how do you respond to words such as the ones from Senator Clinton or the actions of Israel?
I am of the opinion that war solves no problem and can solve no problem. War, on the contrary, creates many new problems for the Middle East. It also creates new problems for the American economy. I am hopeful that the political differences between Iran and the United States can be solved through the path of dialogue and negotiations, and that this can lead to the normalization of our political relations. In my opinion, dialogue has to be direct, transparent, and at three levels: civil society, parliamentary, and between heads of government. In these dialogues, we have to be able to discuss issues of atomic energy, past political tensions between the two countries, but we also have to talk about the issues of human rights and democracy in Iran.
How do you see your own role as a person who has become an icon for supporters of human rights and women’s rights for many around the world, for many Muslims, and for many Iranians? There are so many who project onto you their own hopes and aspirations. What is the best way for the NGOs that are involved in issues of human rights and women’s rights to have a positive impact on Iran? How do you see your own role in Iran today, and your own relations with the Iranian government?
Western NGOs can play a positive role in terms of democracy and human rights in Iran. For coming together in terms of human rights, we don’t look to foreign governments. But we do welcome intellectual assistance from NGOs and civil society from the West. We are convinced that collaboration with Western civil societies can be very helpful.
How can they help us? By conveying the real news from Iran, not any rosier than it is, and not more bleak than it is, but what it actually is, to the people of the world. That way popular opinion of the world community can be an ally for us. We need moral and spiritual support. Cultural exchange between civil societies of Iran and West, at the level of NGOs and universities, definitely needs to take place.
As to my own relationship with the Iranian government… I regret to say that it is not a positive relationship. The Iranian government was not even willing to announce the news of me having received [the 2003] Nobel peace prize from the public TV and radio stations, which are government-owned. After 24 hours, when all of the news sources had announced it and everyone knew about it, and people were complaining (about the lack of broadcast of this news on government owned media), the government relegated the news to a brief announcement on the 11 pm, and that was the end of that. Nevertheless, in spite of this censorship against me and my work, the Iranian people came to welcome me in a warm and generous way in the Iranian airport. Up to today, many continue to volunteer in the NGOs I work with for the causes of human rights, and for this I am always grateful.
In many places, particularly in the West, there are many questions about women’s emancipation and whether it is possible to reach these freedoms from within an Islamic framework. In many of your own speeches, you yourself have spoken about the intertwined nature of women’s rights and human rights. You have repeatedly stated that it is impossible and meaningless to speak of human rights that don’t already include women’s rights. Many seek to arrive at a reading and interpretation of Islam that is compatible with women’s rights and human rights. But there are two ways of discussing this: The first is that there is a “real and authentic” reading and interpretation of Islam that leads us to that. The second is that there is need for a new understanding, a new interpretation, of Islam that can be compatible with these notions. Which one do you support? Lastly, we would be interested in hearing your final thoughts on the future of human rights and reform movement in Iran.
Islam, like every religion, and for that matter any ideology, has multiple interpretations. In the West we see that there are Christian denominations which support a woman’s right to abortion, whereas other denominations are opposed to it—even though both follow the religion of Christ. Or, to take another example, one church supports the right to same-sex marriage, whereas another denomination opposes this—even though they both follow the religion of Christ.
Therefore, it is not such a strange thing for me to say that Islam too contains multiple interpretations. The situation of women’s rights in different countries proves this very reality. In a country like Saudi Arabia, women cannot even drive a car. On the other hand, we see that in other Muslim countries like Indonesia, Bangladesh and Malaysia, women have become prime ministers and presidents over the course of the last twenty years. In the U.A.E., there is no real parliament. But in another Islamic country like Malaysia, there is a relatively more advanced notion of democracy.
The real question is this: what does Islam have to say about democracy and human rights? In my opinion, with a proper understanding and interpretation of Islam, it is possible to honor and acknowledge democracy and human rights. One cannot use cultural relativism as an excuse to overlook the norms of human rights. In Iran, the people desire a more advanced democracy.
Over the course of the last 29 years, we have experienced a revolution, and an 8-year war with Iraq. We are tired of violence and bloodshed. We, the people of Iran, have chosen the path of reform, and are walking on this path. We want to get to our goal without violence. Reform is a long path. But in the end we will arrive at our destination, and we will not resort to violence. So long as the people of Iran chose reform, the future of reform in Iran is bright. You can count on it.
(Photo: Mary Kate McKenna via flickr under a Creative Commons license)

Wajahat Ali is Pakistani Muslim American who is neither a terrorist nor a saint. He is a playwright, essayist, humorist, and Attorney at Law, whose work, “The Domestic Crusaders” is the first major play about Muslim Americans living in a post 9-11 America. His blog is at http://goatmilk.wordpress.com. He can be reached at wajahatmali@gmail.com. Omid Safi, who provided Farsi translations, is a Professor of Islamic Studies at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He edited the volume Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism. His Memories of Muhammad is forthcoming from HarperCollins, as well as forthcoming book on the reform movement in contemporary Iran from Harvard University Press.

altmuslim - “The people of Iran have chosen the path of reform”

US and Iran: A One-Sided Negotiation - TIME

 

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Over the course of the last three days, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has succinctly summarized the four-year arc of her Administration's diplomatic efforts to restrain Iran's nuclear program. On Friday, she told CNN that the decision to reverse four years of U.S. policy and meet with Iranian negotiators in Geneva was a one-time event, designed solely to hear Iran's response to the latest European negotiating offer. "We have one chance to receive the Iranian response," Rice said. "That's going to be on Saturday when [Undersecretary of State] Bill [Burns] receives that response."

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But the Iranians didn't respond. Instead, Tehran's top negotiator, Saeed Jalili, gave the assembled diplomats only "small talk about culture" and a "meandering" speech, Rice told reporters Monday.

Washington's response? Give Iran more time. Rice and the other big power representatives who are trying to get Iran to give up its nuclear program have set a two-week deadline for a firm answer to their latest negotiating offer. "We will see what Iran does in two weeks," Rice said Monday.

That small climb-down is the latest incremental concession by the U.S., in exchange for nothing from the Iranians. That's because the Bush Administration has found little international support for holding Iran's feet to the fire, while the combination of U.S. difficulties in Iraq and the dramatic rise in oil prices has boosted Tehran's confidence. Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Washington rejected an Iranian offer of broad talks in which Tehran would seek to address all U.S. concerns. But when Rice took over as Secretary of State in 2005, she agreed to support European negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. also agreed to facilitate the sale of spare parts for airliners to Iran, and to stop blocking Iranian accession talks to the World Trade Organization.

The European talks went nowhere, and six months after the U.S. concessions, the Iranians accelerated their nuclear program by starting to enrich of uranium. On the last day of May 2006, under pressure from European allies to open up talks with Tehran, the U.S. offered to join the Europeans at the negotiating table — but only if Iran first agreed to suspend its program of uranium enrichment. And, hoping to press the Iranians to comply, Washington spent the next two years trying in vain to forge a consensus in the U.N. Security Council for meaningful sanctions. Last week, Rice announced that she had agreed to send Burns despite Iran's firm refusal to stop enriching uranium. "It's been a slow-motion capitulation since 2005," says Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations, "There's no other way of interpreting it."

The Iranians have remained steadfast in their refusal to suspend enrichment activities, asserting that they had previously done so, from October 2003 to August 2005, in order to allow negotiations with the Europeans to proceed, but that those negotiations had gone nowhere. The election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the summer of 2005 signaled a more hard-line turn in Tehran, and Iran resumed its enrichment activities shortly after, saying it would negotiate with its centrifuges spinning, not silent.

It's possible this time Iran will make a concession of its own. The Europeans have offered to refrain from adding any new sanctions, for a defined period, if Tehran agrees not to expand its enrichment program during the same time frame. (The hope is that this could be a first step toward a wider agreement.) And the U.S. is dangling what it calls a "generous" new incentives package and the prospect of opening an "interest section" in Tehran that would function as a kind of lesser embassy. The U.S. has had no diplomatic relations with Tehran since the seizure of its embassy there in 1979.

Iran could buy itself months of jaw-boning distraction if it were to agree to the latest offer. Then again, why should it? Rice says if the Iranians don't come to terms in two weeks, the U.S. will try to get a fourth round of penalties adopted at the U.N. "If they do not decide to suspend then we will be in a situation where we have to return to the Security Council," she said Monday. But the first three rounds of U.N. sanctions have proven ineffective so far, and with oil at $130 a barrel, the mullahs have a comfortable economic buffer.

More importantly, the past two years have seen the U.S. rather than Tehran forced to bend its position, and Senator Barack Obama has said he'll enter unconditional negotiations with Iran if elected President. Iran's leaders may well believe that more concessions will come — even if they make none of their own.

US and Iran: A One-Sided Negotiation - TIME

Op-Ed Contributor - If Israel Attacks Iran’s Nuclear Sites, Iranians Should Hope It Succeeds. - Op-Ed - NYTimes.com

 

July 18, 2008

Op-Ed Contributor

Using Bombs to Stave Off War

By BENNY MORRIS

Li-On, Israel

ISRAEL will almost surely attack Iran’s nuclear sites in the next four to seven months — and the leaders in Washington and even Tehran should hope that the attack will be successful enough to cause at least a significant delay in the Iranian production schedule, if not complete destruction, of that country’s nuclear program. Because if the attack fails, the Middle East will almost certainly face a nuclear war — either through a subsequent pre-emptive Israeli nuclear strike or a nuclear exchange shortly after Iran gets the bomb.

It is in the interest of neither Iran nor the United States (nor, for that matter, the rest of the world) that Iran be savaged by a nuclear strike, or that both Israel and Iran suffer such a fate. We know what would ensue: a traumatic destabilization of the Middle East with resounding political and military consequences around the globe, serious injury to the West’s oil supply and radioactive pollution of the earth’s atmosphere and water.

But should Israel’s conventional assault fail to significantly harm or stall the Iranian program, a ratcheting up of the Iranian-Israeli conflict to a nuclear level will most likely follow. Every intelligence agency in the world believes the Iranian program is geared toward making weapons, not to the peaceful applications of nuclear power. And, despite the current talk of additional economic sanctions, everyone knows that such measures have so far led nowhere and are unlikely to be applied with sufficient scope to cause Iran real pain, given Russia’s and China’s continued recalcitrance and Western Europe’s (and America’s) ambivalence in behavior, if not in rhetoric. Western intelligence agencies agree that Iran will reach the “point of no return” in acquiring the capacity to produce nuclear weapons in one to four years.

Which leaves the world with only one option if it wishes to halt Iran’s march toward nuclear weaponry: the military option, meaning an aerial assault by either the United States or Israel. Clearly, America has the conventional military capacity to do the job, which would involve a protracted air assault against Iran’s air defenses followed by strikes on the nuclear sites themselves. But, as a result of the Iraq imbroglio, and what is rapidly turning into the Afghan imbroglio, the American public has little enthusiasm for wars in the Islamic lands. This curtails the White House’s ability to begin yet another major military campaign in pursuit of a goal that is not seen as a vital national interest by many Americans.

Which leaves only Israel — the country threatened almost daily with destruction by Iran’s leaders. Thus the recent reports about Israeli plans and preparations to attack Iran (the period from Nov. 5 to Jan. 19 seems the best bet, as it gives the West half a year to try the diplomatic route but ensures that Israel will have support from a lame-duck White House).

The problem is that Israel’s military capacities are far smaller than America’s and, given the distances involved, the fact that the Iranian sites are widely dispersed and underground, and Israel’s inadequate intelligence, it is unlikely that the Israeli conventional forces, even if allowed the use of Jordanian and Iraqi airspace (and perhaps, pending American approval, even Iraqi air strips) can destroy or perhaps significantly delay the Iranian nuclear project.

Nonetheless, Israel, believing that its very existence is at stake — and this is a feeling shared by most Israelis across the political spectrum — will certainly make the effort. Israel’s leaders, from Prime Minister Ehud Olmert down, have all explicitly stated that an Iranian bomb means Israel’s destruction; Iran will not be allowed to get the bomb.

The best outcome will be that an Israeli conventional strike, whether failed or not — and, given the Tehran regime’s totalitarian grip, it may not be immediately clear how much damage the Israeli assault has caused — would persuade the Iranians to halt their nuclear program, or at least persuade the Western powers to significantly increase the diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran.

But the more likely result is that the international community will continue to do nothing effective and that Iran will speed up its efforts to produce the bomb that can destroy Israel. The Iranians will also likely retaliate by attacking Israel’s cities with ballistic missiles (possibly topped with chemical or biological warheads); by prodding its local clients, Hezbollah and Hamas, to unleash their own armories against Israel; and by activating international Muslim terrorist networks against Israeli and Jewish — and possibly American — targets worldwide (though the Iranians may at the last moment be wary of provoking American military involvement).

Such a situation would confront Israeli leaders with two agonizing, dismal choices. One is to allow the Iranians to acquire the bomb and hope for the best — meaning a nuclear standoff, with the prospect of mutual assured destruction preventing the Iranians from actually using the weapon. The other would be to use the Iranian counterstrikes as an excuse to escalate and use the only means available that will actually destroy the Iranian nuclear project: Israel’s own nuclear arsenal.

Given the fundamentalist, self-sacrificial mindset of the mullahs who run Iran, Israel knows that deterrence may not work as well as it did with the comparatively rational men who ran the Kremlin and White House during the cold war. They are likely to use any bomb they build, both because of ideology and because of fear of Israeli nuclear pre-emption. Thus an Israeli nuclear strike to prevent the Iranians from taking the final steps toward getting the bomb is probable. The alternative is letting Tehran have its bomb. In either case, a Middle Eastern nuclear holocaust would be in the cards.

Iran’s leaders would do well to rethink their gamble and suspend their nuclear program. Bar this, the best they could hope for is that Israel’s conventional air assault will destroy their nuclear facilities. To be sure, this would mean thousands of Iranian casualties and international humiliation. But the alternative is an Iran turned into a nuclear wasteland. Some Iranians may believe that this is a worthwhile gamble if the prospect is Israel’s demise. But most Iranians probably don’t.

Benny Morris, a professor of Middle Eastern history at Ben-Gurion University, is the author, most recently, of “1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.”

Op-Ed Contributor - If Israel Attacks Iran’s Nuclear Sites, Iranians Should Hope It Succeeds. - Op-Ed - NYTimes.com

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

 

A reality check on Iran
By David Isenberg
WASHINGTON - The world has over the past months witnessed one of the periodic upsurges of speculation in the ongoing drama over whether the United States will attack Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons program.
Tehran test-fired some of its long-range ballistic missiles last week to signal that it is taking the threat of an attack by Israel or the US seriously. Subsequently, John Bolton, former US ambassador to the United Nations, wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, saying, "We should be intensively considering what cooperation the US will extend to Israel before, during and after a strike on Iran. We will be blamed for the strike anyway, and certainly feel whatever negative consequences result, so

there is compelling logic to make it as successful as possible."
Yet, ironically, the George W Bush administration, is, at least for the moment, ignoring the calls of the neo-conservatives, and is pushing forward with some of the highest-level diplomacy with Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution.
Bush is sending Under Secretary of State William Burns, third in line at the State Department, to talks this weekend aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions. He is traveling to Geneva with the European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, to talk to Iran's main nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili. The move is reportedly fully supported by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
The initiative includes plans by the US to post diplomats in Tehran for the first time since the revolution in the form of a US Interests Section - a move halfway to setting up an embassy, subject to approval by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Iran already has such a section based in Washington.
For those hardliners who want to overthrow the Iranian government, not cooperate with it, these are unsettling moves. And a new monograph by the RAND Corporation, a prominent US think-tank which has long produced reports on various national security issues for the US Air Force, will likely only worsen their mood.
The monograph, titled "Iran's Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities", finds that despite the theocratic basis of its state, Iran is one of the more democratic countries in the Middle East. And despite these authoritarian characteristics, most Iranians perceive the regime as legitimate. Although many Iranians are dissatisfied with the authoritarianism of the regime, few have been willing or prepared to act outside the electoral process. It notes, "The regime appears to be under no imminent danger of collapse or coup."
Given the July 7 New Yorker article by investigative reporter Seymour Hersh that late last year the US Congress agreed to a request from Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, to destabilize its leadership, including support of the minority Ahwazi Arab and Balochi groups and other dissident organizations, this will come as bad news.
Indeed, the report states, "Ethnic cleavages persist in Iran but do not provide an easy means of swaying Iran's leadership. Although Persians, the dominant group, account for only half the population, Iranian governments have been relatively successful in inculcating an Iranian identity into citizens from most other ethnic groups by emphasizing Shi'ism as a unifying force and fostering Iranian nationalism."
This kind of reality-based truth telling is a refreshing, if rare, change from what one normally sees in reports by government contractors. In a phone conversation, Gary Sick, who was on the staff of the National Security Council under presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and was the principal White House aide for Persian Gulf affairs from 1976 to 1981, and is now the executive director of the Gulf/2000 Project at Columbia University, said, "I was surprised also; it doesn't strike me as the kind of thing they normally tell the AF [air force]. Basically, the underlying theory of what they are proposing is that Iran needs to be brought into the international community."
Sick added, "Dissident elements are not a threat to Iran. It is not an effective strategy to try and overthrow the regime. It would require massive resources and a long, long time. This is a 2,500-year-old entity. Most tribes identify themselves as Iranian first; they are looking for more respect, not to overthrow the government."
This is not to say Iran doesn't have vulnerabilities. A more pressing problem for the Iranian government is how to satisfy expectations for higher quality government services and lower-cost housing for Iranians living in urban areas. Iranians endure some of the highest urban housing costs relative to incomes in the world, making housing one of Iran's most pressing social problems.
The Iranian government also faces great pressure to generate employment for the children of the 1980s population boom. The number of young people entering the labor market has risen by four-fifths over the past two decades and is at an all-time high.
But for neo-conservatives, the most alarming section of the RAND report is that discussing the likely domestic consequences of US military actions against Iran if Iran's facilities were to be bombed - public support for any retaliation its government took would likely be widespread.
And at current oil prices, an attack would be unlikely to stop the Iranian nuclear program. The government would be able to finance the reconstruction of the facility and continue the current program without major budgetary consequences.
The RAND report takes issue with the conservative position that an attack would lead to Ahmadinejad's comeuppance. It says, "In our view, a more likely response would be a strong push to retaliate. Critics of such a policy would likely choose to keep silent."
According to Justin Logan, associate director of foreign policy studies at the libertarian CATO Institute in Washington, DC, "What it highlights is that it indicates the problem with US pressure, it is counterproductive."
According to Logan, the longer-term concerns Iran faces - economic, political and demographic - are serious. "The one thing that will increase their [rulers'] legitimacy is that if they are seen as the vanguard of resistance to the great Satan."
The report also found that with respect to blockading Iranian oil exports, this would probably do more to solidify public support for the regime than weaken it. It noted that during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, living standards plummeted. Yet opposition to the war was muted because most Iranians rallied around the flag.
A sharp rise in the price of oil on the world market because of a massive disruption of oil exports from the Persian Gulf would probably push the world economy into recession.
All told, the RAND monograph and the trip by Burns confirm what Sick wrote this week: "In other words, Bolton, as someone whose policies (in my view) are certifiably insane, recognizes real pragmatism and moderation in Washington when he sees it. And he does not like what he sees in this lame-duck administration."
David Isenberg is an analyst in national and international security affairs, sento@earthlink.net. He is also a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, a research fellow at the Independent Institute, and a US Navy veteran. The views expressed are his own.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

Rootless Cosmopolitan - By Tony Karon » Blog Archive » Why John Bolton is Right on Iran

 

Why John Bolton is Right on Iran

Armageddon Man is unhappy with his President

Guest Column: Dr. Gary Sick of Columbia, a preeminent U.S. scholar on Iran, is a must-read analyst given his wide experience engaging with the leadership in Tehran and in U.S. government service (he honed his expertise on the National Security Council). Having spent quite some time on these pages offering analysis on why, despite the rhetoric, the Bush Administration is unlikely to attack Iran, I was delighted to receive in email form the attached analysis, reproduced with Gary’s approval. It’s a great read:

As usual, John Bolton is absolutely right. His policy prescriptions may be reckless to the point of foolishness (”When in doubt, bomb!”), but his understanding of what is happening in Washington policy (as outlined in his op-ed in the Wall Street Journal yesterday) is unerringly accurate.

While much of the world was hyper-ventilating over the possibility that the United States (and maybe Israel) were getting ready to launch a new war against Iran, Bolton was looking at the realities and concluding that far from bombing the US was preparing to do a deal with Iran. He had noticed that over the past two years the US had completely reversed its position that originally opposed European talks with Iran.

First, the US indicated that it would participate if the negotiations showed progress. Then, when they didn’t, we went further and actively participated in negotiating a new and more attractive offer of incentives to Iran. Bolton noticed that when that package was delivered to Tehran by Xavier Solana, the signature of one Condoleeza Rice was there, along with representatives of the other five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.

He had probably also noticed Secretary Rice’s suggestion of possibly opening a US interests section in Tehran — the first step toward reestablishing diplomatic relations. And he didn’t overlook the softening of rhetoric in Under Secretary Wm Burn’s recent testimony to the Congress about Iran.

Now, just one day after Bolton’s cry of alarm that the US is going soft on Iran, we learn that the same Bill Burns will participate directly in the talks that are going to be held on Saturday in Geneva with the chief Iranian negotiator on the nuclear file. Bolton’s worst suspicions seem to be confirmed.

Unlike many observers and commentators, Bolton has been looking, not at what the US administration says, but what it does. Ever since the congressional elections of 2006, the US has been in the process of a fundamental change in its policy on a number of key issues: the Arab-Israel dispute, the North Korean nuclear issue, and Iran. Since the administration proclaims loudly that its policies have not changed, and since the tough rhetoric of the past dominates the discussion, it is easy to overlook what is actually going on.

Bolton no doubt noticed that Rumsfeld is gone and replaced with Robert Gates, a very different sort of secretary of Defense. He will have observed that the worst of the neocons (including himself) are now writing books and spending more time with families and friends, cheer-leading for more war by writing op-eds from the outside rather than pursuing their strategies in policy meetings in the White House.

He will have seen the gradual shift of the policy center of gravity from Dick Cheney to Rice and Gates. He will have been listening when the Chairman of the JCS and others have said as clearly as they realistically can that the military option, though never renounced as a theoretical possibility, is the least attractive option available to us and in fact is close to impossible given our over-stretch in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In other words, Bolton, as someone whose policies (in my view) are certifiably insane, recognizes real pragmatism and moderation in Washington when he sees it. And he does not like what he sees in this lame duck administration.

Over the past two or three years, we have been treated to one sensational threat after another about the likelihood of imminent war with Iran. All of these alarms and predictions have one thing in common: they never happened. Perhaps it is time for us to join Bolton in looking at the real indicators. When Bolton quits writing his jeremiads or when he begins to express satisfaction with the direction of US policy, that is when we should start to get worried

Rootless Cosmopolitan - By Tony Karon » Blog Archive » Why John Bolton is Right on Iran

What's NOT in the IAEA Iran Reports - by Peter Casey

 

What's NOT in the
IAEA Iran Reports

by Peter Casey

Peter Zimmerman carries august credentials. He is a nuclear physicist. He has degrees from Stanford in experimental nuclear and particle physics. He was the top scientist for arms control at the State Department for a number of years. He later served as chief scientist for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He has written scores of papers on nuclear arms and arms control. He is currently emeritus professor of science and security at King's College in London. All in all, he sounds like someone who knows about nuclear technology, including nuclear weapons, and has the time to think carefully about anything he might write on the subject.

Or so you would think. But on July 6, 2008, Zimmerman published an opinion piece in the Boston Globe entitled "Time for Iran to Face More Sanctions," a screed that badly misuses the International Atomic Energy Agency's May 2008 report on its monitoring of Iran's nuclear power activities. In his piece, which was later republished in the International Herald Tribune, Zimmerman blatantly tries to terrify Americans about an Iranian nuclear menace that does not exist, may never exist, and poses no realistic threat whatsoever to the United States in any case. His commentary is also solid evidence that the New York Times, which owns both the Globe and the Tribune, is intent on once again disseminating the same sort of nonsense that facilitated a "case" for the Iraq invasion.

Zimmerman asserts that the IAEA has "recently reported that it has questions that Iran refuses to answer":

"Why is Iran using high explosives to implode a hemispherical shell of heavy metal? The only known use for such tests is to perfect a lightweight nuclear bomb.

"Why is Iran developing the kinds of detonators needed in an atomic weapon?

"Why is Iran designing, or redesigning, a ballistic missile warhead so that it can contain a nuclear weapon?"

This appears to be a deliberate attempt to spread multiple deceptions.

First, Zimmerman falsely depicts the IAEA's "reported questions" as relating to matters of fact. As the report itself makes clear, the questions relate to allegations based on what the IAEA calls the "alleged studies" – documentation found on a laptop computer purportedly obtained by U.S. intelligence agencies in mid-2004. (The bona fides of these laptop documents, whose origin is as murky as the infamous "Niger yellowcake" forgery, remain in substantial doubt, but that is a whole different story.)

Zimmerman also fails to disclose that the IAEA report states that "it should be emphasized … that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies" (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 28 [.pdf]). The immediately preceding board report was even more explicit: "[I]t should be noted that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard" (emphasis added; IAEA Gov/2008/4 at paragraph 54 [.pdf]).

Unfortunately, in Zimmerman's editorial, the issue is not whether Iran is doing or has done any such things. It is "why" it is doing them. It would be one thing for Zimmerman to state that he thinks that the uncorroborated "laptop" allegations are fact. What he thinks probably would have little likelihood of terrorizing most newspaper readers. But by misinforming readers that the IAEA itself considers these circumstances established fact, Zimmerman fortifies both the credibility and the impact of the lie.

Second, Zimmerman misleadingly indicates that the IAEA report describes questions about multiple, ongoing activities that can only relate to nuclear weapons. For example, he asserts that Iran is "using high explosives to implode a hemispherical shell of heavy metal" whose "only known use" is for a "nuclear bomb." But the IAEA report actually states, "A second aspect [of the alleged studies] concerns … the testing of at least one full-scale hemispherical, converging, explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device" (emphasis added; IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 17).

An allegation, based on unauthenticated documents, that refers to a test that could have been applicable to a nuclear device is not the same as a fact regarding ongoing tests for nuclear devices. But even if Zimmerman had missed the nuance between that which may have been and that which is, the IAEA report goes on. "It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information … on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies" (emphasis added; IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 24). A person of Zimmerman's background and education surely ought to recognize that treating "no information" about X as proof of X is not very good reasoning.

It is possible that Zimmerman's "hemispherical shell of heavy metal" was a reference to the so-called "uranium metal document," which reportedly describes procedures for converting "yellowcake" into uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Gareth Porter recently reported that in January 2005, IAEA inspectors stumbled across this document gathering dust in some old files that Iran had let them rummage through. According to the IAEA, Iran claimed that in 1987 it had received the document, unsolicited, from Pakistan when it acquired centrifuge enrichment components and related documentation (IAEA Gov/2007/58 at paragraph 25 [.pdf]). Pakistan confirmed to the IAEA that it possesses an identical document (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 24). And the IAEA has seen "no indication of any [uranium metal conversion] and casting activity in Iran" (IAEA Gov/2007/58 at paragraph 25). If Zimmerman had the "uranium metal document" in mind, his exaggerations are even wilder.

Zimmerman's assertion that the report states that "Iran refuses to answer" IAEA questions is grossly misleading. As documented in every single IAEA board report since the laptop allegations first surfaced, Iran has consistently and adamantly answered many of the allegations by describing them as baseless and fabricated. In addition, it was only in February 2008 that the U.S. gave the IAEA permission to show any of the documents to Iran to enable it to respond (IAEA Gov/2008/4 at paragraph 37). The U.S. further manipulated the IAEA's efforts by providing "much of this information [to the IAEA] only in electronic form" and "not authorizing the [IAEA] to provide copies to Iran" (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 16). The U.S. even refused to give the IAEA itself copies of some material. For example, the U.S. did not let the IAEA have copies of key documents concerning the "ballistic missile warhead" for a "nuclear weapon" Zimmerman refers to. The agency was "therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran."

Iran's declination to respond to allegations based on documents it has never been shown, or has only been allowed to peek at, may qualify as a "refusal" to answer. But Zimmerman's failure to mention this circumstance that at least partly explains a "refusal to answer" is incredibly misleading.

Moreover, the IAEA report discloses that Iran has in fact specifically "answered" questions that Zimmerman claims it has "refused to answer," such as "Why is Iran developing the kinds of detonators needed in an atomic weapon?" The "detonators" (exploding bridgewire detonators) were for civilian and conventional military activities, according to Iran (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 20). More generally, Iran has told the IAEA that documentation it was permitted to look at was not authentic and had been fabricated. Nevertheless, it "did not dispute that some of the information contained in the documents was factually accurate, but said that the events and activities concerned involved civil or conventional military applicants" (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph paragraph 18). The report also noted that Iran continued to respond to questions posed by the IAEA.

Zimmerman's piece is seriously misleading in other important respects. He claims that Iran "has 320 tons of uranium hexafluoride [UF6] gas to feed its centrifuges, enough for almost 100 bombs, but not for even a fraction of one reactor refueling operation." What he does not mention is that "all of [the UF6] remains under [IAEA] containment and surveillance" (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 9). He also fails to inform readers that:

• Without enrichment, 320 "tons" of UF6 is no more dangerous than 320 tons of silly putty.
• Since it began to enrich uranium, in February 2007, Iran has fed 3,970 kilograms, or less than four metric tons, into enrichment cascades (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 2).
• To get fissile material, uranium must be enriched to consist of 90 percent U-235. Iran's enrichment levels, however, have never exceeded 4.7 percent U-235, a level that could only be consistent with producing nuclear electricity (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 5). Iran is scarcely "well on is way" to "mastery" of U-235 production, despite Zimmerman's claim.
• As have all of its prior reports, the IAEA's May report states: "All nuclear material [at the two Iranian enrichment facilities] remains under Agency containment and surveillance" (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 4).

Zimmerman also contends that Iran's current plans for enrichment are "too small … to provide fuel for a nuclear power program of any consequence," but big enough to enable it to build "twice as many nuclear weapons a year … than they otherwise could have done," providing further evidence that "it is apparent that the real purpose of Iranian enrichment is to provide fuel for weapons, not reactors." This is specious reasoning. Iran's program is R&D. Laying out plans to construct the Taj Mahal before you know whether you can build a hot-dog stand wouldn't make much sense. Despite its simplicity, moreover, Zimmerman's observation somehow has escaped the IAEA's attention. As recently as May 20 of this year, Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, stated, "We haven't seen indications or any concrete evidence that Iran is building a nuclear weapon and I've been saying that consistently for the last five years."

Apparently, ElBaradei does not share Zimmerman's Cheney-esque logic that the possibility that Iran may intend to develop nuclear weapons is evidence that it intends to develop them. And can there be any doubt that, had Iran's current plans been big enough (or when they become big enough) in Zimmerman's opinion to embrace a nuclear power program "of consequence," he would be one of the first to claim that those plans evidence Iran's intent to create even greater multiples of weapon-production capacity?

On Aug. 14, 2003, the Washington Post published an opinion piece in which Zimmerman judiciously observed that "[a]vailable evidence demonstrates that Saddam Hussein … lacked a serious nuclear weapons program in 2003. And if Mr. Bush had not held out the threat of Iraqi nuclear weapons 'within months,' it is doubtful that Congress would have given him a blank check. How can one conjure up a benign explanation for the president's assertions?" The essay concluded that "[t]he next time Bush wants to use armed force to preempt or prevent an attack on this country, he will have to prove his case far more completely than before. [The president] of the United States [has] forfeited the benefit of the doubt."

Zimmerman's recent Globe commentary concludes that "If Iran begins enriching uranium to weapons grade on an assembly-line basis, it could transfer this material to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which might fabricate low-technology nuclear explosives. These would probably have yields nearly as high as the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima."

If. Could. Might. Nuclear weapons. Assembly line. Hezbollah. Hamas. Hiroshima. Is it possible that this agitprop could have been written by the same man who wrote in August 2003 that "The president's principal argument for going to war – to prevent a 'smoking gun that would appear as a mushroom cloud' – was based on bad intelligence that was misused while good intelligence was ignored"?

Over the past five years, Peter Zimmerman appears to have taken leave of his good judgment. He now wants to persuade readers to take leave of their own. Don't. Ask the question the Zimmerman of August 2003 demanded: Is there a reason to use armed forces against Iran "to preempt or prevent an attack on this country?" And don't give those who say "yes" the benefit of any doubt.

The IAEA's reports are available on its Web site in the section "IAEA and Iran in Focus." None of them are more than nine or 10 pages. Despite their subject matter, they are written in reasonably plain English. Even if it takes a little extra effort to figure them out, that effort is essential.

There is no sign that Washington and Israel will relent any time soon from their zealous campaign to foment war with Iran. It is no time to accept at face value the media's distorted descriptions of the IAEA's work. It is no time to buy into the reckless scaremongering over the Iranian nuclear "threat" from "experts" like Zimmerman.

It is every American's civic duty to read and understand the IAEA reports themselves. If we do, Washington just might not be able to get away with another fraudulent casus belli.

What's NOT in the IAEA Iran Reports - by Peter Casey

Condemnation of Iranian Missile Tests While Supporting Israeli War Exercise

 

Condemnation of Iranian Missile Tests While Supporting Israeli War Exercise in the Mediterranean.

Once again Iran has been all over the news over its test-firing over 1,200-mile range Shahab-3 missile capable of reaching Israel and U.S troops in Iraq, as part of war games. The missile test conducted by Iran is a response to recent war games by Israel, reportedly and believed to stimulate a test run for a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The White House, State Department, and presidential candidates have all condemned the Iranian test as “provocative” and describing Iran as a “great threat”.
I find it hypocritical to condemn Iran’s missile tests, while supporting Israel’s five-day exercise code named “Turning point” simulating air and missile attacks on cities in Iran. Where is the similar outrage when Israel was performing its “war games” over the Mediterranean? Why is Bush administration not speaking out against Israel and its war games, yet being quick to condemn similar activities by Iran seems hypocritical? It is shame that Bush administration is being hypocritical and selective in condemning Iran. Moreover, I find it amazing that the editorials have failed to address the obvious question – For what reasons does Iran want nuclear weapon?
The answer is logical by looking at the world map. Iran the country of over 200 million is sandwich between nuclear Israel on the west, nuclear Russia to its north and nuclear India and Pakistan on the east, with occupied Iraq and Afghanistan by a nuclear America. Why shouldn’t Iran posse’s nuclear missile to protect its citizen?
What Iran is showing is that can defend its citizen and will retaliate if attacked. After all, after 9/11 we were so emotional that we went after wrong country in order to retaliate. And what about when Israel uses its missiles to attack Palestinian and Lebanon. Why are these Israel’s missiles not a “missile threat” to humanity?
I failed to understand the perception that it is morally reprehensive for Iran to pursue its missile test, but morally acceptable for other to conduct the test. And why is it that some countries can conduct war games to protect their national security, while when other do the same it generates a barrage of righteous indignation?  Basically, why can some countries posses hundreds of nuclear warheads while other countries cannot aspire to obtain nuclear missiles for self-defense or as deterrence? What’s the argument? Isn’t it a “nuclear apartheid” and “double standard”?
The regime change, pre-emptive strike against Iran and $30 billion taxpayer’s money in military aid to Israel is a major obstacle to peace in the Middle East. And US are partly to blame for Iran nuclear ambitions for allowing Israel to develop nuclear warheads.
The Bush Administration, after its deceptive rationales for invading Iraq, should have no credibility on Iran, but unfortunately presidential candidates, Sen. Obama and Sen. McCain have signed on to the AIPAC and Neo-cons theme to “Bomb Bomb” Iran. While “The Lieberma-Kyl” amendment designating Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as “terrorist” organization, has give green light to President Bush for pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities without congressional approval.
Iran, is important partner in regional stability and has a legitimate right to conduct it’s missile test and to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purpose, as it has signed the NPT treaty and has to fully cooperate with the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The administration in Tehran need to realize that it suffers great loses by producing hostile rhetoric toward US and Israel. While Bush administration has to understand that threat of pre-emptive strike, sanctions and isolation are ineffective policy where as diplomatic dialogue is the road to peace. However, ultimately President Bush and future administration will be forced in to accepting a single standard to a nuclear –free Middle East, if democracy is to prevail in Middle East.

Condemnation of Iranian Missile Tests While Supporting Israeli War Exercise

Article | The American Prospect

"Recently Fakhravar has a TV Program on E2 Satellite Iranian Channel. Now we know where the money is coming from."

Unchastened by the catastrophe of the Iraq war or the setback delivered to the White House and Republicans in the midterm elections in part as a result of it, Iran hawks have organized new efforts to promote U.S. support for regime change in Tehran.

Among the latest efforts is the creation earlier this month of the Iran Enterprise Institute, a privately funded nonprofit drawing not just its name but inspiration and moral support from leading figures associated with the American Enterprise Institute. The Iran Enterprise Institute is directed by a newly arrived Iranian dissident whose cause has recently been championed by AEI fellow and former Pentagon advisor Richard Perle. Amir Abbas Fakhravar, 31, served time in Iran's notorious Evin prison before arriving in Washington in May, with Perle's help. Fakhravar, who advocates U.S. intervention to promote secular democracy in Iran, now seeks Washington's backing to lead an organization that would unite Iranian student dissidents. (I profile Fakhravar in this month's Mother Jones). Some other Iranian activists and journalists say Fakhravar and his supporters exaggerate his importance as a dissident leader in Iran. "Student circles and journalistic circles don't recognize him as a student leader,” says Najmeh Bozorgmehr, the Financial Times' Tehran correspondent who closely followed the 1999 pro-democracy Tehran student uprisings.

Incorporation papers received last week by the Washington, D.C., corporate registration office indicate that among those on the Iran Enterprise Institute's initial board of director are Fakhravar; Bijan Karimi, a professor of engineering at the University of New Haven; and Farzad Farahani, the Los Angeles-based half-brother of the U.S. leader of the exile Iranian political party, the Constitutionalist Party, which is closely tied with Fakhravar.

The Institute was created after a three-day meeting in Washington last month. According to one of the Iranians who participated in the meetings and who asked that his name not be used, among those in attendance were Fakhravar; Reza Pahlavi, son of the ousted shah of Iran; former Reagan era official and AEI scholar Michael Ledeen; a Dallas-based Iranian rug dealer who has funded anti-Tehran dissidents; and several other young Iranian oppositionists. According to sources, the group's initial funding will come primarily from Iranian exiles. Perle's office did not immediately respond to an inquiry to his office about the new group.

According to Iranian sources, the shah's son, Pahlavi, announced at the meeting that the group should right then and there form a new leadership council for the Iran opposition movement, consisting mostly of the younger people present at the meeting rather than the aging cadre of monarchist supporters who have debated how to overthrow the mullahs for 25 years.

The incorporation of the Iran Enterprise Institute, which is now seeking office space in Washington, D.C., comes as the State Department is finalizing decisions on what individuals and organizations will receive some of the $75 million in U.S. government funds set aside to promote democracy in Iran. Some $50 million of that is expected to go to U.S.-government Farsi language broadcasting, and several million to U.S.-based NGOs with experience in democracy promotion. But included among the grant applications received by the State Department, according to a source, were applications by Fakhravar for three projects totaling $3 million. The State Department will not say who is receiving the grant money, in order to protect the recipients.

Even as the grant decisions are being made, U.S. government sources indicate that democracy promotion in the Middle East, including Iran, has diminshed as a foreign policy priority in the Bush administration, for a number of reasons. Chief among them is that U.S. policymakers are humbled by their experience trying to cope with the situation in Iraq. They have also been forced to turn to autocratic regimes for help in isolating Iran, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon. “[The administration] has gotten a large dose of realism,” one U.S. official told the Prospect. “You saw [that] with the Secretary of State Rice's last visit to the region -- the idea to create a group of like-minded states to work together on a variety of issues, to oppose Iranian subversion. Democracy and democratic reform are still there. But it's much less salient and much less prominent.”

Laura Rozen is a Prospect senior correspondent.

Article | The American Prospect

Steve Bell: George Bush on bombing Iran | World news | guardian.co.uk

 

Copyright © Steve Bell 2008

Steve Bell: George Bush on bombing Iran | World news | guardian.co.uk

Tomgram: Why Cheney Won't Take Down Iran

 

Reality Bites Back

Why the U.S. Won't Attack Iran
By Tom Engelhardt

It's been on the minds of antiwar activists and war critics since 2003. And little wonder. If you don't remember the pre-invasion of Iraq neocon quip, "Everyone wants to go to Baghdad. Real men want to go to Tehran..." -- then take notice. Even before American troops entered Iraq, knocking off Iran was already "Regime Change: The Sequel." It was always on the Bush agenda and, for a faction of the administration led by Vice President Cheney, it evidently still is.

Add to that a series of provocative statements by President Bush, the Vice President, and other top U.S. officials and former officials. Take Cheney's daughter Elizabeth, who recently sent this verbal message to the Iranians: "[D]espite what you may be hearing from Congress, despite what you may be hearing from others in the administration who might be saying force isn't on the table... we're serious." Asked about an Israeli strike on Iran, she said: "I certainly don't think that we should do anything but support them." Similarly, former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton suggested that the Bush administration might launch an Iranian air assault in its last, post-election weeks in office.

Consider as well the evident relish with which the President and other top administration officials regularly refuse to take "all options" off that proverbial "table" (at which no one bothers to sit down to talk). Throw into the mix semi-official threats, warnings, and hair-raising leaks from Israeli officials and intelligence types about Iran's progress in producing a nuclear weapon and what Israel might do about it. Then there were those recent reports on a "major" Israeli "military exercise" in the Mediterranean that seemed to prefigure a future air assault on Iran. ("Several American officials said the Israeli exercise appeared to be an effort to develop the military's capacity to carry out long-range strikes and to demonstrate the seriousness with which Israel views Iran's nuclear program.")

From the other side of the American political aisle comes a language hardly less hair-raising, including Hillary Clinton's infamous comment about how the U.S. could "totally obliterate" Iran (in response to a hypothetical Iranian nuclear attack on Israel). Congressman Ron Paul recently reported that fellow representatives "have openly voiced support for a pre-emptive nuclear strike" on Iran, while the resolution soon to come before the House (H.J. Res. 362), supported by Democrats as well as Republicans, urges the imposition of the kind of sanctions and a naval blockade on Iran that would be tantamount to a declaration of war.

Stir in a string of new military bases the U.S. has been building within miles of the Iranian border, the repeated crescendos of U.S. military charges about Iranian-supplied weapons killing American soldiers in Iraq, and the revelation by Seymour Hersh, our premier investigative reporter, that, late last year, the Bush administration launched -- with the support of the Democratic leadership in Congress -- a $400 million covert program "designed to destabilize [Iran's] religious leadership," including cross-border activities by U.S. Special Operations Forces and a low-level war of terror through surrogates in regions where Baluchi and Ahwazi Arab minorities are strongest. (Precedents for this terror campaign include previous CIA-run campaigns in Afghanistan in the 1980s, using car bombs and even camel bombs against the Russians, and in Iraq in the 1990s, using car bombs and other explosives in an attempt to destabilize Saddam Hussein's regime.)

Add to this combustible mix the unwillingness of the Iranians to suspend their nuclear enrichment activities, even for a matter of weeks, while negotiating with the Europeans over their nuclear program. Throw in as well various threats from Iranian officials in response to the possibility of a U.S. or Israeli attack on their nuclear facilities, and any number of other alarums, semi-official predictions ("A senior defense official told ABC News there is an 'increasing likelihood' that Israel will carry out such an attack…"), reports, rumors, and warnings -- and it's hardly surprising that the political Internet has been filled with alarming (as well as alarmist) pieces claiming that an assault on Iran may be imminent.

Seymour Hersh, who certainly has his ear to the ground in Washington, has publicly suggested that an Obama victory might be the signal for the Bush administration to launch an air campaign against that country. As Jim Lobe of Inter Press Service has pointed out, there have been a number of "public warnings by U.S. hawks close to Cheney's office that either the Israelis or the U.S. would attack Iran between the November elections and the inaugural of a new president in January 2009."

Given the Bush administration's "preventive war" doctrine which has opened the way for the launching of wars without significant notice or obvious provocation, and the penchant of its officials to ignore reality, all of this should frighten anyone. In fact, it's not only war critics who are increasingly edgy. In recent months, jumpy (and greedy) commodity traders, betting on a future war, have boosted these fears. (Every bit of potential bad news relating to Iran only seems to push the price of a barrel of oil further into the stratosphere.) And mainstream pundits and journalists are increasingly joining them.

No wonder. It's a remarkably frightening scenario, and, if there's one lesson this administration has taught us these last years, it's that nothing's "off the table," not for officials who, only a few years ago, believed themselves capable of creating their own reality and imposing it on the planet. An "unnamed Administration official" -- generally assumed to be Karl Rove -- famously put it this way to journalist Ron Suskind back in October 2004:

"[He] said that guys like me were 'in what we call the reality-based community,' which he defined as people who 'believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.' I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. 'That's not the way the world really works anymore,' he continued. 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors.... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.'"

A Future Global Oil Shock

Nonetheless, sometimes -- as in Iraq -- reality has a way of biting back, no matter how mad or how powerful the imperial dreamer. So, let's consider reality for a moment. When it comes to Iran, reality means oil and natural gas. These days, any twitch of trouble, or potential trouble, affecting the petroleum market, no matter how minor -- from Mexico to Nigeria -- forces the price of oil another bump higher.

Possessing the world's second largest reserves of oil and natural gas, Iran is no speed bump on the energy map. The National Security Network, a group of national security experts, estimates that the Bush administration's policy of bluster, threat, and intermittent low-level actions against Iran has already added a premium of $30-$40 to every $140 barrel of oil. Then there was the one-day $11 spike after Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz suggested that an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities was "unavoidable."

Given that, let's imagine, for a moment, what almost any version of an air assault -- Israeli, American, or a combination of the two -- would be likely to do to the price of oil. When asked recently by Brian Williams on NBC Nightly News about the effects of an Israeli attack on Iran, correspondent Richard Engel responded: "I asked an oil analyst that very question. He said, 'The price of a barrel of oil? Name your price: $300, $400 a barrel.'" Former CIA official Robert Baer suggested in Time Magazine that such an attack would translate into $12 gas at the pump. ("One oil speculator told me that oil would hit $200 a barrel within minutes.")

Those kinds of price leaps could take place in the panic that preceded any Iranian response. But, of course, the Iranians, no matter how badly hit, would be certain to respond -- by themselves and through proxies in the region in a myriad of possible ways. Iranian officials have regularly been threatening all sorts of hell should they be attacked, including "blitzkrieg tactics" in the region. Oil Minister Gholam Hossein Nozari typically swore that his country would "react fiercely, and nobody can imagine what would be the reaction of Iran." The head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Mohammed Jafari, said: "Iran's response to any military action will make the invaders regret their decision and action." ("Mr. Jafari had already warned that if attacked, Iran would launch a barrage of missiles at Israel and close the Strait of Hormuz, the outlet for oil tankers leaving the Persian Gulf.") Ali Shirazi, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's representative to the Revolutionary Guards, offered the following: "The first bullet fired by America at Iran will be followed by Iran burning down its vital interests around the globe."

Let's take a moment to imagine just what some of the responses to any air assault might be. The list of possibilities is nearly endless and many of them would be hard even for the planet's preeminent military power to prevent. They might include, as a start, the mining of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of the world's oil passes, as well as other disruptions of shipping in the region. (Don't even think about what would happen to insurance rates for oil tankers!)

In addition, American troops on their mega-bases in Iraq, rather than being a powerful force in any attack -- Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has already cautioned President Bush that Iraqi territory cannot be used to attack Iran -- would instantly become so many hostages to Iranian actions, including the possible targeting of those bases by missiles. Similarly, U.S. supply lines for those troops, running from Kuwait past the southern oil port of Basra might well become hostages of a different sort, given the outrage that, in Shiite regions of Iraq, would surely follow an attack. Those lines would assumedly not be impossible to disrupt.

Imagine, as well, what possible disruptions of the modest Iraqi oil supply might mean in the chaos of the moment, with Iranian oil already off the market. Then consider what the targeting of even small numbers of Iranian missiles on the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil fields could do to global oil markets. (It might not even matter whether they actually hit anything.) And that, of course, just scratches the surface of the range of retaliatory possibilities available to Iranian leaders.

Looked at another way, Iran is a weak regional power (which hasn't invaded another country in living memory) that nonetheless retains a remarkable capacity to inflict grievous harm locally, regionally, and globally.

Such a scenario would result in a global oil shock of almost inconceivable proportions. For any American who believes that he or she is experiencing "pain at the pump" right now, just wait until you experience what a true global oil shock would involve.

And that's without even taking into consideration what spreading chaos in the oil heartlands of the planet might mean, or what might happen if Hezbollah or Hamas took action of any sort against Israel, and Israel responded. Mohamed ElBaradei, the sober-minded head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, considering the situation, said the following: "A military strike, in my opinion, would be worse than anything possible. It would turn the region into a fireball..."

This, then, is the baseline for any discussion of an attack on Iran. This is reality, and it has to be daunting for an administration that already finds itself militarily stretched to the limit, unable even to find the reinforcements it wants to send into Afghanistan.

Can Israel Attack Iran?

Let's leave to the experts the question of whether Israel could actually launch an effective air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities on its own -- about which there are grave doubts. And let's instead try to imagine what it would mean for Israel to launch such an assault (egged on by the Vice President's faction in the U.S. government) in the last months, or even weeks, of the second term of an especially lame lame-duck President and an historically unpopular administration.

From Iran's foreign minister, we already know that the Iranians would treat an Israeli attack as if it were an American one, whether or not American planes were involved -- and little wonder. For one thing, Israeli planes heading for Iran would undoubtedly have to cross Iraqi air space, at present controlled by the United States, not the nearly air-force-less Maliki government. (In fact, in Status of Forces Agreement negotiations with the Iraqis, the Bush administration has demanded that the U.S. retain control of that air space, up to 29,000 feet, after December 31, 2008, when the U.N. mandate runs out.)

In other words, on the eve of the arrival of a new American administration, Israel, a small, vulnerable Middle Eastern state deeply reliant on its American alliance, would find itself responsible for starting an American war (associated with a Vice President of unparalleled unpopularity) and for a global oil shock of staggering proportions, if not a global great depression. It would also be the proximate cause for a regional "fireball." (Oil-poor Israel would undoubtedly also be economically wounded by its own strike.)

In addition, the latest American National Intelligence Estimate on Iran concluded that the Iranians stopped weaponizing parts of their nuclear program back in 2003, and American intelligence reputedly doubts recent Israeli warnings that Iran is on the verge of a bomb. Of course, Israel itself has an estimated -- though unannounced -- nuclear force of about 200 such weapons.

Simply put, it is next to inconceivable that the present riven Israeli government would be politically capable of launching such an attack on Iran on its own, or even in combination with only a faction, no matter how important, in the U.S. government. And such a point is more or less taken for granted by many Israelis (and Iranians). Without a full-scale "green light" from the Bush administration, launching such an attack could be tantamount to long-term political suicide.

Only in conjunction with an American attack would an Israeli attack (rash to the point of madness even then) be likely. So let's turn to the Bush administration and consider what might be called the Hersh scenario.

Will the Bush administration Attack Iran If Obama Is Elected?

The first problem is a simple one. Oil, which was at $146 a barrel last week, dropped to $136 (in part because of a statement by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad dismissing "the possibility that war with the United States and Israel was imminent"), and, on Wednesday rose a dollar to $137 in reaction to Iranian missile tests. But, whatever its immediate zigs and zags, the overall pattern of the price of oil seems clear enough. Some suggest that, by the time of any Obama victory, a barrel of crude oil will be at $170. The chairman of the giant Russian oil monopoly Gazprom recently predicted that it would hit $250 within 18 months -- and that's without an attack on Iran.

For those eager to launch a reasonably no-pain campaign against Iran, the moment is already long gone. Every leap in the price of oil only emphasizes the pain to come. In turn, that means, with every passing day, it's madder -- and harder -- to launch such an attack. There is already significant opposition within the administration; the American people, feeling pain, are unprepared for and, as polls indicate, massively unwilling to sanction such an attack. There can be no question that the Bush legacy, such as it is, would be secured in infamy forever and a day.

Now, consider recent administration actions on North Korea. Facing a "reality" that first-term Bush officials would have abjured, the President and his advisors not only negotiated with that nuclearized Axis of Evil nation, but are now removing it from the Trading with the Enemy Act list and the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. No matter what steps Kim Jong Il's regime has taken, including blowing up the cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor, this is nothing short of a stunning reversal for this administration. An angry John Bolton, standing in for the Cheney faction, compared what happened to a "police truce with the Mafia." And Vice President Cheney's anger over the decision -- and the policy -- was visible and widely reported.

It's possible, of course, that Cheney and associates are simply holding their fire for what they care most about, but here's another question that needs to be considered: Does George W. Bush actually support his imperial Vice President in the manner he once did? There's no way to know, but Bush has always been a more important figure in the administration than many critics like to imagine. The North Korean decision indicates that Cheney may not have a free hand from the President on Iran policy either.

The Adults in the Room

And what about the opposition? I'm not talking about those of us out here who would oppose such a strike. I mean within the world of Bush's Washington. Forget the Democrats. They hardly count and, as Hersh has pointed out, their leadership already signed off on that $400 million covert destabilization campaign.

I mean the adults in the room, who have been in short supply indeed these last years in the Bush administration, specifically Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen. (Condoleezza Rice evidently falls into this camp as well, although she's proven herself something of a President-enabling nonentity over the years.)

With former Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Gates tellingly co-chaired a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations back in 2004 which called for negotiations with Iran. He arrived at the Pentagon early in 2007 as an envoy from the world of George H.W. Bush and as a man on a mission. He was there to staunch the madness and begin the clean up in the imperial Augean stables.

In his Congressional confirmation hearings, he was absolutely clear: any attack on Iran would be a "very last resort." Sometimes, in the bureaucratic world of Washington, a single "very" can tell you what you need to know. Until then, administration officials had been referring to an attack on Iran simply as a "last resort." He also offered a bloodcurdling scenario for what the aftermath of such an American attack might be like:

"It's always awkward to talk about hypotheticals in this case. But I think that while Iran cannot attack us directly militarily, I think that their capacity to potentially close off the Persian Gulf to all exports of oil, their potential to unleash a significant wave of terror both in the -- well, in the Middle East and in Europe and even here in this country is very real… Their ability to get Hezbollah to further destabilize Lebanon I think is very real. So I think that while their ability to retaliate against us in a conventional military way is quite limited, they have the capacity to do all of the things, and perhaps more, that I just described."

And perhaps more… That puts it in a nutshell.

Hersh, in his most recent piece on the administration's covert program in Iran, reports the following:

"A Democratic senator told me that, late last year, in an off-the-record lunch meeting, Secretary of Defense Gates met with the Democratic caucus in the Senate. (Such meetings are held regularly.) Gates warned of the consequences if the Bush Administration staged a preemptive strike on Iran, saying, as the senator recalled, 'We'll create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America.' Gates's comments stunned the Democrats at the lunch."

In other words, back in 2007, early and late, our new secretary of defense managed to sound remarkably like one of those Iranian officials issuing warnings. Gates, who has a long history as a skilled Washington in-fighter, has once again proven that skill. So far, he seems to have outmaneuvered the Cheney faction.

The March "resignation" of CENTCOM commander Admiral William J. Fallon, outspokenly against an administration strike on Iran, sent both a shiver of fear through war critics and a new set of attack scenarios coursing through the political Internet, as well as into the world of the mainstream media. As reporter Jim Lobe points out at his invaluable Lobelog blog, however, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Gates's man in the Pentagon, has proven nothing short of adamant when it comes to the inadvisabilty of attacking Iran.

His recent public statements have actually been stronger than Fallon's (and the position he fills is obviously more crucial than CENTCOM commander). Lobe comments that, at a July 2nd press conference at the Pentagon, Mullen "repeatedly made clear that he opposes an attack on Iran -- whether by Israel or his own forces -- and, moreover, favors dialogue with Tehran, without the normal White House nuclear preconditions."

Mullen, being an adult, has noticed the obvious. As columnist Jay Bookman of the Atlanta Constitution put the matter recently: "A U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear installations would create trouble that we aren't equipped to handle easily, not with ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, drove that point home in a press conference last week at the Pentagon."

The Weight of Reality

Here's the point: Yes, there is a powerful faction in this administration, headed by the Vice President, which has, it seems, saved its last rounds of ammunition for a strike against Iran. The question, of course, is: Are they still capable of creating "their own reality" and imposing it, however briefly, on the planet? Every tick upwards in the price of oil says no. Every day that passes makes an attack on Iran harder to pull off.

On this subject, panic may be everywhere in the world of the political Internet, and even in the mainstream, but it's important not to make the mistake of overestimating these political actors or underestimating the forces arrayed against them. It's a reasonable proposition today -- as it wasn't perhaps a year ago -- that, whatever their desires, they will not, in the end, be able to launch an attack on Iran; that, even where there's a will, there may not be a way.

They would have to act, after all, against the unfettered opposition of the American people; against leading military commanders who, even if obliged to follow a direct order from the President, have other ways to make their wills known; against key figures in the administration; and, above all, against reality which bears down on them with a weight that is already staggering -- and still growing.

And yet, of course, for the maddest gamblers and dystopian dreamers in our history, never say never.

Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. The World According to TomDispatch: America in the New Age of Empire (Verso, 2008), a collection of some of the best pieces from his site, has just been published. Focusing on what the mainstream media hasn't covered, it is an alternative history of the mad Bush years. A brief video in which Engelhardt discusses American mega-bases in Iraq can be viewed by clicking here.

Tomgram: Why Cheney Won't Take Down Iran

Now is the time to talk - Haaretz - Israel News

 

Not withstanding the recent threats of military action against Iran, all parties still remain formally committed to diplomacy as the preferred track for dealing with the Iranian nuclear challenge. But so far all negotiations and offers to negotiate have failed to yield results-Iran has fooled the West into thinking it is sincerely negotiating on the nuclear issue, while in reality it has had no intention of halting its nuclear program. Iran has used negotiations to buy time, which it has used to push its nuclear program forward. But as Iran gets closer to achieving its goal, the recent intensified threats of a military strike could ultimately become reality. So if the West is serious about negotiations, it needs to think hard about what to negotiate and how. The time for smarter diplomacy - preferably back-channel - is now.
The major challenge on the diplomatic track is to get Iran to negotiate for the purpose of actually reaching a deal. There are three essential preconditions: First, Iran must be in a very uncomfortable place -facing real pressure and/or threats of pending attack; second, there must be the prospect of a deal that Iran is interested in pursuing; and third, Iran must be talking to the party that can deliver on the deal. In all respects the United States is the key.
Economic sanctions have not yet made Iran uncomfortable enough to get serious about negotiating, but the escalation in war rhetoric is convincing its leaders that a military attack is a distinct possibility. Their near-hysterical reactions to recent threats indicate that they are feeling the heat.

Regarding a prospective deal, it should be clear that Iran's interest in nuclear activity is primarily a function of its regional ambitions. For this reason, the focus of a deal must shift to the regional sphere. Over the past five years, Iran has made it a priority to enhance its regional power and influence -through increased support of radical elements in the region, as well as stepped-up efforts to improve political relations with its neighbors in the Gulf and Egypt.
There is little doubt that Iran is trying to prepare the ground for becoming the regional hegemonic power, and securing nuclear status has been part of the plan. Yet while it has strengthened its ties with Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran has been less successful in improving relations with "status-quo" Arab countries, such as Egypt or the Gulf states. Moreover, Iran's nuclear activity in the interim, developmental stage, is already backfiring. It has scared moderate states and increased their suspicion of Iran. As a strong power, and influential regional presence, the U.S. is uniquely positioned to assist Iran in securing its regional status in a more positive way. This is the price the U.S. would have to pay for a deal with Iran.
The natural arena for negotiation on Iran's regional role is the Gulf. The U.S. is due to pull out gradually from Iraq, and the terms of its departure can be discussed with Iran. Conditions for a regional security dialogue with those Gulf Cooperation Council states that recognize Iran's prominence can also be negotiated. For its part, Iran must desist from enhancing its influence elsewhere in the Middle East, and end its active support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Peace talks between Syria and Israel would help such a deal by reducing tensions.
For any discussion to begin, the West needs to get past the precondition it has set until now for negotiations: namely, that Iran must cease its uranium-enrichment activities. While the logic of this demand is sound, repeated disregard by Iran has weakened the condition to the point that it has become a liability. Indeed, the precondition works doubly against Western interests: It has had absolutely no effect on Iran's continued drive to pursue uranium enrichment openly and energetically, and it is keeping the West - especially the U.S. - from engaging with Iran in order to explore more realistic options. Maintaining this precondition and focusing exclusively on nuclear activity will unfortunately lead nowhere.
Obviously, this does not mean that the nuclear issue should be left out of the negotiations themselves -far from it. Serious and comprehensive restrictions on Iran's nuclear activity must be part of the deal. But the matter needs to be placed within a framework of wider regional issues that most likely are more important to Iran.
Many other issues must be carefully considered, first and foremost Israel's security. But beyond that, there is the question of how to talk to Iran. It would be best to proceed with very low-profile talks, and negotiating with Iran on equal footing should have better prospects for success.
There are some (albeit sketchy) hints that this kind of dialogue might already be under consideration. Iran's foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said last week that the possibility of the U.S. opening an American interests section in Iran "can be examined." Moreover, according to a recent media report, while the U.S. still insists on the precondition for pursuing full-blown negotiations with Iran, it has not ruled out "less strict pre-negotiations." And with regard to the Israeli-Syrian peace prospects, the U.S. and Iran- both potential spoilers - are allowing this dynamic to move forward. Could positions have been coordinated indirectly at some level?
The window of opportunity for much-needed back-channel diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran will be open during the coming months. Even in the final stretch of his presidency, George W. Bush can and should move in this direction. It won't be easy, but it just might work.

Now is the time to talk - Haaretz - Israel News