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"Nothing Mr ElBaradei's men say looks able yet to dispel the cloud of Iranian secrecy "

Feb 28th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Its latest Iran report highlights the problems of the UN's atomic watchdog

APElBaradei: please elaborate

SO IS Iran trying to build the bomb or not? Iran says it is not. Israel says it is. America's intelligence people say it was trying to until 2003 but probably stopped—and is still keeping its options open. Wouldn't it be splendid if an independent referee, with full access to the evidence, could rule for sure one way or another?

Such a body does exist. But the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), published on February 22nd, shows how tentative the UN's nuclear watchdog must sometimes be. Iran took the report as proof of its innocence. America and several European countries drew the opposite inference. They say that although the IAEA has still found no clear evidence of a bomb programme, the report leaves ample grounds for suspicion.

A look at the report's careful equivocations shows why it can be used as ammunition by both sides. Of the “outstanding” technical issues between Iran and the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director-general, claims his people have clarified all but one. But (there is said to be tension between the director-general and his safeguards experts) that is not quite what the report actually says. To anyone of a suspicious cast of mind, these “clarifications” leave something to be desired.

Why, for example, did Iran possess a 15-page document describing among other things how to machine enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons? Iran's explanation is that the nuclear smuggling network run by Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan had sent it this document in 1987, along with other documentation on centrifuges Iran had received, but that Iran had not asked for it. The agency says it is still waiting for further details on this from Pakistan.

In the case of other issues that Dr ElBaradei now calls clarified, what the report actually says is that Iran has provided explanations that are “consistent with” (or “not inconsistent with”) information available to the agency, but for which it is still “seeking corroboration”, even though it considers the question no longer outstanding “at this stage”. That is the formula the report applies, for example, to Iran's explanation for having conducted research on polonium-210, which can be useful for triggering nuclear weapons. This, say the Iranians (with supporting documents) was just basic science carried out at the personal initiative of the project leader.

The IAEA's ability to be more definitive is hampered by limited access to the evidence. Having run a secret nuclear programme for nearly two decades, Iran suffers from what Mr ElBaradei delicately calls a “confidence deficit”, which he urges it to correct by embracing fully the so-called “additional protocol”, giving his inspectors the right to a much closer look at its nuclear doings. But the agency's knowledge is also determined by the amount of information that foreign intelligence services choose to offer—or withhold.

In mid-February the Americans at last gave the IAEA permission to show Iran a batch of evidence, much of it reportedly recovered from an Iranian laptop, suggesting that it had conducted work on uranium conversion, missile-warhead design and high-explosives testing—all possibly related to nuclear weapons. This, says the IAEA's latest report, “is a matter of serious concern”. But on being shown the new evidence before the agency's report was compiled, Iran called the allegations baseless and the supporting documents forged.

The world's supposedly independent nuclear referee, in short, is stumped for the present. It has verified that none of the nuclear material that Iran has already declared has been diverted for a weapons programme. It has received some “consistent” explanations of previously fishy-looking activities. It says it knows more than it did about Iran's programme, but that it has not yet received complete information. And now it has to deal with an impasse over the evidence from America that Iran dismisses as a fabrication.

Iran says it would sign the additional protocol as Mr ElBaradei asks if the UN Security Council got off its back and its nuclear file was returned to the IAEA to handle alone. Fat chance. Having ignored two resolutions ordering it to stop enriching uranium, Iran now faces the prospect of a third. Nothing Mr ElBaradei's men say looks able yet to dispel the cloud of Iranian secrecy and Western suspicion that hovers over Iran's nuclear programme.

Nuclear proliferation | Why not just blow your whistle? | Economist.com