Iranians for Ron Paul

How Iran's Nuclear Power Play Can Change Global Politics | World | AlterNet

2009-07-29T05:48:00.001-07:00

How Iran's Nuclear Power Play Can Change Global Politics

By Pepe Escobar, Asia Times. Posted July 28, 2009.

A nuclear Iran would inevitably turbo-charge a new, emerging multipolar world; one where the U.S. won't be relied on to control Mideast oil.

HONG KONG -- Things get curiouser and curiouser in the Iranian wonderland. Imagine what happened last week during Friday prayers in Tehran, personally conducted by former president Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, aka "The Shark", Iran's wealthiest man, who made his fortune partly because of Irangate -- the 1980s' secret weapons contracts with Israel and the US.

As is well known, Rafsanjani is behind the Mir-Hossein Mousavi-Mohammad Khatami pragmatic conservative faction that lost the most recent battle at the top -- rather than a presidential election -- to the ultra-hardline faction of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei-Mahmud Ahmadinejad-Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. During prayers, partisans of the hegemonic faction yelled the usual "Death to America!" -- while the pragmatic conservatives came up, for the first time, with "Death to Russia!" and "Death to China!"

Oops. Unlike the United States and Western Europe, both Russia and China almost instantly accepted the contested presidential re-election of Ahmadinejad. Could they then be portrayed as enemies of Iran? Or have pragmatic conservatives not been informed that obsessed-by-Eurasia Zbig Brzezinksi -- who has US President Barack Obama's undivided attention -- has been preaching since the 1990s that it is essential to break up the Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis and torpedo the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)?

On top of it, don't they know that both Russia and China -- as well as Iran -- are firm proponents of the end of the dollar as global reserve currency to the benefit of a (multipolar) basket of currencies, a common currency of which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had the gall this month to present a prototype at the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting in Aquila, Italy? By the way, it's a rather neat coin. Minted in Belgium, it sports the faces of the G-8 leaders and also a motto -- "Unity in diversity".

"Unity in diversity" is not exactly what the Obama administration has in mind as far as Iran and Russia are concerned -- no matter the zillion bytes of lofty rhetoric. Let's start with the energy picture.

Iran is world number two both in terms of proven oil reserves (11.2%) and gas reserves (15.7%), according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008.

If Iran ever opted towards a more unclenched-fist relationship with Washington, US Big Oil would feast on Iran's Caspian energy wealth. This means that whatever the rhetoric, no US administration will ever want to deal with a hyper-nationalist Iranian regime, such as the current military dictatorship of the mullahtariat.

What really scares Washington -- from George W Bush to Obama -- is the perspective of a Russia-Iran-Venezuela axis. Together, Iran and Russia hold 17.6% of the world's proven oil reserves. The Persian Gulf petro-monarchies -- de facto controlled by Washington -- hold 45%. The Moscow-Tehran-Caracas axis controls 25%. If we add Kazakhstan's 3% and Africa's 9.5%, this new axis is more than an effective counter-power to American hegemony over the Arab Middle East. The same thing applies to gas. Adding the "axis" to the Central Asian "stans", we reach 30% of world gas production. As a comparison, the whole Middle East -- including Iran -- currently produces only 12.1% of the world's needs.

All about Pipelineistan

A nuclear Iran would inevitably turbo-charge the new, emerging multipolar world. Iran and Russia are de facto showing to both China and India that it is not wise to rely on US might subjugating the bulk of oil in the Arab Middle East. All these players are very much aware that Iraq remains occupied, and that Washington's obsession remains the privatization of Iraq's enormous oil wealth.

As Chinese intellectuals are fond of emphasizing, four emerging or re-emerging powers -- Russia, China, Iran and India -- are strategic and civilizational poles, three of them sanctuaries because they are nuclear powers. A more confident and assertive Iran -- mastering the full cycle of nuclear technology -- may translate into Iran and Russia increasing their relative weight in Europe and Asia to the distress of Washington, not only in the energy sphere but also as proponents of a multipolar monetary system.

The entente is already on. Since 2008, Iranian officials have stressed that sooner or later Iran and Russia will start trading in rubles. Gazprom is willing to be paid for oil and gas in roubles -- and not dollars. And the secretariat of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has already seen the writing on the wall -- admitting for over a year now that OPEC will be trading in euros before 2020.

Not only the "axis" Moscow-Tehran-Caracas, but also Qatar and Norway, for instance, and sooner or later the Gulf Emirates, are ready to break up with the petrodollar. It goes without saying that the end of the petrodollar -- which won't happen tomorrow, of course -- means the end of the dollar as the world's reserve currency; the end of the world paying for America's massive budget deficits; and the end of an Anglo-American finance stranglehold over the world that has lasted since the second part of the 19th century.

The energy equation between Iran and Russia is much more complex: it configures them as two scorpions in a bottle. Tehran, isolated from the West, lacks foreign investment to upgrade its 1970s-era energy installations. That's why Iran cannot fully profit from exploiting its Caspian energy wealth.

Here it's a matter of Pipelineistan at its peak -- since the US, still during the 1990s, decided to hit the Caspian in full force by supporting the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tblisi-Supsa (BTS) gas pipeline.

For Gazprom, Iran is literally a goldmine. In September 2008, the Russian energy giant announced it would explore the huge Azadegan-North oilfield, as well as three others. Russia's Lukoil has increased its prospecting and Tatneft said it would be involved in the north. The George W Bush administration thought it was weakening Russia and isolating Iran in Central Asia. Wrong: it only accelerated their strategic energy cooperation.

Putin power play

In February 1995, Moscow committed to finishing construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This was a project started by that erstwhile, self-proclaimed "gendarme of the Gulf" for the US -- the shah of Iran. The shah engaged KWU from Germany in 1974, but the project was halted by the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and hit hard between 1984 and 1988 by Saddam Hussein's bombs. The Russians finally entered the picture proposing to finish the project for $800 million. By December 2001, Moscow also started to sell missiles to Tehran -- a surefire way of making extra money offering protection for strategic assets such as Bushehr.

Bushehr is a source of immense controversy in Iran. It should have been finished by 2000. As Iranian officials see it, the Russians seem never to be interested in wrapping it up. There are technical reasons -- such as the Russian reactor being too big to fit inside what KWU had already built -- as well as a technology deficit on the part of Iranian nuclear engineers.

But most of all there are geopolitical reasons. Former president Vladimir Putin used Bushehr as a key diplomatic peon in his double chessboard match with the West and the Iranians. It was Putin who launched the idea of enriching uranium for Iran in Russia; talk about a strategic asset in terms of managing a global nuclear crisis. Ahmadinejad -- and most of all the Supreme Leader -- gave him a flat refusal. The Russian response was even more foot-dragging, and even mild support for more US-sponsored sanctions against Tehran.

Tehran got the message -- that Putin was not an unconditional ally. Thus, in August 2006, the Russians landed a new deal for the construction and supervision of two new nuclear plants. This all means that the Iranian nuclear dossier simply cannot be solved without Russia. Simultaneously, by Putin's own framework, it's very clear in Moscow that a possible Israeli strike would make it lose a profitable nuclear client on top of a diplomatic debacle. Medvedev for his part is pursuing the same two-pronged strategy; stressing to Americans and Europeans that Russia does not want nuclear proliferation in the Middle East while stressing to Tehran that it needs Russia more than ever.

Another feature of Moscow's chessboard strategy -- never spelled out in public -- is to keep the cooperation with Tehran to prevent China from taking over the whole project, but without driving the Americans ballistic at the same time. As long as the Iranian nuclear program is not finished, Russia can always play the wise moderating role between Iran and the West.

Building up a civilian nuclear program in Iran is good business for both Iran and Russia for a number of reasons.

First of all, both are military encircled. Iran is strategically encircled by the US in Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and by US naval power in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Russia has seen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gobbling up the Baltic countries and threatening to "annex" Georgia and Ukraine; NATO is at war in Afghanistan; and the US is still present, one way or another, across Central Asia.

Iran and Russia share the same strategy as far as the Caspian Sea is concerned. They are in fact opposed to the new Caspian states -- Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Iran and Russia also face the threat of hardcore Sunni Islam. They have a tacit agreement; for instance, Tehran has never done anything to help the Chechens. Then there's the Armenian issue. A de facto Moscow-Tehran-Erevan axis profoundly irks the Americans.

Finally, in this decade, Iran has become the third-largest importer of Russian weapons, after China and India. This includes the anti-missile system Tor M-1, which defends Iran's nuclear installations.

What's your axis?

So thanks to Putin, the Iran-Russia alliance is carefully deployed in three fronts -- nuclear, energy and weapons.

Are there cracks in this armor? Certainly.

First, Moscow by all means does not want a weaponized Iranian nuclear program. This spells out "regional destabilization". Then, Central Asia is considered by Moscow as its backyard, so for Iran to be ascendant in the region is quite problematic. As far as the Caspian goes, Iran needs Russia for a satisfactory juridical solution (Is it a sea or a lake? How much of it belongs to each border country?)

On other hand, Iran's new military dictatorship of the mullahtariat will react savagely if it ever had Russia fully against it in the UN Security Council. That would spell a rupture in economic relations -- very bad for both sides -- but also the possibility of Tehran supporting radical Islam everywhere from the southern Caucasus to Central Asia.

Under these complex circumstances, it's not so far-fetched to imagine a sort of polite Cold War going on between Tehran and Moscow.

From Russia's point of view, it all comes back to the "axis" -- which would be in fact Moscow-Tehran-Erevan-New Delhi, a counter-power to the US-supported Ankara-Tblisi-Telaviv-Baku axis. But there's ample debate about it even inside the Russian elite. The old guard, like former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, thinks that Russia is back as a great power by cultivating its former Arab clients as well as Iran; but then the so-called "Westernizers" are convinced that Iran is more of a liability.

They may have a point. The key of this Moscow-Tehran axis is opportunism -- opposition to US hegemonic designs. Is Obama -- via his "unclenched fist" policy -- wily enough to try to turn this all upside down; or will he be forced by the Israel lobby and the industrial-military complex to finally strike a regime now universally despised all over the West?

Russia -- and Iran -- are fully committed to a multipolar world. The new military dictatorship of the mullahtariat in Tehran knows it cannot afford to be isolated; its road to the limelight may have to go through Moscow. That explains why Iran is making all sorts of diplomatic efforts to join the SCO.

As much as progressives in the West may support Iranian pragmatic conservatives -- who are far from reformists -- the crucial fact remains that Iran is a key peon for Russia to manage its relationship with the US and Europe. No matter how nasty the overtones, all evidence points to "stability" at this vital artery in the heart of the New Great Game.

How Iran's Nuclear Power Play Can Change Global Politics | World | AlterNet

Martin Amis on the beginning of the end for Iran's ayatollahs | World news | The Guardian

2009-07-23T04:35:00.001-07:00

Martin Amis: The end of Iran's ayatollahs?

In 1979, the return to Iran of an exiled cleric marked the start of the Islamic Republic. The death in June of Neda Soltan may herald the long-overdue fall of this moribund regime

An Iranian protester during an opposition rally in Tehran on 9 July 2009 Photograph: -/AFP/Getty Images

The following correction was printed in the Guardian's Corrections and clarifications column, Monday 20 July 2009

An essay exploring whether Iran's Islamic republic is in its death throes – referred to President Jimmy Carter's "failed Entebbe raid of April 1980" to rescue US hostages in Iran. The failed 1980 mission was Operation Eagle Claw. The rescue of airline passengers at Entebbe, Uganda, was carried out with almost complete success by the Israeli military in July 1976.

The writer Jason Elliot called his recent and resonant Iranian travelogue Mirrors of the Unseen; and I am aware of the usual dangers associated with writing about the future. But what we seem to be witnessing in Iran is the first spasm of the death agony of the Islamic Republic. In this process, which will be very long and very ugly, Mir Hossein Mousavi is likely to play a lesser role than Neda Agha Soltan, whose transformation (from youth, hope, and beauty, in a matter of seconds, to muddy death) unforgettably crystallised the core Iranian idea – the Shia tragedy and passion – of martyrdom in the face of barbaric injustice. Neda Soltan personified something else, too: the modern.

Elliot's title should again be borne in mind as we consider the June Events, which are open to two interpretations. Quite possibly, things are more or less as they appear: the results of a fraudulent election were presented to the people with indecent haste and laughable incompetence (with, in other words, implicit contempt for democracy); civil unrest was then followed by the application of state violence. Now consider. If, after the usual interval, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had soberly announced a 51% win for President Ahmadinejad, then Iran, and the world, might well have bowed its head and moved on. Just as possibly (the Islamic Republic being what it is), the landslide was rigged, and ostentatiously vaunted, to bring on the terror and the crackdown.

In 1997, the regime felt confident enough to sanction the surprise victory of President Muhammad Khatami, who won by the same landslide margin of 69% in a joyous election that no one disputed. Khatami, a cleric, had nonetheless far stronger liberal credentials than the technocrat Mousavi (who, during the Iran-Iraq war, was well to the right of Khamenei). Lovingly hailed as "Ayatollah Gorbachev", Khatami was soon talking about the "thoughtful dialogue" he hoped to open with America. It seemed possible that international isolation, which so parches and de-oxygenates the Iranian air, was about to be eased.

Everyone understood that this process would take time. In June 2001, Khatami was re-elected with a majority of 78%. Seven months later came George W Bush's "axis of evil" speech (one of the most destructive in American history), and the Tehran Spring was at an end. In truth, Bush was heaven-sent for the Iranian right; he blindly enhanced its regional power (with the adventurist, indeed experimental, war with Iraq), while remaining adequately "arrogant" (the most detested of all attributes in the Shia-Iranian sensorium). Now, the mullahs are aware that Barack Obama is far cannier than that. Had Mousavi won, Obama would have rewarded Iran, and in a way palpable to all Iranians. Such a "linkage" – liberalisation equals benefits – would have fatal consequences for the mullahs. The earth has already stirred beneath them, with the pro-western, anti-Syrian, anti-Iranian election in Lebanon. This, together with certain historical forces, explains the current confusion and hysteria of the armed clerisy.

For the mullahs now know that they are afloat on an ocean of illegitimacy. The great hawsers of the revolution of 1978-79 are all either snapped or fraying. Of the four foundational narratives, three are myths: the "Islamic Revolution" was not an Islamic revolution; the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), which destroyed a generation, was not the "Imposed War", as it is still called; and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was not a great man (Khomeini, as every inquisitive Iranian has long understood, was a world-historical monster). Perhaps most importantly of all, for now, the fourth narrative, or thread (anti-Americanism – "Westoxication", in the old battle cry), has been severed by the person of Obama. The Islamic Republic is also doomed by modernity (in the form of instant communications) and by demographic destiny. Persia, one of the oldest nations on earth, is getting younger and younger.

"In the history of the Iranian plateau," writes Sandra Mackey, in her stylish and magisterial classic, The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation, "the sun has risen and set on nearly a million days." But before we come to the Iranian soul, and the million days, let us examine the Three Lies about the Islamic Republic.

The 1979 revolution wasn't an Islamic revolution until it was over. In its origins, it was a full-spectrum mass movement, an avalanche of demonstrations and riots, and strikes so relentless that they blacked out the Peacock's palace; the military, moreover, was sustaining a thousand defections per day. The June Events of 2009 constitute a mere whisper of demurral when set against the deafening crescendo of 1978. The noise was not made for clerical rule; the noise was made because a decadent monarchy had lost the farr – the inherent aura of kingship.

It is instructive to compare the Iranian revolution with the two Russian revolutions of 1917: the February revolution, a popular revolt, and the October revolution, a Leninist coup (with an impotent Provisional Government in the interim). Trotsky said that the Bolsheviks found power lying in the street and "picked it up like a feather". And then, of course, the really warm work began – against the Whites, against the Greens (the peasantry), against the trade unions, against the church, and so on, until every alternative centre of power (and opinion) was eradicated, down to and including any gathering of three.

On 16 January 1979, Muhammad Reza Shah flew out of Tehran – to exile in Cairo. On 1 February, Ayatollah Khomeini flew into Tehran – from exile in Paris (where one of his more regrettable neighbours, I feel obliged to mention, was Brigitte Bardot). Thus the political revolution was over; now the cultural revolution began. The Provisional Government was successively eroded by the komitehs (mosque-based militias, later the Basij), by the Revolutionary Guards (later the Pasdaran, or the Iranian army), and by the revolutionary tribunals (which dealt out rough justice to survivors of the old regime, and various other undesirables). On 4 November, a group of pious students spontaneously infiltrated the US embassy and seized the 53 hostages. Khomeini manipulated this V-sign directed at the Great Satan to such effect that in the imminent referendum on the new constitution "99.5%" of a turnout of 17 million gave their blessing to Islamic autocracy.

But there was still that "0.5" to deal with. And Khomeini faced vigorous opposition from almost every quarter – most formidably from the Mujahedin-e Khalq. Established a decade and a half earlier, in opposition to the Shah, the Mujahedin (Marxist, left-Islamic, and committed to women's rights) had half a million adherents and could field a guerrilla army of 100,000 experienced fighters. When Khomeini excluded them from the new political order as "un-Islamic", they turned to terror. In 1981, if you recall, the Mujahedin were blowing up mullahs by the dozen (74 in a single strike in Tehran); and they went on to assassinate more than a thousand government officials in the latter months of that year. What followed was terroristic civil strife. By September, Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards were executing 50 people a day for "waging war against God" (the same crime, and the same punishment, now being invoked by the clerics of 2009). Fired by a zeal both revolutionary and religious, the mullahs bloodily prevailed.

Revolutions, almost by definition, are fiercely anti-clerical. As late as 1922, to take the fiercest possible example, Lenin executed 4,500 priests and monks, plus 3,500 nuns. Contrarian Iran, however, swam upstream. By December 1982, Khomeini had more or less secured the monopoly of violence, and the Iranian people found themselves living under the world's only revolutionary theocracy. The Islamic Republic was Islamic, now, but it was no longer a republic. Iranians have since enjoyed only a shadow of popular sovereignty; and by 1982, besides, they had something else to think about – the meatgrinding confrontation with Iraq.

The Iran-Iraq war can rightly be thought of as the Imposed War, but only if we understand that the war was imposed by Khomeini. It tests the historical imagination to get a sense of the horrified dismay engendered, throughout the region, by the advent of the meshuga ayatollah. Stalin, after a while, was content with "socialism in one country". Khomeini, proclaimedly, wanted Shia theocracy in every country on earth. Throughout the course of the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini put himself about elsewhere, with bombings, assassination attempts, and armed subversion, in Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. In Mecca, the hajj became the scene of annual agitation; in 1987, a clash between Iranian militiamen and Saudi riot police left more than 400 dead.

And Iraq? In 1979 Saddam Hussein reached out a trembling hand of friendship to the new Iran, and was clearly hoping for the continuation of the detente he had established with the Shah. Iran responded by resuming support for the separatist Kurds (suspended since 1975) and for the Shia underground; there were assassination attempts on the deputy premier and the minister of information, and the successful murder of at least 20 prominent officials in April 1980 alone. Khomeini, meanwhile, withdrew his ambassador from Baghdad; in September, Iran shelled the border cities of Khanaqin and Mandali.

In The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Efraim Karsh lists in his chronology eight Iraqi offers of ceasefires, the first on 5 October 1980, 12 days after the war began, the last on 13 July 1988, five weeks before it ended. Khomeini's war aim was the theocratisation, or de-Satanisation, of Iraq; thus the war became a (failed) test of Islam, and devolved, in Mackey's words, into "a daily enactment of Shia themes of sacrifice, dispossession, and mourning". So: 12-year-olds were attacking Iraqi machine gun emplacements on bicycles, and 750,000 Iranians filled the multi-acre cemeteries, and perhaps twice that number were left crippled in body or mind. Eleven months later, Khomeini himself joined the fallen in the land of the dead.

What remains, then, you might wonder, as you deplane at Tehran's Imam Khomeini International Airport, and enter a city where no cab-driver will stop for a cleric – what remains of the legacy bequeathed by the Father of the Revolution, or alternatively by "that fucking asshole", as he is reflexively called, in English, by the youth of the cities of Iran? Khomeini's notion of the Velayat-e Faqih, or rule by the vice-regent of God (ie, the top mullah, ie, Khomeini), was so unhistorical that many of its angriest opponents came from the clergy. Political participation, in Shia theology, is seen as a contaminant. And with good reason: that power corrupts is not a metaphor; and absolute power, combined with absolute self-righteousness, defined the insane nightmare of Khomeini's rule.

His moral imbecilities provide a rich field. I will confine myself to two examples. After President Carter's "fiasco in the desert", the failed Entebbe raid of April 1980, Khomeini announced that God had personally thrown sand into the helicopters' engines, to protect the nation of Islam. To hear this kind of talk from an eight-year-old is one thing; to hear it from a bellicose head of state, on public radio, is another. The second example comes from Mackey (the time is 1981):

A film run on government-controlled television showed a mother denouncing her son as a Marxist. The son, sobbing and grabbing for his mother's hand, desperately tries to convince her that he has given up Marxist politics. The mother rejects his pleas saying, "You must repent in front of God and you will be executed." The picture fades to Ayatollah Khomeini telling the people of Iran, "I want to see more mothers turning in their children with such courage without shedding a tear. This is what Islam is."

Well, it may or may not be what Islam is. But it is not what Iranians are.

* * *

Iran is one of the most venerable civilisations on earth: it makes China look like an adolescent, and America look like a stripling. And its 2,500-year history is sliced almost exactly in two by the rise of Islam. Accordingly, the Iranian heart is bipolar, divided between Xerxes and Muhammad, between Persepolis and Qom, between the imperially sensuous (with its luxury and poetry) and the unsmilingly pious. You will, I think, acknowledge that dividedness when I tell you that the author of this quietly beautiful quatrain –

I am a supplicant for a goblet of wine

From the hand of a sweetheart.

In whom can I confide this secret of mine,

Where can I take this sorrow?

– is the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Not Ferdowsi, not Rumi, not Hafez, not Omar Khayyam: Khomeini. It is perhaps the most beguiling single feature of Iranian life that its people go on pilgrimages, not only to the shrines of their martyrs and imams, but also to the shrines of their poets. The Iranian-Persian soul resembles the goddess Proserpina in Ted Hughes's masterly Tales from Ovid –

Proserpina, who divides her year

Between her husband in hell, among spectres,

And her mother on earth, among flowers.

Her nature, too, is divided. One moment

Gloomy as hell's king, but the next

Bright as the sun's mass, bursting from clouds.

In 1935, Iranians found themselves living in a different country – not Persia but Iran, the specifically pre-Islamic "land of the Arians". This was the work of Reza Shah (the army strongman who seized the throne in 1925). Reza Shah was a modernist and seculariser – Iran's Ataturk or Nasser. He was also a friend of Nazi Germany (and was deposed by the Allies in 1941). In 1976, Iranians found themselves living in a different millennium, not 1355 (dated from the time of the Prophet) but 2535 (dated from the time of Cyrus the Great). This was the work of Reza Shah's son. Installed by the coup of 1953 (the west's very grave historical crime, whose disastrous consequences are still with us), Muhammad Reza Shah was a "miserable wretch", as Khomeini rightly called him; but he was quite closely attuned to Iran's divided self. Reza Shah beat women who wore the veil; Khomeini beat women who didn't; Muhammad Reza Shah beat neither.

After 1979, Iran was subjected to militant and breakneck re-Islamisation. The Zoroastrian era was declared to be jahiliyyah, a benighted slum of ignorance and idolatry, and a dire embarrassment to all good Muslims. In the mid-1990s, for example, the historian Jahangir Tafazoli was put to death simply because he was the best-known specialist on ancient Iran. We would call this "killing the messenger", and we would call the entire tendency "delusional denial". The 30-year suppression of the mixed Iranian soul – which says yes to freedom and tolerance, yes to love and life and art, yes to Islam, and yes to modernity – provided the energy and courage of the June Events, and entrained the hideous murder of Neda Soltan.

* * *

So now we have another four years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who will be more purple-gummed with insecurity than ever, and another four years of troubled dreams about the Iranian bomb. I find that the one thing Ahmadinejad mandates, with full legitimacy, is a tone of ridicule – because it is impossible to write solemnly about the man who, among other absurdities, clinched the 2005 election by the simple feat of not having a Jacuzzi. And you needn't reread that sentence: the "Jacuzzi moment", or the no-Jacuzzi moment, when the candidate revealed that yes, he had no Jacuzzi, was widely credited with securing his majority. This was enough, apparently, to make him shine out in the smog of pelf and hypocrisy that passes for the Islamic Republic.

The American politician whom Ahmadinejad most closely resembles – in one vital respect – is Ronald Reagan. General similarities, I agree, are hard to spot. Ahmadinejad doesn't live on a ranch with a former starlet. Reagan didn't have a degree in traffic control. Ahmadinejad doesn't use Grecian 2000 (as his rapidly greying hair triumphantly attests). Reagan, as a young man, wasn't involved in the murder of political adversaries. And so on. But what they have in common is this: both figures are denizens of that stormlit plain where end-time theology meets nuclear weapons.

Now we can return, for a while, to dissimilarities. Ahmadinejad is not checked and balanced by democratic institutions. Reagan did not actually spend public money on civic preparations for the Second Coming, and was not the product of a culture saturated in ecstatic fantasies of morbid torment. Ahmadinejad does not have a temperament in which "simple-minded idealism" (in Eric Hobsbawm's formulation) might lead him to recognise "the sinister absurdity" of the arms race. And Reagan was not answerable to some millenarian vicar in the holy city of, say, Baltimore. Finally, whereas Reagan wielded enough firepower to kill everyone on earth several times over, Ahmadinejad does not yet have his Button.

Jesus Christ, according to both presidents, is due very shortly, but in Ahmadinejad's vision the Nazarene will merely form a part of the entourage of a much grander personage – the Hidden Imam. Who is the Hidden Imam? In the year 873, the bloodline of the Prophet came to an end when Hasan al-Askari (in Shiism, the 11th legitimate imam) died without an heir. At this point, among the believers, a classic circularity took hold. It was assumed that there must be an heir; there was no record of his existence, they reasoned, because extraordinary efforts had been made to conceal it; and extraordinary efforts had been made because this little boy was an extraordinary imam – the Mahdi, in fact, or the Lord of Time.

In Shia eschatology the Mahdi will return during a period of great tribulation (during, say, a nuclear war), will deliver the faithful from injustice and oppression, and will then supervise the Day of Judgment. Not only Ahmadinejad but members of his cabinet have been giving the Hidden Imam "about four years" – well within the president's second term. And where has the Hidden Imam dwelt since the ninth century? In "occultation", wherever that may be. The Hidden Imam is at least intelligibly called the Lord of Time: he is 1,100 years old.

Rule number one: no theocracy can ever deploy nuclear arms. And Iran, we respectfully suggest, is not yet ready for the force that drives the sun. We all know what Ahmadinejad thinks of Israel (and we remember his Islamists' conference, or his goons' rodeo, in Tehran, on the historicity of the Holocaust). Yet this is what Ali Rafsanjani thinks of Israel – Rafsanjani, the old, much-jailed revolutionary chancer, a pragmatist and reformer, hugely worldly, hugely venal: "The use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything", whereas a counterstrike on Iran will merely "harm" the Islamic world; "it is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality". Indeed, given the Shia commitment to martyrdom, mutual assured destruction, as one Israeli official put it, "is not a deterrent. It's an incentive."

Nuclear weapons, it seems, were sent down here to furnish mankind with a succession of excruciating dilemmas. Until recently the mullahs' quest for the H-bomb seemed partly containable: the nuclear powers could give face to Tehran, and begin to scale back their arsenals towards the zero option. But now those powers include North Korea (already the land of the living dead); and the Islamic Republic, in any case, no longer seems appeasable. Equipped with weapons of fission or fusion, the supreme leader may delegate first use to Hezbollah, or to the Call of Islam, or to the Legion of the Pure. Or he may himself become the first suicide bomber to be gauged in megatons.

* * *

Meanwhile, the memory of the June Events, and of Neda Soltan, will do its work, and add weight to the mass of unendurable humiliations meted out to the Iranian people. Meanwhile, too, the senescent regime (I again warily predict) will reach beyond crackdownism for the supposedly unifying effects of war. Not a war against someone its own size, or someone bigger. Tiny Bahrain, which is 60% Shia, looks about right.

As for apocalyptic Islamism, in all its forms, I cannot improve on the great Norman Cohn. This is from the 1995 foreword to Warrant for Genocide (1967), where the subject is the Tsarist fabrication The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and what Jewry calls the Shoa, or the Wind of Death:

"There exists a subterranean world where pathological fantasies disguised as ideas are churned out by crooks and half-educated fanatics [notably the lower clergy] for the benefit of the ignorant and superstitious. There are times when this underworld emerges from the depths and suddenly fascinates, captures and dominates multitudes of usually sane and responsible people, who thereupon take leave of sanity and responsibility. And it occasionally happens that this underworld becomes a political power and changes the course of history."

• Martin Amis's novel The Pregnant Widow will be published by Cape next February

Martin Amis on the beginning of the end for Iran's ayatollahs | World news | The Guardian

Op-Ed Columnist - Iran’s Tragic Joke - NYTimes.com

2009-07-23T04:30:00.001-07:00

Iran’s Tragic Joke

By ROGER COHEN

Published: July 20, 2009

NEW YORK — Allow me to quote the British novelist Martin Amis, writing about Persia in The Guardian: “Iran is one of the most venerable civilizations on earth: it makes China look like an adolescent, and America look like a stripling.”

Earl Wilson/The New York Times

Roger Cohen

Iranians, aware of that history, are a proud people. They do not take kindly to being played around with, nor to seeing their country turned into a laughingstock. They do not like the memory of an election campaign that now seems like pure theater, the expression of the sadistic whim of some puppeteer.

So the line I take away from the important Friday sermon of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the two-time former president who believes that the Islamic Republic’s future lies in compromise rather than endless confrontation, is this one: “We shouldn’t let our enemies laugh at us because we’ve imprisoned our own people.”

There’s been tragedy aplenty since June 12 — dozens of killings, thousands of arrests, countless beatings of the innocent — and I hope I belittle none of it when I say there’s also been something laughable.

What president would celebrate a “victory” by two-thirds of the vote with a clampdown resembling a putsch? What self-respecting nation would attribute the appearance in the streets of three million protesters convinced their votes were stolen to Zionists, “evil” media and British agents?

(The former British ambassador to Iran told me with a smile last January that Tehran was an interesting place to serve “because it’s one of the very few places left on earth where people still believe we have some influence!”)

What sort of country invites hundreds of journalists to witness an election only to throw them all out? What kind of revolutionary authority invokes “ethics” and “religious democracy” as it allows plain-clothes thugs to beat women?

What is to be thought of a supreme leader who calls an election result divine, then says there are some questions that need resolution by an oversight council, and then tells that council what the result of its recount is before it’s over?

Iran is not some banana republic. The events since the night of June 12 have been a shameful interlude. Iranians have not digested this grotesquery.

No, Iran is not a banana republic. It’s a sophisticated nation of 75 million people. It pretends to a significant role in the affairs of the world. It’s a land of poets who knew how to marry the sacred and the sensuous and always laughed at the idea of a truth so absolute it would not accommodate contradiction.

It’s an Islamic Republic and, as Rafsanjani said, “If the Islamic and Republican sides of the revolution are not preserved, it means that we have forgotten the principles of the revolution.”

Respecting that duality — the clerical and the republican — means that the price Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has to pay for his lifelong authority is the quadrennial holding of presidential elections that cannot remove him from office but must inform his actions.

Because Khamenei trampled on this principle, ignoring the will of the people, he created the “crisis” of which Rafsanjani spoke.

It will not abate quickly. Iranians believe the puppeteer must pay a price for such clumsy theater. Within the revolutionary establishment and within society, fissures have become chasms. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now the most divisive figure in the Islamic Republic’s 30-year history.

As Rafsanjani said: “We could have taken our best step in the history of the Islamic Revolution had the election not faced problems.”

The campaign was of an exemplary openness. Supporters of Ahmadinejad and Mir Hussein Moussavi, the reformist candidate, took to the streets without incident. Moussavi, with his impeccable revolutionary credentials, was the very emblem of unthreatening change.

But a hardline faction around Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards felt threatened — in their power, wealth and world view.

They do not believe, as Rafsanjani believes, in a China option for Iran: the possibility of normalizing relations with the U.S. and preserving the system.

While Rafsanjani spoke, Ahmadinejad was speaking in Mashad. “As soon as the new government is formed, it will enter the global sphere with a power that is 10 times greater than that of the West and overthrow the West from its hegemonic position,” he said.

I heard the president say the same thing, again and again and again, over the course of a three-hour press conference two days after the election. He is suffering from a pathology. Rafsanjani is not alone in believing it is dangerous.

A succession struggle of sorts has begun in Iran. Rafsanjani, 74, is challenging Khamenei, 70. So is Mohammad Khatami, the reformist former president who called Sunday for a referendum on the legitimacy of the election. They are saying Iran is a great and proud nation: open the prisons, free the press, allow debate, do not make a laughingstock of our institutions. That, they insist, is the only form of loyalty to the Revolution.

It’s also the only action worthy of a millennial nation. The joke has been too foul to stand.

Op-Ed Columnist - Iran’s Tragic Joke - NYTimes.com

Foreign Policy In Focus | Iran: Code Orange?

2009-07-07T14:20:00.001-07:00

Iran: Code Orange?

Yelena Biberman | June 30, 2009

Editor: John Feffer

Foreign Policy In Focus

www.fpif.org

"Iran is now on the verge of an Orange-style Revolution." This statement is likely to elicit enthusiasm from those working tirelessly to promote democracy in Iran.

However, the term "Orange Revolution" has become a misnomer. Yes, the Ukrainian uprising was "Orange." But it was not a revolution. Ultimately, it brought no fundamental change to Ukrainian politics and bred further corruption. Today, less than five years later, the vast majority of those who participated in the protests no longer support their leader. If Victor Yushchenko ran for president again, he would have no real chance of winning the election.

With Iran now closer to change than it has been over the past 20 years, a Ukrainian-style transformation should not be the goal of those who seek democracy in Iran. An incomplete revolution would be worse than a full one. As the Ukrainian case has shown, such a half step would discredit and dishearten those who believe that fundamental change is possible and very likely bring about a political relapse.

Parallels with Ukraine

As in the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the current political disarray in Iran was sparked by allegations of electoral fraud and is characterized by the major role of young people. Like the dramatic events that took place in Ukraine, it's also a result of years of pent-up frustration, helplessness, and hope, especially among members of the young post-revolutionary generation. It's also a product of serious organizational capacity, though significantly lower in Iran that it was in Ukraine due to the more oppressive nature of the regime. And in Iran, it's not yet clear who is doing the organizing.

The key ingredient in both episodes has been youth. Iran is a young country. The majority of the country's population is under the age of 30, with the median age now being 27. In fact, Iran's current youth population (between 15 and 30 years old) is the largest it has ever been in the history of the country.

The Iranian state has failed to meet young people's growing demand for economic opportunities, moral guidance, and even basic needs. A record number of young Iranians are consequently emigrating, marrying later in life, and turning to drugs. As one Iranian émigré has recently shared with me, there has also been a wave of conversion to other religions as a sign of protest against the clerical regime.

Young people played an important role in the landslide victory of reformist Mohammad Khatami in 1997, but soon became disappointed with Khatami's inability to deliver the promised reforms. Student protests were common in the early 2000s, but died down by the time Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office.

On March 17, 2009, when Khatami withdrew his candidacy for the country's June 12 election and announced that he would support fellow reformist Mousavi, few doubted that Mousavi would spark the imagination of the young. At the same time, experts cautioned that Mousavi's victory, like the victories of Khatami in 1997 and 2001, would be no guarantee of major change in Iran due to the Islamic Republic's power structure.

Khamenei's Blunder

If it wanted to prevent fundamental change, Iran's ruling elite made a brilliant blunder by engineering Mousavi's defeat. The defeat of Mousavi acted to mobilize the population (of Tehran) and raised its expectations of fundamental change, should Mousavi come to power. As the regime cracked down on the protesters, it inadvertently transformed the issue of contention from election fraud to the legitimacy of the clerical rule.

However, like Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine, Mousavi would not have brought revolutionary change. He has challenged the outcome of a presidential election, but he hasn't truly challenged the country's political structure and institutions. Without such a challenge, a modern revolution cannot succeed in Iran.

The Iranian government's second blunder was the arrest of members of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani's family. Rafsanjani heads both the powerful Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts, which has the authority to monitor and remove the supreme leader. He's also the founder of the Islamic Azad University, a mega university with over a million students. In other words, angering Rafsanjani will no doubt further fuel the fire of Iranian youth discontent.

The Iranian ruling elite has learned nothing from the Orange popular uprising in Ukraine. In Ukraine, the slip-up was Russian President Vladimir Putin's premature congratulation of Viktor Yanukovych's victory. As Yanukovych appeared to have been handpicked by the Kremlin, so did Ahmadinejad seem handpicked by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In both cases the people didn't have any say, but clearly had something very important to tell their government.

The most important lesson for the Iranian opposition to take away from the Orange uprising is the realization that bringing Mousavi to power won't be enough. Yushchenko, victor of the "Orange Revolution," now enjoys a 2% popularity rating. He has no chance of being re-elected in the next presidential election, scheduled to take place in January 2010. In fact, Ukrainian voters may pick Yanukovich. For those inside Iran and those outside, putting all of one's faith in Mousavi as Iran's best chance for democracy is misguided.

Foreign Policy In Focus contributor Yelena Biberman is currently serving as an IREX U.S. Embassy Policy Specialist in Kiev, Ukraine. She is also a doctoral candidate at Brown University (The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any government agency or organization to which she is affiliated.).

Foreign Policy In Focus | Iran: Code Orange?

Political Cortex: CIA Chronicles: Destroying Democracy in Iran for British Petroleum

2009-06-05T05:16:00.001-07:00

CIA Chronicles: Destroying Democracy in Iran for British Petroleum

By Bill Hare
06/03/2009 05:05:04 PM EST

We read and hear every day what a trouble spot Iran is to America and the world. "If only they would understand us" is one pet saying delivered with the shake of a head and a loud accompanying sigh.

A search through history, in this and other instances, reveals why Iran took the steps it did to bring it to its current chapter where the mainstream media engages in perpetual hand wringing over what is perceived as the policies of "crazies."

To those who have not studied the history of post-World War Two in Iran the idea of Iranians having their own functioning democracy existing under an elected popular leader can expect to be greeted with a dismaying stare and a comment of "Couldn't be! We're not talking about the same country. Not in Iran."

Understandably the mainstream media along with corporate giants, particularly in the global oil sphere, are not eager for the real history of Iran to be revealed. It becomes embarrassing and downright disconcerting.

Iran had a popular prime minister named Mohammed Mossadegh. There were no controversies surrounding his election as there were the two elections of America's oil cartel and New World Order favorite George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004.

Mossadegh, a man looking after the economic interests of the people who voted him into power, did not like the fact that outside powers controlled the oil that flowed within Iran. He decided to nationalize Iran's plentiful oil supply.

A plan was hatched to use of the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency that had been created under President Harry Truman as the successor of the Office of Strategic Services that was the government's international intelligence instrument during the World War Two period.

The most popular politician in the nation, Mohammed Mossadegh was elected Prime Minister of Iran in 1951. His major election plank was nationalization of the only oil company operating in the nation at the time, British Petroleum, a measure implemented into law by unanimous passage by the Iranian Parliament.

As Mark Zepezauer stated in "The CIA's Greatest Hits", "Though Mossadegh offered BP considerable compensation, his days were numbered from that point on. The British coordinated an international economic embargo of Iran, throwing its economy into chaos. And the CIA, at the request of the British, began spending millions of dollars on ways to get rid of Mossadegh."

Archie Roosevelt, the grandson of former president Theodore, late in his life confessed his involvement in the overthrow of a leader holding the support of the majority of the Iranian people and his replacement by the reliable young Shah of Iran, Reha Pahlavi.

In 1953, with the CIA supplying needed clout, Mossadegh was removed from office. When demonstrators filled the streets supporting Mossadegh, the Shah fled for Rome.

The CIA sought to restore control on the side of British Petroleum and the oil global order by providing pro-Shah demonstrators. Some of them seized a radio station, proclaiming that Mossadegh had been deposed and that the Shah would be shortly returning.

A nine hour tank battle erupted in the streets of Tehran in a successful effort to remove Iran's popularly elected leader. The Shah returned from Italy while Mossadegh was compelled to spend the rest of his life under house arrest.

SAVAK, the CIA-trained security police of the Shah, by 1976 was cited by Amnesty International for possessing the worst human rights record in the world. The savage torture techniques SAVAK employed are reminiscent of what have been more recently employed by U.S. government functionaries at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.

Meanwhile a radical Islamic cleric living in exile in Paris awaited the right moment. When unpopularity of the Shah and his vicious SAVAK agents reached its peak a revolution occurred and the formerly exiled Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran to take control.

So what is the complaint against Iran today? -- That it has a radical Islamic fundamentalist government.

How many analysts transport us back to the roots of change that occurred after a popularly installed leader was removed from office in a CIA-orchestrated coup? Could there just possibly be a correlation between events of then and now?

Does the mainstream media wish to do a documentary on the CIA, British Petroleum, and the link between those events of the early fifties and what transpired in the better than two generations that transpired in Iran?

KEYWORDS: CIA Coup in Iran, Archie Roosevelt, Shah of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, Ayatollah Khomeini

Political Cortex: CIA Chronicles: Destroying Democracy in Iran for British Petroleum

Report Ties Dubious Iran Nuclear Docs to Israel by Gareth Porter -- Antiwar.com

2009-06-05T05:13:00.001-07:00

Report Ties Dubious Iran Nuclear Docs to Israel

by Gareth Porter, June 04, 2009

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A report on Iran’s nuclear program issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month generated news stories publicizing an incendiary charge that U.S. intelligence is underestimating Iran’s progress in designing a "nuclear warhead" before the halt in nuclear weapons-related research in 2003.

That false and misleading charge from an intelligence official of a foreign country, who was not identified but was clearly Israeli, reinforces two of Israel’s key propaganda themes on Iran – that the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran is wrong, and that Tehran is poised to build nuclear weapons as soon as possible.
But it also provides new evidence that Israeli intelligence was the source of the collection of intelligence documents which have been used to accuse Iran of hiding nuclear weapons research.
The Committee report, dated May 4, cited unnamed "foreign analysts" as claiming intelligence that Iran ended its nuclear weapons-related work in 2003 because it had mastered the design and tested components of a nuclear weapon and thus didn’t need to work on it further until it had produced enough sufficient material.
That conclusion, which implies that Iran has already decided to build nuclear weapons, contradicts both the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, and current intelligence analysis. The NIE concluded that Iran had ended nuclear weapons-related work in 2003 because of increased international scrutiny, and that it was "less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005."
The report included what appears to be a spectacular revelation from "a senior allied intelligence official" that a collection of intelligence documents supposedly obtained by U.S. intelligence in 2004 from an Iranian laptop computer includes "blueprints for a nuclear warhead."
It quotes the unnamed official as saying that the blueprints "precisely matched" similar blueprints the official’s own agency "had obtained from other sources inside Iran."
No U.S. or IAEA official has ever claimed that the so-called laptop documents included designs for a "nuclear warhead." The detailed list in a May 26, 2008 IAEA report of the contents of what have been called the "alleged studies" – intelligence documents on alleged Iranian nuclear weapons work — made no mention of any such blueprints.
In using the phrase "blueprints for a nuclear warhead," the unnamed official was evidently seeking to conflate blueprints for the reentry vehicle of the Iranian Shehab missile, which were among the alleged Iranian documents, with blueprints for nuclear weapons.
When New York Times reporters William J. Broad and David E. Sanger used the term "nuclear warhead" to refer to a reentry vehicle in a Nov. 13, 2005 story on the intelligence documents on the Iranian nuclear program, it brought sharp criticism from David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security.
"This distinction is not minor," Albright observed, "and Broad should understand the differences between the two objects, particularly when the information does not contain any words such as nuclear or nuclear warhead."
The Senate report does not identify the country for which the analyst in question works, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff refused to respond to questions about the report from IPS, including the reason why the report concealed the identity of the country for which the unidentified "senior allied intelligence official" works.
Reached later in May, the author of the report, Douglas Frantz, told IPS he is under strict instructions not to speak with the news media.
After a briefing on the report for selected news media immediately after its release, however, the Associated Press reported May 6 that interviews were conducted in Israel. Frantz was apparently forbidden by Israeli officials from revealing their national affiliation as a condition for the interviews.
Frantz, a former journalist for the Los Angeles Times, had extensive contacts with high-ranking Israeli military, intelligence and foreign ministry officials before joining the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. He and co-author Catherine Collins conducted interviews with those Israeli officials for The Nuclear Jihadist, published in 2007. The interviews were all conducted under rules prohibiting disclosure of their identities, according to the book.
The unnamed Israeli intelligence officer’s statement that the "blueprints for a nuclear warhead" — meaning specifications for a missile reentry vehicle - were identical to "designs his agency had obtained from other sources in Iran" suggests that the documents collection which the IAEA has called "alleged studies" actually originated in Israel.
A U.S.-based nuclear weapons analyst who has followed the "alleged studies" intelligence documents closely says he understands that the documents obtained by U.S. intelligence in 2004 were not originally stored on the laptop on which they were located when they were brought in by an unidentified Iranian source, as U.S. officials have claimed to U.S. journalists.
The analyst, who insists on not being identified, says the documents were collected by an intelligence network and then assembled on a single laptop.
The anonymous Israeli intelligence official’s claim, cited in the Committee report, that the "blueprints" in the "alleged studies" collection matched documents his agency had gotten from its own source seems to confirm the analyst’s finding that Israeli intelligence assembled the documents.
German officials have said that the Mujahedin-e-Khalq or MEK, the Iranian resistance organization, brought the laptop documents collection to the attention of U.S. intelligence, as reported by IPS in February 2008. Israeli ties with the political arm of the MEK, the National Committee of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), go back to the early 1990s and include assistance to the organization in broadcasting into Iran from Paris.
The NCRI publicly revealed the existence of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in August 2002. However, that and other intelligence apparently came from Israeli intelligence. The Israeli co-authors of The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran, Yossi Melman and Meir Javeanfar, revealed that "Western" intelligence was "laundered" to hide its actual provenance by providing it to Iranian opposition groups, especially NCRI, in order to get it to the IAEA.
They cite U.S., British and Israeli officials as sources for the revelation.
New Yorker writer Connie Bruck wrote in a March 2006 article that an Israeli diplomat confirmed to her that Israel had found the MEK "useful" but declined to elaborate.
Israeli intelligence is also known to have been actively seeking to use alleged Iranian documents to prove that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program just at the time the intelligence documents which eventually surfaced in 2004 would have been put together.
The most revealing glimpse of Israeli use of such documents to influence international opinion on Iran’s nuclear program comes from the book by Frantz and Collins. They report that Israel’s international intelligence agency Mossad created a special unit in the summer of 2003 to carry out a campaign to provide secret briefings on the Iranian nuclear program, which sometimes included "documents from inside Iran and elsewhere."
The "alleged studies" collection of documents has never been verified as genuine by either the IAEA or by intelligence analysts. The Senate report said senior United Nations officials and foreign intelligence officials who had seen "many of the documents" in the collection of alleged Iranian military documents had told committee staff "it is impossible to rule out an elaborate intelligence ruse."

Report Ties Dubious Iran Nuclear Docs to Israel by Gareth Porter -- Antiwar.com

Report Takes Fresh Look at Iranian Regime, Challenges U.S. Assumptions - washingtonpost.com

2009-05-26T19:24:00.001-07:00

Report Questions Conventional Wisdom About Iranian Regime

An Iranian soldier stands guard as other troops in camouflage march during an Army Day ceremony outside Tehran. (By Hasan Sarbakhshian -- Associated Press)

By Walter Pincus

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

"Tehran feels vulnerable, both from outside and from within."

That is just one of a handful of intriguing findings in a study released by the Rand Corp. last week that challenges conventional American thinking about the Iranian regime.

The U.S. Air Force Directorate of Operational Plans and Joint Matters sponsored the study, given Iran's apparent drive to develop nuclear weapons and the likelihood that the United States would use air power as a "first resort" military response to meet that threat.

Faced with that situation, the report's authors decided to take a fresh look at what could be expected from Iran over the next decade, measured against not only the country's military and economic strengths and religious influence but also its "serious liabilities and limitations."

U.S. policies over the past nine years eliminated the most serious threat to Iran, Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, and an American-led coalition has been fighting against the Taliban, another potential enemy of Iran. Still, there remains "a myriad of threats and vulnerabilities that challenge Iran in the current strategic environment," according to the Rand report.

"We found significant barriers and buffers to Iran's strategic reach rooted in both the regional geo-politics it is trying to influence and in its limited conventional military capacity, diplomatic isolation, and past strategic missteps," the report says.

The study calls attention to sectarian violence and Sunni-inspired terrorism in two key Iranian provinces, Khuzestan and Baluchistan, where opposition exists against the Shiite regime in Tehran. In addition, the report says that Tehran's religious hierarchy is worried about theological and political challenges emerging from Shiite seminaries in Iraq.

"The Shiite learning centers of Najaf and Karbala [in Iraq] long dominated Shiite discourse before being suppressed by Baathist regimes," according to the study. They are reemerging and have the potential to overshadow their Iranian counterparts in Qom, the seat of Shiite scholarship. The study notes that many Shiites in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, for example, "look to the seminaries in Najaf, particularly Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, instead of the Iranian Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] for spiritual and political guidance."

And although Iran has supported Shiite militant groups in Iraq, the report says, "Iranian funds and military assistance are not essential to the survival of major Shiite political factions." Instead, some of the groups receiving aid from Tehran are "promoting an image of Iraqi nationalism for domestic support and thus prefer to maintain a degree of separation from Tehran."

Iran has long provided financial and military aid to Islamist groups such as Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The study, however, raises doubts that in the event of a U.S. attack against Iran, "the willingness of these groups to retaliate purely in the service of Tehran should not be assumed as automatic." The report's authors conclude that "it is best to conceive of Iran as exerting influence over its Shiite allies, but not control."

The study also questions conventional wisdom about Iran's military capabilities. Iranian leaders have created a multilayered military, in part because of a relatively weak army "mired down in conventional doctrine because of bureaucratic inertia in procurement and frequent infighting." Its equipment is aging and poorly maintained.

Iran's overlapping security structure "is beset with factionalism," according to the study. Decision making requires consensus among competing groups that consist of the office and associates of Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the military and intelligence communities, and finally the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Revolutionary Guard provides much of the support to Hamas, Hezbollah and other militant groups outside Iran. It also has major missile weaponry and a network of businesses, making it a player in foreign policy and domestic politics.

But there is frequent squabbling between the Revolutionary Guard and conventional forces, according to the study. Beyond these groups are the bonyads, charitable trusts that control almost 40 percent of Iran's wealth and support Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard; the bazaari business community; and the religious sector. The factionalism of this system leads to inconsistencies in the approach toward the United States but at the same time makes it difficult for Iran to change course rapidly, the study says.

Despite Iran's rhetoric, the study concludes that Tehran does not seek to enlarge its territory or force its brand of Islamic revolution on its neighbors. Instead, the report cautions that "the ideology and bravado of Iran's President Ahmadinejad and its religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik -- the qualities that define 'normal' state behavior."

Report Takes Fresh Look at Iranian Regime, Challenges U.S. Assumptions - washingtonpost.com

ElBaradei: Iranians "Are Not Fanatics" | Newsweek International | Newsweek.com

2009-05-23T21:07:00.001-07:00

Samuel Kubani / AFP-Getty Images

ElBaradei in March 2008

Mohamed ElBaradei: ‘They are not Fanatics’

The director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency on what it's like to negotiate with the Iranians.

By Christopher Dickey | NEWSWEEK

Published May 23, 2009

From the magazine issue dated Jun 1, 2009

Zakaria: What You Know About Iran is Wrong

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ElBaradei: Iran Wants to Be Part of Global Community

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As head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei has spent the past 11 years trying to keep Iran from getting nuclear weapons. The Nobel Peace Prize winner recently spoke to NEWSWEEK'S Christopher Dickey about his intense, often frustrating dialogue with the Iranians—and with the Americans. Excerpts:

ElBaradei: Iranians 'Are Not Fanatics'

President Barack Obama addressed a conciliatory video message to Iran two months ago, but the dialogue seems to have gone very quiet since then. Why do you think that is?
Obama does not talk "carrot and stick"—which, it's been said, is a policy suitable for a donkey but not for a proud nation. He talks about mutual respect. And you have no idea, when he said for the first time, as an American president, "the Islamic Republic of Iran," how well that was received by the Iranians. But that has not been followed up by negotiations because the Americans are going through a review of their policy. And the Iranians are not in a rush because they are going through an election and because, as very good bazaaris, they want to know the outcome of the [U.S.] review.
The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel's Prime Minister has complicated matters. He's left open the possibility Israel will attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
Unfortunately, we have to keep saying what we have been saying for years (and being vilified for it by the neocons): there is no military solution. There is only a diplomatic solution. Israeli President Shimon Peres made the point that you cannot bomb the knowledge [of Iranian nuclear scientists]. I wish that sort of thing had been said three years ago.

Had the Bush administration been more flexible, do you think it could have had a deal to freeze the Iranian enrichment program in its experimental phases?
There is no way you are able to deny them the knowledge. But if they do not have the industrial capacity, they do not have weapons. It is as simple as that. I have seen the Iranians ready to accept putting a cap on their enrichment [program] in terms of tens of centrifuges, and then in terms of hundreds of centrifuges. But nobody even tried to engage them on these offers. Now Iran has 5,000 centrifuges. The line was, "Iran will buckle under pressure." But this issue has become so ingrained in the Iranian soul as a matter of national pride. They talk about their nuclear program as if they had gone to the moon. And they also understood—unfortunately, not wrongly—that if you have the know-how, you're still kosher within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And yet you are sending a message: I can do this; I have bought myself an insurance policy, and you don't want to mess with me.

When the United States issued its national intelligence estimate in 2007 indicating that Iran had halted its nuclear-weapons program in 2003, that came as something of a shock at the IAEA, which hadn't known about the program in the first place.
We could not have detected that weapons program. We are not an army that can barge in without notice. [The Americans] claim that there are [Iranian] blueprints showing how to put nuclear payloads into one of their Shahab-3 missiles, as well as plans for how to detonate a nuclear weapon—there is no way I would have discovered that, somewhere in some small lab on someone's computer.

You focus on actual nuclear material. But the Americans have supplied the IAEA with the documents in question. The Iranians insist they are fake and refuse to talk about them.
A lot is in documents which we cannot share with the Iranians because of the need to protect sources and methods. Iran says, how can I tell you if it is fake or authentic if I am not getting a copy? So in many ways it's like a merry-go-round.

Tell me a little more about the Iranians' bargaining style.
The Iranians have always been extremely well briefed on the details. They know what they want. They are excellent on the strategic goals, excellent on waiting for the right price. I don't want to make them sound like superhumans; you do see a lot of infighting among them. And part of it is about who is going to get credit for finally breaking out of this 30 years of fighting and confrontation with the United States. Everybody is positioning himself to be the national hero who would finally put Iran back onto the world map as part of the mainstream. They are not like the stereotyped fanatics bent on destroying everybody around them. They are not.

© 2009

ElBaradei: Iranians "Are Not Fanatics" | Newsweek International | Newsweek.com

New York Times Falsifies Obama-Netanyahu Meeting

2009-05-21T15:49:00.001-07:00

by Prof. David Bromwich

Global Research, May 19, 2009

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The New York Times assigned to the story a campaign-trail reporter, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, whose political perceptions are bland and whose knowledge of Israeli-American relations is an antiseptic zero. At the newspaper of record, a thing like that does not happen by accident. They took the most anxiously awaited meeting with a foreign leader of President Obama's term thus far, and buried it on page 12. The coverage of a major event, which the same newspaper had greeted only the day before by running an oversize attack-Iran op-ed by Jeffrey Goldberg, has officially now shrunk to the scale of a smaller op-ed.

What is more disturbing and far more consequential is that the Times made this meeting into a story about Iran. They read into Obama's careful and measured remarks exactly the hostile intention toward Iran and the explicit deadline for results from his negotiations with Iran that Obama had taken great pains to avoid stating. Obama's relevant remark was this:

My expectation would be that if we can begin discussions soon, shortly after the Iranian elections, we should have a fairly good sense by the end of the year as to whether they are moving in the right direction and whether the parties involved are making progress and that there's a good faith effort to resolve differences. That doesn't mean every issue would be resolved by that point, but it does mean that we'll probably be able to gauge and do a reassessment by the end of the year of this approach. "Shortly after," "fairly good sense," "the right direction," "good faith effort," "probably," "by the end of the year." This was a language chosen deliberately to cool the fever of Netanyahu and his far-right War Coalition in Israel. But Stolberg, writing for the Times, converts these hedged and vague suggestions into a revelation that Obama for the first time seemed "willing to set even a general timetable for progress in talks with Iran."

In fact, as any reader of the transcript may judge, President Obama sounded a more urgent note about the progress Israel ought to make in yielding what it long has promised to the Palestinian people. Palestine was the proper name that dominated Obama's side of the news conference. In the Times story, by contrast, the word Iran occurs three times before the first mention of "Palestinians." Iran is mentioned twice more before the words West Bank are uttered once.

Regarding the necessity of a Palestinian state, President Obama was explicit:

We have seen progress stalled on this front, and I suggested to the Prime Minister that he has an historic opportunity to get a serious movement on this issue during his tenure. And when Netanyahu said the Israeli attitude toward Palestine would completely depend on the details of progress toward securing Iran against the acquisition of a single nuclear weapon, Obama replied that his view was almost the reverse. In a leader as averse as Barack Obama to the slightest public hint of personal conflict, this was a critical moment in the exchange; how far, a reporter asked Obama, did he assent to the Netanyahu concept of "linkage" -- the idea that first the U.S. must deal with Iran, and a more obliging Israeli approach to Palestine will surely follow. Obama answered:

I recognize Israel's legitimate concerns about the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon when they have a president who has in the past said that Israel should not exist. That would give any leader of any country pause. Having said that, if there is a linkage between Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, I personally believe it actually runs the other way. To the extent that we can make peace with the Palestinians -- between the Palestinians and the Israelis -- then I actually think it strengthens our hand in the international community in dealing with a potential Iranian threat. This was a reluctantly formulated but direct and inescapable inversion of the Netanyahu doctrine on linkage. Not a trace of it appears in the Times account.

Finally, Gaza was much in President Obama's mind and on his conscience at this meeting; so much so that he broke decorum and stepped out of his way to mention it:

The fact is, is that if the people of Gaza have no hope, if they can't even get clean water at this point, if the border closures are so tight that it is impossible for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts to take place, then that is not going to be a recipe for Israel's long-term security or a constructive peace track to move forward. And yet not a word from Stolberg and the Times about these words of Obama's on Gaza. Nor was any analytic piece offered as a supplement -- the usual procedure in assessing an event of this importance.

To sum up, what happened at the meeting can be judged plainly enough by the news conference that followed. Binyamin Netanyahu tried to make it all about Iran. Obama declined, and spoke again and again about the importance of peace in the entire region, and the crucial role that Israel would have to play by freezing the West Bank settlements and negotiating in good faith to achieve a Palestinian state.

Let us end where we began, with Barack Obama on the good of peaceable relations with Iran, and the New York Times on the importance of thinking such relations are close to impossible.

President Obama: "You know, I don't want to set an artificial deadline."

Now the Times headline: "Obama Tells Netanyahu He Has a Timetable on Iran." And the Times front-page teaser for their A12 story: "Obama's Iran Timetable."

The decision-makers at the New York Times are acting again as if their readers had no other means of checking the facts they report. They are saying the thing that is not, without remembering that the record which refutes them has become easily and quickly available. A great newspaper is dying. And on the subject of Israel, it is doing its best to earn its death-warrant.
David Bromwich is Professor of Literature at Yale

New York Times Falsifies Obama-Netanyahu Meeting

CIA chief: 'Big trouble' if Israel attacks Iran alone - Haaretz - Israel News

2009-05-20T05:09:00.001-07:00

CIA chief: 'Big trouble' if Israel attacks Iran alone

By Haaretz Service

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon Panetta said in remarks published Tuesday that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows that if Israel were to independently attack Iran it would lead to "big trouble."
Panetta told political quarterly Global Viewpoint on Monday that it is clear that Israel is concerned about the possibility of Iran producing nuclear weapons, but added that Israel's security would be better served if the government worked together with international powers to curb the threat.
"The threat posed by Iran has our full attention," Panetta said. "Iran is a destabilizing force in the Middle East. Even though the administration is moving toward diplomatic engagement with that country, no one is naive about the challenges."

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Panetta continued, "The judgment of the U.S. intelligence community is that Iran, at a minimum, is keeping open the option to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. It is our judgment that Iran halted weaponization in 2003, but it continues to develop uranium enrichment technology and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles."
Assessing Iran's intentions is a top priority, according to Panetta, who said, "The last thing we need in the Middle East is a nuclear arms race."
An Israeli official said on Tuesday that Israel will be forced to take on Iran's contentious nuclear program alone once U.S. President Barack Obama's overture for dialogue with Tehran fails.
The official was quoted by Channel 10 as saying that Obama's insistence on engagement with Iran would force Israel to make a "difficult decision" on the matter by the end of 2009.
Netanyahu and U.S. lawmakers said earlier Tuesday that Israel and the United States had agreed that Iran must not be allowed to continue its developing its nuclear capabilities.

CIA chief: 'Big trouble' if Israel attacks Iran alone - Haaretz - Israel News

Obama Steers Toward Endless War With Islam by Michael Scheuer -- Antiwar.com

2009-05-20T05:00:00.001-07:00

In just over 100 days, President Obama is on the verge of ensuring that militant Islam’s war on America will be waged for decades to come and its forces will never suffer manpower or money shortages. How did he accomplish so much in some little time? He simply behaved as all U.S. political leaders behave; that is, as an ignorant and arrogant interventionist.

Let us take the ignorant part first. Since Jan. 20, Obama and his band of Israel-Firsters have shown the Muslim world – moderate, conservative, radical, and fanatic – that George W. Bush was no one-off fluke, that Democrats intend to wage war on Islam just like the Republicans. How so? Well, look at Obama’s decisions and actions. They can only be explained by accepting that the new president is ignorant of our Islamist foes, either by choice or because the ability to read is not required to graduate at Harvard.

For 13 years, Osama bin Laden, his lieutenants, their allies, and numerous anti-Islamist commentators across the Middle East have patiently, repeatedly, and explicitly explained to the bipartisan U.S. governing elite and its media and academic acolytes that the Islamists attacking America do not give a tinker’s damn about its lifestyle, liberties, freedoms, or elections. Orally and in print, U.S. leaders have been told what motivates the Islamists’ war on America is the U.S. government’s foreign policies in the Muslim world. Foremost among these are U.S. support for Muslim tyrannies, the U.S. military’s presence in Muslim lands, and unqualified U.S. support for Israel.

And what have Obama and his advisers done with this excellent intelligence about enemy motivation, which, by the way, comes straight from the horse’s mouth? Well, they clearly ignored it, and by deciding to operate in an intelligence-free environment Obama has acted in a way that will intensify and prolong the Islamists’ war against the United States. How so?

On the tyranny front, Obama chose to go to Turkey for his first visit to the Muslim world. That country is formally governed by an Islamic party, but it is actually ruled by a thoroughly Westernized general staff ready to pounce on and dismantle the Islamic regime if its gets too religiously ambitious. Needless to say, Turkey is regarded by many Muslims as having long ago sold its Islamic soul by joining the "Christian" NATO alliance.

Obama then proceeded to acknowledge America’s oil vassalage to Saudi Arabia when, on being introduced, he bowed to Saudi King Abdullah, the master of the Saudi police state. The president also chose to speak his first televised words to Muslims in an interview on al-Arabiya television, the mouthpiece of the Saudi tyranny.

Obama next said that he will go to Egypt to address Muslims in a speech he promised during the presidential campaign. This visit will show Obama prating about the glories of secular democracy and the peacefulness of Islam while standing cheek-by-jowl with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, chief warden of the Muslim world’s premier police state.

On the military side, Obama has announced plans to send 21,000 more U.S. troops to what Muslims call "the defiant land of jihad, Afghanistan." The arrival of those troops – too few to win but enough to slow our defeat – will be portrayed by al-Jazeera, the BBC, and especially the Saudis’ anti-American shills at al-Arabiya as a brutal re-invasion of Afghanistan.

Obama was silent while Israel invaded and wrecked Gaza last winter; has appointed an IDF veteran as his chief of staff – think of the espionage potential in that move; has watched the proliferation of Israeli settlements; and has re-imposed sanctions on Syria and kept war with Iran on the front burner. His Justice Department has also exempted from prosecution Israel-First Americans and their agents in the Congress.

Like former president Bush, then, Obama has kept himself ignorant of the Islamists’ motivation and is playing directly into their hands; indeed, bin Laden, with all his road-building skills, could not pave a smoother path to hell for America. In taking this tack, Obama also displays the abiding arrogance that permeates our governing elite, an attitude that causes them to believe that both Muslims and Americans are stupid. If you doubt this, listen to the sophomoric words of White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs as he tries to make sure that no one looks behind the curtain of Mubarak’s tyranny when Obama speaks in Egypt:

"[T]his isn’t a speech to leaders. This is a speech to many, many people and a continuing effort by this president and this White House to demonstrate how we can work together to ensure the safety and security and the future well-being through hope and opportunity of the children of this country and of the Muslim world."

Well, Mr. Gibbs, as one of Obama’s predecessors once said, you can’t fool all of the people all of the time. Elected on a pledge to end Bush’s wars, Obama has instead ensured their extension by actions sure to further inflame Islamists and, indeed, most Muslims governed by royal, military, or elected-for-life tyrants. As it becomes clear that Obama’s administration is miring America deeper in a war with Islam that benefits only Israel, he and his advisers will repeat the mantra long intoned by Israeli politicians: "We tried our best to better relations with Islam, but we were rebuffed and so now Americans must soldier on in endless wars." This will be a lie. Obama may use softer rhetoric, but he is loyal to the status quo interventionism Washington practices no matter which party holds power.

The only redeeming aspect of Obama’s 100-plus-day foreign-policy debacle is that his deceit is about played out. He will fool no Muslims. His courting of Westernized Turkish generals, bowing to King Abdullah, and joining Mubarak in a cheer for freedom will tell Muslims all they need to know about U.S. intentions in their region. Likewise, Obama’s expanding war in Afghanistan and his kowtowing to Israel and American Israel-Firsters will give the lie to his claim that Washington is now an honest broker in the Middle East.

Americans will be slower off the mark than Muslims, but they will soon see that Democrats share the Republicans’ eagerness to wage unnecessary wars at the cost of their children and taxes. The inevitable need for more troops and money to stave off U.S. defeat in Afghanistan, the increased Islamist attacks on U.S. interests at home and abroad, and – most of all – the unraveling of "success" in Iraq (which, in turn, will prevent a U.S. withdrawal that would be lethal to Israel) will be seen by Americans for what they are: the price of an ignorant, arrogant interventionism that is ruining not only America’s economy and domestic cohesion, but their kids’ future prosperity and security. At this point, a long overdue foreign-policy debate can begin. It will give Americans a last chance to realign the republic’s foreign policy with the tenets of Washington’s Farewell Address and, in so doing, forever break the corrupting power of the Israel-Firsters, individuals who Washington uncannily described in 1796 as "ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens … [who] betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country."

Pray to God this occurs before a cynical, racist Benjamin Netanyahu presents Obama with a fait accompli that drags 300 million Americans into Israel’s war against Iran.

Obama Steers Toward Endless War With Islam by Michael Scheuer -- Antiwar.com

U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT ON IRAN

2009-05-20T04:54:00.001-07:00

GROUNDBREAKING U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT ON IRAN
EWI Contact: Sarosh Syed, New York
19-May-2009, New York, NY -

NEW YORK. May 19. The EastWest Institute (EWI) released today a U.S.-Russia joint threat assessment on Iran’s nuclear and missile potential. More than a year in the making, the report was produced by a team of Russian and American scientists and experts brought together by EWI. “The EastWest Institute is proud to have facilitated such an unprecedented effort,” said John Edwin Mroz, President and CEO of the EastWest Institute. “We hope that this joint threat assessment by Russians and Americans will serve to inform a more collaborative and robust response to the Iranian program.”

Click here to download the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's nuclear and missile potential (367K PDF)

The report finds that Iran could produce a simple nuclear device within one to three years. It could develop a nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles in six to eight years. It further finds that Iran will not be able, for at least ten to fifteen years, to independently master the technologies necessary for advanced intermediate-range ballistic missiles or intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Those timetables could be accelerated, the report notes, if Iran were to receive substantial outside help. While stressing that they do not know Iran’s political intentions, the report’s authors call on the U.S. and Russia to explore cooperative responses if Iran should try to “break out” as a nuclear power.

“It wasn't easy to produce a report both sides could agree on,” said Grigory Chernyavsky, Chairman of the Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Arms Control and one of the Russian contributors to the report. “But the final result provides a solid technical base for decision-making.”

The report’s participants warn that European missile defenses will not provide dependable protection against an Iranian threat if and when it emerges. They suggest that an effective response requires cooperation between Russia and the U.S. on missile defense, avoiding the kind of tensions that have arisen over the planned deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

"The important thing is for the U.S. and Russia to cooperate in resolving the urgent crisis arising from the Iranian program," said David Holloway, one of the contributors to the report and a faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

The idea of conducting the joint threat assessment on Iran first surfaced on October 27, 2007, when EWI convened a meeting of its U.S.-Russia Group on Counter-terrorism and Strategic Security in Moscow. The U.S. team was led by retired General James L. Jones and the Russian team by Ambassador Anatoly Safonov, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation.

The conclusions and recommendations in the report are the group’s own—EWI was pleased to convene the group and provide the space and resources for them to do their work, but did not exercise editorial control of the contents.

Click here to download the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's nuclear and missile potential (367K PDF)

Contacts:
Sarosh Syed, +1-646-662-1913, ssyed@ewi.info
Jean Dumont de Chassart, +32 (2) 743-4610, jdc@ewi.info

The following technical addenda are the contribution of Dr. Theodore Postol,
Professor of Science, Technology, and International Security at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. These addenda do not necessarily
represent the views of the other members of the study group. For additional information about the addenda, please contact Ted Postol at postol@mit.edu

Technical Addendum On Defense Against Iranian Ballistic Missiles (2.7MB PDF)

Technical Addendum On Iran's Ballistic Missile Program (2.8MB PDF)

http://www.ewi.info/announcements/news/index.cfm?title=News&view=detail&nid=716&aid=7722

Op-Ed Columnist - Iran and Israel - NYTimes.com

2009-05-20T01:22:00.001-07:00

Iran and Israel

By ROGER COHEN

Published: May 17, 2009

RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA — A story is doing the rounds in Washington about an Arab ambassador whose view of Barack Obama’s overtures to Iran is: “We don’t mind you seeking engagement, but please, no marriage!”

Earl Wilson/The New York Times

Roger Cohen

It’s sometimes hard to know if the Arabs or Israelis are more alarmed — or alarmist — about Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions.

A comment a few months back from an Iranian official to the effect that the small desert kingdom of Bahrain was historically a province of Iran sent fears of exportable Shia revolution into overdrive in Sunni Arab capitals. Iran apologized, but the damage was done.

After Iran’s American-aided push into Iraq through the establishment of a Shia-dominated government there, the Bahrain talk set frayed Arab nerves on edge. Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, called on Arab states to “deal with the Iranian challenge.”

The mistrust has a long history. Arabs and Persians enjoy cordial enmity; the cultural rivalry between the Sunni and Shia universes dates back a mere 1.5 millennia or so, to the battle of Karbala in 680 and beyond.

But recent developments have envenomed things to the point that Arab diplomats troop daily into the State Department to warn that the U.S. quest for détente with Tehran is dangerous.

That point will be made with vigor by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he meets with President Obama Monday. After all, when Israelis and Arabs make common cause, surely the danger is real.

Obama should be skeptical, for reasons I will explain. But first those Arab fears.

The Saudis have been incensed by how U.S. policy has favored “the Persians” — as they refer to them — by removing Iran’s Sunni Taliban enemy in Afghanistan and ending Sunni dominance of Iraq. Despite U.S. prodding, the Saudis have not named an ambassador to Iraq and view the prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as an Iranian pawn. Their strategic goal remains an “Iraq that comes back to be a solid Arab country,” as one Saudi official put it to me.

They also express frustration at the U.S. failure to rein in Israel, whose wars against Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza have stirred growing support for these Iran-backed movements. Anger on the Arab street is easily exploited by Iranian leaders using insurgent rhetoric.

With a significant Shia minority, Saudi Arabia — like Kuwait and Bahrain — believes Iran is inciting these communities to rebellion. It’s not uncommon to see posters of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Iran-backed Hezbollah, in Shia homes. Shiites, in turn, say Iran’s rising influence is used to justify oppression.

When popular rage rises, the region’s Arab autocrats look in the mirror and see the Shah. They don’t want a rerun of Tehran 1979.

“The Arabs are very worried that, for expediency’s sake in Iraq or Afghanistan, we’ll cut some deal with Iran that will leave Tehran as the regional hegemon,” one U.S. official told me.

It’s not going to happen. Washington and Tehran are a long way from even starting bilateral talks. Differences are such that any deal would take time.

What’s really at issue here is that neither Israel nor the Arabs want a change in a status quo that locks in Israeli regional military dominance and the cozy relationships — arms deals, aid and all — that U.S. allies from the Gulf to Cairo enjoy.

American interests are, however, another story. They are not served by having no communication with Iran, the rising Mideast power; nor by the uncritical support of Israel that has allowed West Bank settlements to grow and peace to fade; nor by relationships with Arab states that comfort stasis.

The Arab arguments over Iran are weak. It is precisely U.S. non-engagement that has led to Tehran’s rising power. So it makes sense to change policy. Only within an American “grand bargain” with Iran will a solution to the nuclear issue be possible.

Given that a Mideast peace is inconceivable without Iran because of its influence over Hamas and Hezbollah, it is in the Arab interest that the United States attempt to bring Iran “inside the tent.” Outside it will make trouble.

Moreover, the Arabs themselves have engaged. The Saudis have normal if strained diplomatic relations with Iran.

So here’s what Obama should say to Netanyahu when he says Arab states have identical fears over Iran:

“We’re aware of this, Mr. Prime Minister, which is why we sent Defense Secretary Robert Gates and others to reassure Arab allies. But the U.S. interest is not served by the Mideast status quo. Our interest lies in new region-wide security arrangements that promote a two-state peace, end 30 years of non-communication with Iran, and ultimately afford Israel a brighter future. You can’t build settlements and expect Iran’s influence to diminish.”

When Netanyahu demurs, Obama should add: “And you know what the Arabs tell me in private? That Israeli use of force against Iran would be a disaster. And that it’s impossible to tell Iran it can’t have nukes when Israel has them. They say that’s a double standard. And you know what? They may have a point.”

Readers are invited to comment at global.nytimes.com/opinion

Op-Ed Columnist - Iran and Israel - NYTimes.com

Aipac's hidden persuaders | Richard Silverstein | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

2009-05-17T18:52:00.001-07:00

Aipac's hidden persuaders

The Israel lobby is aiming to soften up US public opinion for an attack on Iran. Americans should resist its propaganda

Comments (303)

guardian.co.uk, Friday 15 May 2009 14.00 BST

Despite the ballyhoo of the recent Aipac national policy conference in Washington, when Israel-US bonds were feted, relations between the two countries are currently more strained than at any time since 1991. That was when the elder George Bush, as US president, fiercely lobbied Yitzchak Shamir to join in the Madrid peace conference. Relations then reached their nadir when James Baker uttered his infamous remark about Israel's American-Jewish supporters: "Fuck the Jews, they don't even vote for us."

If relations continue to deteriorate in coming months, we might have to go back in time to the Suez crisis of 1956 to find a time when relations were this fraught.

A case in point is Iran. That bogey-nation was everywhere at the Aipac conference. Every keynote speech – if they weren't directly written by that group's staff – seemed unmistakably scripted and "on message", dedicated to the existential threat that Iran poses not just to Israel, but the entire world.

A glossy brochure distributed at the Aipac meeting showed a map (pictured below) centred on Iran and beyond, with a dark ominous ring around Iran's neighbours and as far away as India, Russia, Africa and eastern Europe. The message: these are the countries under imminent threat of Iranian ballistic missiles.

A map contained in a brochure distributed at an Aipac meeting

The brochure copy even intimates that the next step for Iran is "building a missile with range to reach US territory". (Never mind that Iran doesn't yet have any ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon, nor will it have the bomb itself for anywhere from a year to five years depending on which you source you choose to believe.)

Israel is in the midst of a massive diplomatic, political and intelligence campaign, both public and covert, that could lead – if those officials behind it have their way – towards a military strike on Iran. It is a war for the hearts and minds of Americans. Or you might call it the war before the war. In intelligence circles, this Israeli project is known as perception management and defined by the department of defence as:

Actions to convey and/or deny information … to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders … ultimately resulting in foreign behaviours and official actions favourable to [US] objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception and psychological operations.

The Israelis are following the template of the Bush administration's run-up to the Iraq war. First, the US government advocated half-hearted efforts at diplomatic engagement. Then it ratcheted up pressure through sanctions and UN resolutions. That is where the Israeli campaign stands now.

Aipac's members carried a unified message to Capitol Hill during their lobbying of US senators and members of Congress. They demanded that Congress pass the most draconian sanctions ever proposed against Iran. They demanded that Iran be offered a limited time in which to respond to an ultimatum insisting it drop its nuclear programme.

What then? If you review Aipac's literature and the various commentaries published either by Israeli diplomats or their supporters in the US media, they don't specify what comes next. But any sensible person can guess that the final step will be war: "Israeli leaders have … hinted at pre-emptive military strikes if they decide that diplomacy has failed."

The Israelis surely know that the Obama administration will never go to war against Iran. In fact, they know that Obama would not approve of Israel doing so. But I've become convinced, in doing the research and speaking to knowledgeable sources, that Israel is prepared at some date in the near future to attack Iran itself, even against the wishes of the US.

This of course will put Obama in an untenable position: do US forces attack the Israelis (in effect defending the Iranians) and risk the fallout that would occur in relations between the Democratic administration and American Jews? Or does he allow the Israelis to carry on to their targets and bomb Iran, accepting the bloodletting and mayhem that will inevitably result? If Israel wishes for the latter outcome, they must lay the groundwork here in the US for tacit acceptance by the American people of a third-party attack on Iran.

Indeed, they are already a good deal of the way toward this goal, as the latest polling from Rasmussen Report reveals. According to it, 49% of Americans believe that if Israel attacks Iran then the US should help Israel.

Some readers may say this is alarmist. Before I learned some of the information I gathered from sources both public and not, I also would have labelled this as overly dramatic. But Israel hasn't shrunk, for example, from drafting opinion columns for US newspapers on the menace posed by Iran, and telling the editor that a local Jewish community leader would be attaching his name to it.

Within the US Israel exploits a willing circle of Likudist advocacy groups and thinktanks – such as the Washington Institute for Near East Peace, the Israel Project, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs as well as Aipac itself – that are closely scripted and co-ordinate their political message with Israeli diplomats. While some of these groups deny such a close affiliation, there is proof of scripting and amplification of the Israeli government's agenda. And of course there may be cases in which the organisations know the needs of their patron so well that they need no prompting.

In another example, Israeli diplomats monitored and encouraged a member of Congress to host an anti-Iranian conference that would advocate Israel's message of sanctions (and more).

Israel, along with enablers like Aipac, has not shrunk from hounding its critics. One peace activist in the US so angered Israeli authorities that he was driven from a job through a whispering campaign in the community, which also included a disparaging article leaked to a willing reporter.

The level of hubris necessary to pull this off is astonishing. Fresh off the dismissal of the Rosen-Weissman spy charges involving its own employees, Aipac is flexing its political muscle and reminding the world of its resurgence. It does this through a combination of manipulation, public lobbying and punishment of its enemies.

We in the US must be prepared to resist. We must protect ourselves from Israel's propaganda offensive ginning up war with Iran. We must encourage President Obama to stay strong in his commitment to Israeli-Arab peace, whether or not Israel is a willing partner. Keeping our eyes on the prize of peace is going to be the hardest challenge of all, because the Netanyahu government is doing everything it can to divert the world's attention.

Aipac's hidden persuaders | Richard Silverstein | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Israel's Secret War With Iran - WSJ.com

2009-05-16T20:07:00.001-07:00

By RONEN BERGMAN

Those who leaf through the secret files of any intelligence service know what grave mistakes bad intelligence can lead to. But they also know that sometimes even excellent intelligence doesn't change a thing.

The Israeli intelligence community is now learning this lesson the hard way. It has penetrated enemies like Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah and Hamas. Yet despite former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's willingness to authorize highly dangerous operations based on this intelligence, and despite the unquestionable success of the operations themselves, the overall security picture remains as grim as ever.

In 2002, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon appointed his friend and former subordinate, Gen. Meir Dagan, director of the Mossad. Gen. Dagan found the organization lacking in imagination and shying away from operational risks. Mr. Sharon, who knew Gen. Dagan from his days as head of a secret assassinations unit that acted against Fatah in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s, told the general that he wanted "a Mossad with a knife between its teeth."

Gen. Dagan transformed the Mossad from top to bottom and made the organization's sole focus Iran's nuclear project and its ties to jihadist organizations. He put tremendous pressure on his subordinates to execute as many operations as possible. Moreover, he built up ties with espionage services in Europe and the Middle East on top of Israel's long-standing relationship with the CIA.

In tandem with Gen. Dagan's Mossad revolution, other Israeli military intelligence has also made outstanding breakthroughs. The Shin-Bet (Israel's internal intelligence service), in cooperation with the military, has made huge strides in its understanding of Palestinian guerilla organizations.

The results have been tremendous. During the last four years, the uranium enrichment project in Iran was delayed by a series of apparent accidents: the disappearance of an Iranian nuclear scientist, the crash of two planes carrying cargo relating to the project, and two labs that burst into flames. In addition, an Iranian opposition group in exile published highly credible information about the details of the project, which caused Iran much embarrassment and led to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

On July 12, 2006, thanks to precise intelligence, the Israeli Air Force destroyed almost the entire stock of Hezbollah's long-range rockets stored in underground warehouses. Hezbollah was shocked.

In July 2007, another mysterious accident occurred in a missile factory jointly operated by Iran and Syria at a Syrian site called Al-Safir. The production line -- which armed Scud missiles with warheads -- was shut down and many were killed.

In September 2007, Israel destroyed a nuclear reactor built by Syria and aided by North Korea in Dir A-Zur -- despite Syria's significant efforts to keep it a secret. With indirect authorization from a very high ranking Israeli official, the CIA published incriminating pictures obtained by Israel of the site before it was bombed. These photos convinced the world that the Syrians were indeed attempting to manufacture a nuclear bomb.

In February 2008, Hezbollah's military leader, Imad Mughniyah, was killed in Damascus. In August of that year, Gen. Mohammed Suliman, a liaison to Hamas and Hezbollah who participated in the Syrian nuclear project, was assassinated by a sniper.

In December 2008, Israel initiated operation Cast Lead, which dealt Hamas a massive blow. Most of its weapons were destroyed within days by Israeli air strikes. (Israel also knew where the Hamas leadership was hiding, but since it was in a hospital Mr. Olmert refused to authorize the strike.) In January 2009, Israeli Hermes 450 drones attacked three convoys in Sudan that were smuggling weapons from Iran to the Gaza Strip.

These are all excellent achievements, but did they change reality? Mostly not.

The destruction of the Syrian nuclear reactor seems to have put a temporary end to President Bashar Assad's ambitions of acquiring a nuclear weapon. However, the public humiliation caused by the site's bombing did not sway him from supporting Hamas and Hezbollah and hosting terrorist organizations.

Even worse, the heads of Israeli intelligence are now losing sleep over recent information showing that attempts to delay the Iranian nuclear project have failed. Despite some technical difficulties, the Iranians are storming ahead and may possess a nuclear bomb as early as 2010. Hezbollah, although weakened by the 2006 war and Mughniyah's assassination, has become the leading political force in Lebanon.

On the southern front, despite the convoy bombings in Sudan, the trafficking of weapons and ammunition into the Gaza Strip continues. Hamas's standing among Palestinians has strengthened. And if a cease-fire is negotiated between Hamas and Israel it would be perceived as a victory for Hamas.

The bottom line is that excellent intelligence is very important, but it can only take you so far. In the end, it's the tough diplomatic and military decisions made by Israeli leaders that ensure the security of the state.

Mr. Bergman, a correspondent for the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth, is the author of the "The Secret War With Iran" (Free Press, 2008).

Israel's Secret War With Iran - WSJ.com

Israel recruits gay community in PR campaign against Iran - Haaretz - Israel News

2009-04-22T04:52:00.001-07:00

Israel recruits gay community in PR campaign against Iran

By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent

Tags: public relations, iran

Israel is stepping up its public relations effort to discredit Iran within the international community, and part of its new campaign focuses on Tehran's abuse of human rights and sponsorship of terrorism.
"We have to lay the foundation in the world, and particularly in Europe, in order to be able to take harsher steps against Iran, especially in the economic sector," said one senior political source in Jerusalem.
The new campaign, to be overseen by the Foreign Ministry, aims to appeal to people who are less concerned with Iran's nuclear aspirations and more fearful of its human rights abuses and mistreatment of minorities, including the gay and lesbian community.

The campaign plans to recruit the international gay community, which Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad dismissed in 2007 when he said there were no homosexuals living in his country.
The campaign will also reach out to Jewish groups who want to bring more attention to Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial and some members of the Iranian regime's anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist views.
About NIS 8 million have already been budgeted for the new campaign, which also includes increased briefings for foreign journalists on the Iranian nuclear program and greater use of the Internet and sites such as YouTube.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman want to broaden the PR campaign on the subject of Iran in the wake of increasing international willingness to negotiate with Tehran over its nuclear program. One political source said there appear to be greater expectations in the U.S. and in Europe that diplomacy will solve the nuclear dispute.
However, the assumption in Israel is that dialogue will not lead to fundamental change in Tehran's stance and that the regime will not relinquish its nuclear aspirations, even in exchange for an incentives package from the international community.
The senior political source in Jerusalem said it is necessary to lay the groundwork now for the possible diplomatic failure. Despite talk of a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, the current campaign focuses more on harsh economic sanctions against Tehran.

Israel recruits gay community in PR campaign against Iran - Haaretz - Israel News

Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid With U.S. Help - WSJ.com

2009-04-05T01:23:00.001-07:00

ABU DHABI -- The mating of the words "nuclear" and "Persian Gulf" normally sets off alarm bells in Washington. Yet this oil-rich Arab state just across the gulf from Iran is on a crash course to develop nuclear power with U.S. backing.

Dozens of American engineers, lawyers and businessmen have converged on Abu Dhabi in recent months to help the United Arab Emirates get the Arab world's first nuclear-power program running by 2017. "I don't know anyone else who has rolled out a nuclear program of this magnitude this fast," says Jeffrey Benjamin, an American engineer who in October was named project manager for Emirates Nuclear Energy Corp., which oversees Abu Dhabi's nuclear program.

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World Nuclear Energy Production

See details on countries' nuclear energy capacity in an interactive map.

Even as the U.S. remains determined to block Iran from developing nuclear weapons, President Barack Obama sees the U.A.E. program as a "model for the world," according to a senior White House official, and by mid-April could move to present a bilateral nuclear-cooperation treaty to Congress for approval. The ability to make electricity through nuclear power is a long way from the ability to build weapons -- and, proponents say, the agreement could make bomb-making harder.

The treaty, signed by former President George W. Bush during his last week in office, would allow American firms to engage in nuclear trade with the U.A.E. To build support, the U.A.E. is agreeing to buy approved nuclear fuel on the international market, rather than enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium, both of which can be made into weapons-grade material. It will also open its facilities to random international inspections.

The U.A.E.'s push represents a test for nuclear-power advocates who want countries across the globe to go nuclear -- so long as they play by the rules. The U.S. and United Nations officials are championing the U.A.E. as a role model for other developing countries and as a counterexample to Iran. Tehran has repeatedly rebuffed international inspectors, while amassing large quantities of materials that can be used to build bombs. A spokesman at the Iranian mission to the U.N. says Iran's nuclear program is purely for civilian purposes, and says Tehran believes "peaceful nuclear programs" are the right of all signatures to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Some U.S. lawmakers have threatened to block the U.A.E. deal, saying the risks of letting that country split the atom are too large. They cite the U.A.E.'s history as a transit point for sensitive military technologies to Iran, Iraq and Libya. They also make the slippery-slope argument: If one Arab country has nuclear power, others may pile in, and perhaps down the road, seek nuclear weapons as well. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have recently announced their desire to develop nuclear-power programs with U.S. assistance.

Western and Asian companies are already salivating at the chance for lucrative contracts with the U.A.E., which has set the end of April as the rough deadline for bids. General Electric Co. and Westinghouse Electric Co. are among the U.S. firms interested in the initial $20 billion in reactor work, say officials familiar with the bidding process. GE and Westinghouse declined to comment.

Facing ambitious timelines set by officials bent on growth, Mr. Benjamin, the American engineer, and his colleagues rarely get far from the Emirates Nuclear Energy headquarters in downtown Abu Dhabi. Many live in an apartment building next to the office and exercise at the same gym. Mr. Benjamin lives three floors above his office.

Surge in Demand

The U.A.E. began exploring nuclear power three years ago as it faced a surge in electricity demand, say Emirati officials. The Persian Gulf country is a federation of seven states, among them Abu Dhabi, the capital, and Dubai. It has among the largest oil reserves in the world. But it's short of the natural gas that is used to fuel power and water-desalination plants, and imports most of its gas from neighboring Qatar.

Reuters

Qatari Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, right, receives United Arab Emirates President Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan at Doha international airport on Sunday. Leaders of the 22-member Arab League gathered in the Gulf Arab state of Qatar for a two-day summit meeting.

Abu Dhabi's ruler, Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, commissioned a white paper that concluded the country's electricity demand would reach 40,000 megawatts by 2020 from around 16,000 megawatts currently. Nonnuclear options, such as coal-fired plants, solar energy or alternative fuels, were seen either as insufficient to meet demand, too expensive or harmful to the environment.

"Nuclear power was seen both as practical and clean," says Hussain al Nowais, an Abu Dhabi industrialist who took part in the study.

The U.A.E.'s foreign minister announced Abu Dhabi's intentions to pursue nuclear power last May. Officials here say they believe the global economic downturn is temporary and are sticking to ambitious growth plans that assume rising electricity demand.

Bush Initiative

The Bush administration quickly emerged as a powerful partner. Former Bush officials say they wanted to tout the U.A.E.'s nuclear approach to developing nations and to pressure Iran to follow suit. Some former officials say they believed nuclear power was inevitably going to spread farther into the Middle East. A deal with Abu Dhabi could also set a precedent by binding a key economic powerhouse to U.S. technologies and international standards.

"This is the kind of counterexample to Iran we need to actively support," says Jackie Wolcott, a former U.S. envoy who helped negotiate the pact Mr. Bush signed in January.

David Scott is one of the Americans helping to build the nuclear program in the U.A.E. Mr. Scott served as the National Security Council's director for the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa during President Bush's first term. In 2006, he became the director of economic affairs for Abu Dhabi's Executive Affairs Authority, which is run by the crown prince.

Frenzied Growth

On a recent morning, Mr. Scott was in a helicopter over Abu Dhabi, pointing out the frenzied growth of skyscrapers and apartment blocks that he hopes will soon be powered by nuclear energy. Mr. Scott, a graduate of Utah's Brigham Young University, has worked for the U.S. military, the State Department and Occidental Petroleum Corp. On weekends, he and his family ride wakeboards on Abu Dhabi's turquoise waters.

Also in the helicopter was Mohamed al Hammadi, the chief executive of the Emirati nuclear company. Mr. Hammadi was tracking the flight path using the global-positioning system on his cellphone. The 33-year-old, a graduate of the Florida Institute of Technology and a native of Abu Dhabi, said he hardly recognized the town he grew up in.

"Most of this was just desert," said Mr. Hammadi. The Louvre and Guggenheim museums are building branches on an island next to Abu Dhabi's downtown waterfront. A Formula One racetrack built on another nearby island will stage its first event later this year. Farther away from the city, one of the world's largest aluminum smelters is under construction.

Mr. Hammadi's job includes choosing sites for the reactors that are in secure locations and away from population centers, but still close to desalination plants and the power grid. He'll also decide which designs the U.A.E. adopts. Plants must withstand sandstorms and summer heat that can reach 120 degrees.

Following the Western model, the U.A.E. has established an independent regulator to monitor nuclear safety. The regulator's first director general is set to be William Travers, a 58-year-old Florida native. In the 1980s, he was dispatched by the U.S.'s Nuclear Regulatory Commission to help clean up America's worst nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Travers oversees a staff of 30 American, Emirati and European officials that's expected to grow to more than 100 by 2013. The regulatory office is seeking to put in place licensing requirements so the U.A.E. can begin importing components for its nuclear reactors. Mr. Travers says he plans to retain his independence, which is one reason his offices have been literally walled off from the nuclear-energy company, even though they share the same floor. "What they want from me is a safety call," Mr. Travers says from his spartan office.

Emirati officials say they've started developing homegrown talent to run and maintain the reactors. Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi's largest technical school, is teaming up with European and U.S. colleges to create nuclear science and engineering degrees. The government is offering to retrain engineers already working in the nation's petroleum sector.

'Serve My Country'

"I want to see myself in a stronger position so that I can serve my country," said 30-year-old Fahad al Rumaithi, who's preparing for a degree in nuclear engineering after working for the Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Co. in Malaysia and South Korea. He said he spends his spare time reading engineering books on thermodynamics.

Most critics of the program, including some U.S. lawmakers and nonproliferation experts, believe the U.A.E. is unlikely to turn to nuclear weapons. But they have reservations about the country's past role in the flow of sensitive military technologies. The rogue Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan used the port of Dubai to transfer centrifuge technologies to countries like Libya, according to American and U.N. officials. Mr. Khan's network grew to include nuclear sales to North Korea and Iran, before American and international investigators shut him down in 2003.

Iran has allegedly obtained materials for its missile program from front companies based in Dubai. Iran and the U.A.E. are trading partners, exchanging more than $5.5 billion in goods in 2007, according to the European Union.

Some American lawmakers have said they want to block the U.S.-U.A.E. deal on the grounds that the U.A.E. hasn't done enough to combat the flow of funds and technology into Iran.

"If this is to be the model for future nuclear cooperation agreements, don't we want to get this right the first time?" asks Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, the Republican vice chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen wants more assurances that the U.A.E. will support U.S. efforts to confront Iran and that it won't pursue nuclear weapons.

U.A.E. officials say in the past they have been lax in monitoring the flow of sensitive technologies through the ports. But they say they have stepped up enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Iran and tightened business-license regulations for Iranian nationals. They have also signed on to U.S.-led efforts to track air and sea shipments to Iran.

Iranian Crackdown

Over the past three years, U.A.E. officials say, they have shut down 40 Iranian companies operating in Dubai over either export-control violations or lack of proper licenses. In the past six months, Emirati authorities have also blocked more then 10 shipments of goods for potential military use heading to Iran through Dubai, largely from Asia. "We will not allow anyone to use our territory to harm anybody else," said Yacub al-Hosani, a Foreign Ministry official.

The U.A.E. points to Iran's stepped-up rhetoric over Persian Gulf islands that are in dispute between Abu Dhabi and Tehran as evidence that its harder stance isn't going unnoticed.

Emirati officials say their nuclear program won't be derailed by international pressure. The country has already signed a nuclear-cooperation agreement with France, and has tentative deals with Japan and Britain. Companies such as France's Areva SA and Korea Electric Power Co. are preparing to make bids for contracts that could ultimately top $40 billion.

Write to Jay Solomon at jay.solomon@wsj.com and Margaret Coker at margaret.coker@wsj.com

Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid With U.S. Help - WSJ.com

FT.com / UK - US may cede to Iran's nuclear ambition

2009-04-05T01:15:00.001-07:00

By Daniel Dombey in Washington

Published: April 4 2009 03:00 | Last updated: April 4 2009 03:00

US officials are considering whether to accept Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment, which has been outlawed by the United Nations and remains at the heart of fears that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons capability.

As part of a policy review commissioned by President Barack Obama, diplomats are discussing whether the US will eventually have to accept Iran's insistence on carrying out the process, which can produce both nuclear fuel and weapons- grade material.

"There's a fundamental impasse between the western demand for no enrichment and the Iranian dem-and to continue enrichment," says Mark Fitzpat-rick, a former state depart-- --ment expert now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "There's no obvious compromise bet-ween those two positions."

The US has insisted that Iran stop enrichment, although Mr Fitzpatrick notes that international offers put to Tehran during George W. Bush's second term as president left the door open to the possible resumption of enrichment.

"There is a growing recognition in [Washington] that the zero [enrichment] solution, though still favoured, simply is unfeasible," says Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council. "The US may still have zero as its opening position, while recognising it may not be where things stand at the end of a potential agreement."

Yesterday, Mr Obama summarised the US message to Iran as, "Don't develop a nuclear weapon" - a form of words that would not rule out a deal accepting Iranian enrichment. Mr Bush was much more specific in calling Iran to halt enrichment.

A series of UN Security Council resolutions since 2006 has forbidden Iran from enriching uranium, with the European Union, Russia and China backing US calls for Tehran to halt the process.

But Iran has sped up its programme during that time and has installed more than 5,500 centrifuges to enrich uranium and has amassed a stockpile of more than 1,000kg of low-enriched uranium - enough, if it were enriched to higher levels, to produce fissile material for one bomb. "Across the political spectrum in Iran, enrichment as a right has become a non-negotiable position," Mr Parsi said.

Asked last month whether the administration was considering allowing Iran to keep a limited enrichment capability, Robert Wood, a state department spokesman, said: "I don't know . . . Let's let the review be completed and then we can spell out our policies."

Some analysts say priority should be given to winning greater access for UN inspectors, to acquire more information about Iran's enrichment plant in Natanz and fill in gaps in knowledge on Iran's nuclear-related activities across the country.

That could provide warning of any move to enrich uranium to weapons grade levels at Natanz and ease fears of clandestine facilities.

Privately both US and Israeli officials say that even the current, more limited inspection regime at Natanz would provide sufficient warning of any "breakout" towards a nuclear bomb. Outside Natanz, by contrast, information on Iran's programme is diminishing.

The US line that Iran is seeking the capability to develop nuclear weapons - but not necessarily such weapons themselves - contrasts with Mr Bush's insistence while in office that it sought nuclear weapons.

Iranian regime insiders have said they would expect a compromise by the US on enrichment to be reciprocated.

FT.com / UK - US may cede to Iran's nuclear ambition

Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran—Or I Will - The Atlantic (March 31, 2009)

2009-04-01T07:20:00.001-07:00

In an interview conducted shortly before he was sworn in today as prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu laid down a challenge for Barack Obama. The American president, he said, must stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons—and quickly—or an imperiled Israel may be forced to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities itself.

“The Obama presidency has two great missions: fixing the economy, and preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons,” Netanyahu told me. He said the Iranian nuclear challenge represents a “hinge of history” and added that “Western civilization” will have failed if Iran is allowed to develop nuclear weapons.

In unusually blunt language, Netanyahu said of the Iranian leadership, “You don’t want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran.”

History teaches Jews that threats against their collective existence should be taken seriously, and, if possible, preempted, he suggested. In recent years, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has regularly called for Israel to be “wiped off the map,” and the supreme Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, this month called Israel a “cancerous tumor.”

But Netanyahu also said that Iran threatens many other countries apart from Israel, and so his mission over the next several months is to convince the world of the broad danger posed by Iran. One of his chief security advisers, Moshe Ya’alon, told me that a nuclear Iran could mean the end of American influence in the Middle East. “This is an existential threat for Israel, but it will be a blow for American interests, especially on the energy front. Who will dominate the oil in the region—Washington or Tehran?”

Netanyahu said he would support President Obama’s decision to engage Iran, so long as negotiations brought about a quick end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “How you achieve this goal is less important than achieving it,” he said, but he added that he was skeptical that Iran would respond positively to Obama’s appeals. In an hour-long conversation, held in the Knesset, Netanyahu tempered his aggressive rhetoric with an acknowledgement that nonmilitary pressure could yet work. “I think the Iranian economy is very weak, which makes Iran susceptible to sanctions that can be ratcheted up by a variety of means.” When I suggested that this statement contradicted his assertion that Iran, by its fanatic nature, is immune to pressure, Netanyahu smiled thinly and said, “Iran is a composite leadership, but in that composite leadership there are elements of wide-eyed fanaticism that do not exist right now in any other would-be nuclear power in the world. That’s what makes them so dangerous.”

He went on, “Since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have not had a fanatic regime that might put its zealotry above its self-interest. People say that they’ll behave like any other nuclear power. Can you take the risk? Can you assume that?”

Netanyahu offered Iran’s behavior during its eight-year war with Iraq as proof of Tehran’s penchant for irrational behavior. Iran “wasted over a million lives without batting an eyelash … It didn’t sear a terrible wound into the Iranian consciousness. It wasn’t Britain after World War I, lapsing into pacifism because of the great tragedy of a loss of a generation. You see nothing of the kind.”

He continued: “You see a country that glorifies blood and death, including its own self-immolation.” I asked Netanyahu if he believed Iran would risk its own nuclear annihilation at the hands of Israel or America. “I’m not going to get into that,” he said.

Neither Netanyahu nor his principal military advisers would suggest a deadline for American progress on the Iran nuclear program, though one aide said pointedly that Israeli time lines are now drawn in months, “not years.” These same military advisers told me that they believe Iran’s defenses remain penetrable, and that Israel would not necessarily need American approval to launch an attack. “The problem is not military capability, the problem is whether you have the stomach, the political will, to take action,” one of his advisers, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told me.

Both Israeli and American intelligence officials agree that Iran is moving forward in developing a nuclear-weapons capability. The chief of Israeli military intelligence, Major General Amos Yadlin, said earlier this month that Iran has already “crossed the technological threshold,” and that nuclear military capability could soon be a fact: “Iran is continuing to amass hundreds of kilograms of low-enriched uranium, and it hopes to exploit the dialogue with the West and Washington to advance toward the production of an atomic bomb.”

American officials argue that Iran has not crossed the “technological threshold”; the director of national intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair, said recently that Israel and the U.S. are working with the same set of facts, but are interpreting it differently. “The Israelis are far more concerned about it, and they take more of a worst-case approach to these things from their point of view,” he said. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Michael Mullen, recently warned that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would undermine stability in the Middle East and endanger the lives of Americans in the Persian Gulf.

The Obama administration agrees with Israel that Iran’s nuclear program is a threat to Middle East stability, but it also wants Israel to focus on the Palestinian question. Netanyahu, for his part, promises to move forward on negotiations with the Palestinians, but he made it clear in our conversation that he believes a comprehensive peace will be difficult to achieve if Iran continues to threaten Israel, and he cited Iran’s sponsorship of such Islamist groups as Hezbollah and Hamas as a stumbling block.

Ya’alon, a former army chief of staff who is slated to serve as Netanyahu’s minister for strategic threats, dismissed the possibility of a revitalized peace process, telling me that “jihadists” interpret compromise as weakness. He cited the reaction to Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza four years ago. “The mistake of disengagement from Gaza was that we thought like Westerners, that compromise would defuse a problem—but it just encouraged the problem,” he said. “The jihadists saw withdrawal as a defeat of the West … Now, what do you signal to them if you are ready to divide Jerusalem, or if you’re ready to withdraw to the 1967 lines? In this kind of conflict, your ability to stand and be determined is more important than your firepower.”

American administration sources tell me that President Obama won’t shy from pressuring Netanyahu on the Palestinian issue during his first visit to Washington as prime minister, which is scheduled for early May. But Netanyahu suggested that he and Obama already see eye-to-eye on such crucial issues as the threat posed by Hamas. “The Obama administration has recently said that Hamas has to first recognize Israel and cease the support of terror. That’s a very good definition. It says you have to cease being Hamas.”

When I noted that many in Washington doubt his commitment to curtailing Jewish settlement on the West Bank, he said, in reference to his previous term as prime minister, from 1996 to 1999, “I can only point to what I did as prime minister in the first round. I certainly didn’t build new settlements.”

Netanyahu will manage Israel’s relationship with Washington personally—his foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, of the anti-Arab Israel Beiteinu party, is deeply unpopular in Washington—and I asked him if he could foresee agreeing on a “grand bargain” with Obama, in which he would move forward on talks with the Palestinians in exchange for a robust American response to Iran’s nuclear program. He said: “We intend to move on the Palestinian track independent of what happens with Iran, and I hope the U.S. moves to stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons regardless of what happens on the Palestinian track.”

In our conversation, Netanyahu gave his fullest public explication yet of why he believes President Obama must consider Iran’s nuclear ambitions to be his preeminent overseas challenge. “Why is this a hinge of history? Several bad results would emanate from this single development. First, Iran’s militant proxies would be able to fire rockets and engage in other terror activities while enjoying a nuclear umbrella. This raises the stakes of any confrontation that they’d force on Israel. Instead of being a local event, however painful, it becomes a global one. Second, this development would embolden Islamic militants far and wide, on many continents, who would believe that this is a providential sign, that this fanaticism is on the ultimate road to triumph.

“Third, they would be able to pose a real and credible threat to the supply of oil, to the overwhelming part of the world’s oil supply. Fourth, they may threaten to use these weapons or to give them to terrorist proxies of their own, or fabricate terror proxies. Finally, you’d create a great sea change in the balance of power in our area—nearly all the Arab regimes are dead-set opposed to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. They fervently hope, even if they don’t say it, that the U.S. will act to prevent this, that it will use its political, economic, and, if necessary, military power to prevent this from happening.”

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Netanyahu asserted, Washington’s Arab allies would drift into Iran’s orbit. “The only way I can explain what will happen to such regimes is to give you an example from the past of what happened to one staunch ally of the United States, and a great champion of peace, when another aggressive power loomed large. I’m referring to the late King Hussein [of Jordan] … who was an unequalled champion of peace. The same King Hussein in many ways subordinated his country to Saddam Hussein when Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990. Saddam seemed all-powerful, unchallenged by the United States, and until the U.S. extracted Kuwait from Saddam’s gullet, King Hussein was very much in Iraq’s orbit. The minute that changed, the minute Saddam was defeated, King Hussein came back to the Western camp.”

One of Iran’s goals, Netanyahu said, is to convince the moderate Arab countries not to enter peace treaties with Israel. Finally, he said, several countries in Iran’s neighborhood might try to develop nuclear weapons of their own. “Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The Middle East is incendiary enough, but with a nuclear arms race it will become a tinderbox,” he said.

Few in Netanyahu’s inner circle believe that Iran has any short-term plans to drop a nuclear weapon on Tel Aviv, should it find a means to deliver it. The first-stage Iranian goal, in the understanding of Netanyahu and his advisers, is to frighten Israel’s most talented citizens into leaving their country. “The idea is to keep attacking the Israelis on a daily basis, to weaken the willingness of the Jewish people to hold on to their homeland,” Moshe Ya’alon said. “The idea is to make a place that is supposed to be a safe haven for Jews unattractive for them. They are waging a war of attrition.”

The Israeli threat to strike Iran militarily if the West fails to stop the nuclear program may, of course, be a tremendous bluff. After all, such threats may just be aimed at motivating President Obama and others to grapple urgently with the problem. But Netanyahu and his advisers seem to believe sincerely that Israel would have difficulty surviving in a Middle East dominated by a nuclear Iran. And they are men predisposed to action; many, like Netanyahu, are former commandos.

As I waited in the Knesset cafeteria to see Netanyahu, I opened a book he edited of his late brother’s letters. Yoni Netanyahu, a commando leader, was killed in 1976 during the Israeli raid on Entebbe, and his family organized his letters in a book they titled Self-Portrait of a Hero. In one letter, Yoni wrote to his teenage brother, then living in America, who had apparently been in a fight after someone directed an anti-Semitic remark at him. “I see … that you had to release the surplus energy you stored up during the summer,” Yoni wrote. “There’s nothing wrong with that. But it’s too bad you sprained a finger in the process. In my opinion, there’s nothing wrong with a good fist fight; on the contrary, if you’re young and you’re not seriously hurt, it won’t do you real harm. Remember what I told you? He who delivers the first blow, wins.”

Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran—Or I Will - The Atlantic (March 31, 2009)

Jewish writer raises a storm in America with his report from a 'tolerant' Iran | Media | The Observer

2009-03-29T19:07:00.001-07:00

A row has broken out over allegations of antisemitism at the New York Times, America's most vaunted name in journalism and a newspaper with a large Jewish readership.

The storm centres on a column about Jews in Iran written by New York Times journalist Roger Cohen and a cartoon attacking the recent war in Gaza.

The newspaper, and Cohen in particular, has been accused of being too critical of Israel and an apologist for Iran and its leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Cohen's column was written from Iran about the country's small Jewish minority. His piece acknowledged the difficulties the group experienced and portrayed them as part of an Iranian society that he said was more tolerant, democratic and sophisticated than many American critics allowed.

Such sentiments might seem uncontroversial, but in America no one touching on issues around Israel or antisemitism escapes close scrutiny. Cohen was attacked by Jewish writers and bloggers. The Jerusalem Post dubbed him "misled", while the Atlantic Monthly called him "credulous". Others went much further. "The Nazis had Theresienstadt, their 'model' concentration camp used to 'persuade' the gullible that Jews and others who aroused the ire of the Nazis were being treated well. Would Roger Cohen have had no problem portraying that favourably as well?" fumed writer Ed Lasky on the American Thinker website.

Cohen said he was stunned by the vehemence of the response, an impression exacerbated when he visited exiled Iranian Jews in California and was abusively heckled. "I was surprised at the anger and intensity of the reaction ... I expected a reaction but did not expect it to blow up into a whole furore," Cohen said.

Perhaps part of the reason for the intensity of the attack is the fact that he is Jewish himself. "I think it's partly my name. The 'self-hating Jew' things can come to the surface in some of the responses," he said. Another reason is that the column appeared in the Times, which many media experts hardly see as a fierce critic of Israel, given its home audience. "As soon as I read the column I thought a lot of people would be unhappy," said Jack Lule, a journalism professor at Lehigh University.

The debate over Cohen's piece came as the Times published Pat Oliphant's cartoon, which shows a headless figure goose-stepping and pushing a snarling Star of David in front of it. The figure is herding a woman carrying a child labelled Gaza to the edge of a cliff. The cartoon also appeared in the Washington Post, Slate and other publications. It caused instant outrage among Jewish groups. "It is cartoons like this that inspired millions of people to hate in the 1930s and help set the stage for the Nazi genocide," said a statement from the Simon Wiesenthal Centre.

Jewish writer raises a storm in America with his report from a 'tolerant' Iran | Media | The Observer

Eberhard Kronhausen and Phyllis Kronhausen: An Inconvenient Truth About Iran

2009-03-26T10:45:00.001-07:00

What "inconvenient truth about Iran" could there possibly be that might have escaped even our present, unusually intelligent, political leadership?

Very simply, it is that we are dealing, once again, Hitler-like, with a highly dangerous and obsession-directed leader -- Ahmadinejedad -- of a well-armed and economically important (oil-rich) country, Iran. Furthermore, that particular leader of his country, Iran, sees the world -- again, very Hitler-like -- single-mindedly through the lens of an all-consuming and highly personal obsession of his own making: the absolute need for the destruction of what he calls "the Zionist entity," in other words, the State of Israel.

Contrary to Hitler, though, and not altogether unbelievably, he claims to have, personally, nothing against the Jewish people, as such. He points, for instance, to the, thus far, undeniable fact that thousands of Iranians of Jewish ethnicity are living peacefully and unharmed among their non-Jewish, Iranian fellow-citizens. Iranian Jews, he says -- without anybody having, thus far, been able to prove him wrong -- suffer no discrimination in his country (for instance, no "Nuremberg racial laws" in Iran, as in Hitler's Germany). Much less are Iranian Jews subjected to persecution and harassment as had been true, from the very beginning, in the case of Nazi Germany. Nor are there, as Ahmadinejedad likes pointing out, any restrictions to the personal freedom of Jews, nor of the safety of their property, in Iran. In fact, Jewish Iranians are treated not only by law but in actual, daily life, just like any other Iranians -- and what foreign journalist or other impartial observer has been able to present evidence to the contrary?

So, what is Iran's problem with the Jews all about? Nothing, as much as one can see: For, there simply is no Iranian problem with the Jews, as such, at all!

Iran's "Jewish problem" -- or at least President Ahmadinejedad's, as well as Iran's "Supreme Leader," Ayatollah Ali Khameini's and that of most of the rest of Iran's high-ranking, religious "Mullahs" -- simply is not with the Jews themselves. Rather, it is about the existence of what they call "the Zionist entity" -- in other words, the State of Israel itself!

Their argument is that the State of Israel has, in their view, no legitimacy, as such. That is supposedly so -- if you can twist your mind into the contorted thinking of Iran's present leadership -- because the State of Israel is, to them, a totally artificial creation. As that argument goes, it was settled by people who did not "belong" to that region at all -- that is, according to that distorted view of history -- what eventually became the state of Israel is really Palestinian land, now occupied by "foreigners," that is, principally European Jewish immigrants who, in Iran's view, do not "belong" there.

Put differently, it is in the present Iranian leadership's view a "fact" that these mostly Jewish foreigners of European origin have simply settled on land that belonged to others -- Palestinians, in this case -- which the European, Jewish immigrants and their offspring usurped by either stealth or force. They, then, drove (according to the same argument) most of the original, legitimate occupants of this area -- the Palestinians -- off their land and properties, appropriating them as their own.

It actually is an argument that could be much more easily made in the case of the European settlers of the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and above all, Africa. In all those cases there was no pre-history of former European presence, history, culture, and occupancy of any of these vast, overseas areas.

In stark contrast, as far as the disputed Palestine is concerned, one would have to disregard entire millennia of former Jewish occupancy of this entire area, from earliest Biblical times on, to make the Iranian argument stick. However, that is the perverted historical view the present Iranian leadership under Ahmadinejedad -- from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the highest religious establishment on down -- have chosen to adopt. Consequently, once having taken that position, no matter how historically wrong it happens to be, the present Iranian leadership see it as nothing less than their religious duty to do away with the hated and, in their distorted view "illegitimate," so-called "Zionist entity," in other words, the State of Israel, itself.

For the same reason the present Iranian leadership, represented by President Ahmadinejedad, is not interested at all in any so-called "two states" solution: To their way of thinking, the only acceptable solution is plainly and simply to, as Ahmadinejedad bluntly enough put it again and again, "wipe the state of Israel ('the Zionest entity') off the map," drive any survivors back to where they had come from, such as Germany, Russia, Romania, or whatever, and return the land to its rightful owners, the Palestinians.

It is safe to assume that the Iranian government's desperate rush to complete the construction of an atomic bomb is to be seen in that light, as well. The Iranian leadership is, of course, fully aware of the fact that Israel already has such an atomic weapon, as well. So, are we to conclude that the Iranian leadership thinks they can, if in possession of the Bomb and perhaps some help from other, friendly states in the area, successfully wage a total war against Israel and so get rid of it, once and for all?

Now, as far as the possession of atomic weapons is concerned: Well, Russia and the United States both have had hundreds of atomic weapons at their disposal, for a very long time. In fact, both countries still have large arsenals of such "doomsday weapons" but without either of them ever having used them against each other. Only once, during the Cuban missile crisis, did they come within a hair of just such a conflagration. The basic fact, though, remains that both countries were fully aware that if either one or the other or them were crazy enough to start an atomic war, it meant "mutually guaranteed destruction." Since neither one nor the other side had any such suicidal impulses, the fact that both sides possessed the capacity to destroy each other, did have (and still has) sufficient restraining effect for preventing any such catastrophic event from happening.

In the Iranian case, though, the same cannot be assumed with the same degree of assurance. What if the Iranian leadership does not have the same survival instincts, as did, fortunately, have the Russian and American leadership, as well as their two countries' populations? Fortunately, neither the Russians nor the Americans have ever had any such concept as "martyrdom" -- much less any desire for experiencing its promised afterlife glories or sensual pleasures, such as eternal, sexual bliss, for those who become "martyrs."

However, can the same be confidently said of the present Iranian leadership?

Furthermore, and in complete contrast to Hitler's Germany, the Iranian leadership, fortunately, cannot count with the absolute loyalty of the vast majority of its population -- especially its large under-30 years old sector. This alone constitutes a great weakness for the Iranian leadership -- whether they care to admit it or not. In fact, this may be the only truly effective deterrent we can count on, in this case.

The truly worrisome point for the authors, though -- one of whom (EK) has had firsthand experience with Hitler's Germany -- is that there may be just enough suicidal ("martyrdom") potential, at least among Iran's leadership, that "mutually guaranteed destruction" may not be a sufficient deterrent -- even absent the absolute loyalty of much of the population.

We consider it, hence, highly risky to allow Iran to come into possession of an atomic weapon. Nor should our forever optimistic Obama leadership give too much weight to such considerations as Ahmadinejedad having, at one time, said he would not mind giving the Israelis 10 years to vacate the country. Hitler also did give the majority of Jews quite a few years to leave Germany -- provided, of course, they were prepared to leave their real estate and other valuable assets in Germany.

The difference between Hitler's monomania against the Jews and that of Ahmadinejedad against the "Zionist entity" (the State of Israel rather than the Jews, as such), is purely psychological and semantic. Politically, though, it is of no consequence: Hitler's hatred of the Jews, as such, seems to have been highly personal, having apparently been based on his fear that his own blood had been polluted by the seduction of one of his female ancestors by the son of her Jewish employer (hence the origin of the myth of "the lecherous Jew, seducing innocent German women!").

In contrast, Ahmadinejedad's obsession with the State of Israel is much more impersonal or ideologically motivated. In the final analysis, the end result, though, amounts to the same thing: "Juden raus!" -- meaning in Hitler's case, ethnic cleansing of the German population (and, eventually, the whole world), from the Jews themselves.

In Ahmadinejedad's case, "Juden raus!" simply means, out with the Jews from Palestine, the land that they, in his opinion, illegally occupied and where they have no right being.

In our opinion, Ahmadinejedad's monomania with the destruction of the State of Israel, though, is no less dangerous than that of his predecessor, Hitler's obsession with the ethnic cleansing of Germany (and, by implication, of the whole world) from the Jews themselves. Let no one kid himself or herself, though -- (Hillary, are you listening?) -- that Ahmadinejedad's obsession is any less dangerous than was, once, Hitler's obsession with the Jews, as such (in fact, Hillary, if anybody, ought to have plenty of personal experience with the power of personal obsessions, such as, for instance, those of her own husband with sex and food!). It should have immunized her against being overly optimistic to prevail over any obsessions with purely logical arguments. She certainly did not succeed, in that respect, in the case of her own marriage, so why should she be so optimistic in the case of Iran?

Let us just hope that we are dead wrong and that there is still some wiggle room to arrive at some kind of rational compromise with the present Iranian leadership! At the same time, it might be the better part of wisdom to be prepared that rational arguments might not be able to prevail over the Iranian leadership's obsession with what they seem to consider the "absolute necessity" of destroying what they like calling "the Zionist entity" -- that is, the State of Israel.

One thing seems sure already: Breaking through this obsession of the Iranian leadership with the destruction of Israel will not be nearly as easy a task as our own "best and brightest" seem to assume. They are, in our humble opinion, not giving nearly enough attention to the psychology involved, in this particular case. Instead, they appear to let themselves be mostly guided by the so-called "facts on the ground," which all seem to indicate that -- giving the problem proper, personal attention -- a rational solution to the Iran problem ought to be possible. The inconvenient truth, though, may -- alas! -- turn out to be otherwise.

Ahmadinejad

Genocide

Iran

Israel

Eberhard Kronhausen and Phyllis Kronhausen: An Inconvenient Truth About Iran

televisionwashington – Iran Visual News Corps – Israel provides US with intelligence on Iran nuclear site – report -

2009-03-19T04:36:00.001-07:00

Updated: Wednesday, March 18, 2009

11:00GMT—7:00AM/EST

Washington, 18 March (IranVNC)—A senior Israeli defense official provided fresh intelligence to the United States regarding Iran’s nuclear facility in Arak, during a visit to Washington earlier this week, the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan reported on Wednesday.

During his official visit, Israel Defense Forces [IDF] chief, Gabi Ashkenazi, met with General James Jones, national security advisor to US President Barack Obama, and Dennis Ross, senior advisor to the Persian Gulf.

Unnamed US sources told the Saudi daily that Ashkenazi gave US officials new intelligence about the Arak facility, which is believed to contain a heavy water reactor.

Iran has barred inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] from visiting the site to verify that it is being designed for peaceful uses, reports Reuters. Tehran says that the facility will be used to produce isotopes for medical care and agriculture.

Heavy water can be used in certain nuclear reactors or for the production of plutonium, for use in a nuclear weapons program.

Western powers suspect that Iran may design the nuclear facility in Arak to acquire plutonium as another possible source of bomb-grade fuel, besides uranium from its Natanz uranium enrichment plant, which is under IAEA surveillance.

Last month, the IAEA reported that Iran had built a dome over the reactor, meaning that satellite imagery was no longer able to monitor further construction inside the site.

The Islamic Republic says its nuclear activities are entirely peaceful.

Sources: Al-Watan newspaper, Reuters

televisionwashington – Iran Visual News Corps – Israel provides US with intelligence on Iran nuclear site – report -

Chicago Nonpartisan Examiner: Iran democracy possible with help from The Great Satan

2009-03-17T05:03:00.001-07:00

Although the U.S. has been the Great Satan to the Iran Republic for decades, they can take advantage of a democracy movement among a younger generation.

Anytime a westerner thinks of the Iranian revolution, images of Shiite swarms burning stuffed U.S. statesman in effigy come to mind, while mouth foaming throngs chant “death to the Great Satan”. Shocking though it may seem, the fact is perhaps there’s legitimacy behind the accusations that the Unites States has resembled Satan during the course of modern U.S.-Iran history. Iran, of course, certainly not to be outdone, should focus on their side of the street, especially its Islamist theocratic leadership, because one can see demonic likenesses embedded in Iranian wicked rhetoric and actions both internally and on the international stage. The most effective approach to defeating Iran's theocracy is not nuclear deterrence, direct negotiations, economic sanctions or military action, although all those are and/or may be necessary – the most effective approach for the U.S. is to continue developing the seeds of democracy within a new generation of Iranians that crave it.

This is not some far-fetched theory. Ironically, it is U.S. actions that have helped fan the flames of hatred for America, and have enabled an extremist mindset to flourish to date. If there are any doubts, pick up a text on U.S.-Iran relations over the past few decades, and let history judge - especially when we backed Iraq in a bloddy eight year war. But the U.S. is positioned, and fortunate, that a new generation of Iranians yearn for a secular democratic state and an American lifestyle, as pointed out by Christopher Hitchins in an interview, that was done while Bush was still in office, but his recommendations still hold true for Obama:

Hitchins, the ever skeptical atheist and a great fan of what he refers to as that "good idea" called democracy, despises theocratic rule of any type, and believes that, not only Iran, but that Iraq will have a functioning democracy in 10 years. Will he be right? We'll let history judge.

U.S. policy has not only ignited right-wing Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, but the U.S. has gone so far as to stifle democracy in this Persian Islamic Republic, beginning over half of a century ago. In addition, as mentioned in the previous article, U.S. support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s has aggrandized America’s image as “The Great Satan”. Although younger generations have revealed a heart-felt predilection towards American freedom, the U.S. can’t simply wait 10 years for democracy to flourish - like a boy whistling in the dark; it must deal with the regime in power that is led by Ahmadinejad and old guard imams, mullahs and ayatollahs immediately – especially to deter them from weaponizing nuclear power for long-range usage.

In order to attempt diplomacy with Iran, U.S. diplomats must understand Iran – and the more one reviews the chronology of U.S. misdeeds since 1953, as outlined by Eric Margolis in a recent article, Iran’s hatred for the West does make more and more sense.

It all began in 1953, when, based on extending the containment policy to the Middle East, the U.S. and British mounted a coup that overthrew an extremely popular Iranian leader, Mohammed Mossadegh – which ended Iran’s first democratic government. Mossadegh, a leader that put the devastated Iranian state on the road to prosperity by securing a larger portion of its own oil reserves from the grasp of Western greed, was replaced by Shah Pahlavi, an incompetent tyrant, and as a byproduct, Iran’s oil wealth was transferred to British and American control, while the Iranian masses wallowed in abject poverty.

This single event was seared into the minds of an entire generation of Iranians, as Mossadegh and his National Front party were focused on decentralizing power, implementing a representative government, providing public education and accessible healthcare, enacting judicial reforms, and, amazingly, ensuring equality before law. Instead, the country eventually fell into the hands of radical Islamic elements that wanted to turn back the clock to the seventh century.

The Shah’s corruption enabled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni to stage the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which led to the installation of an extremist Islamic government. The C.I.A. and British secret service tried everything in their power to oust the Ayatollah, but eventually the Western powers relied on a dubious ally - Saddam Hussein - to prosecute war against Iran. The ensuing eight-year war between Iran and Iraq led to one million Iranian causalities and deaths, while the U.S and Brits, with some help from Israel, provided arms, intelligence and financing to Iraq, along with chemical weapons - including anthrax. The final devastation is summarized effectively by Margolis:

Iran lay in financial and emotional ruins, with an entire generation killed in battle or horribly maimed by Iraq's western-supplied chemical weapons that included the burning agent’s mustard gas and lewisite, chlorine, cyanide, and a variety of deadly nerve gases.

Ahmadinejad actually fought in the Iran-Iraq war, and based on the overall history of Iran’s struggle with the west, one could only imagine what his feelings are, at depth, about the United States, England and Israel. Regardless, resolution begins with knowledge of the past, and we can only hope Madame Secretary Clinton and her team grasp this. Because it will be harder to capitalize on next-generation Iran’s love for America, if we can’t effectively deal with the current generation’s obvious, and understandable, lack of it.

Chicago Nonpartisan Examiner: Iran democracy possible with help from The Great Satan

A 'back channel' appeal to Iran - Los Angeles Times

2009-03-15T06:22:00.001-07:00

Obama hopes that reaching out to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will open the door to negotiations.

Doyle McManus

President Obama and his aides are preparing to send a secret message to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, inviting him to open a clandestine "back channel" for direct talks between the United States and Iran.
It may sound cloak-and-dagger, but that's how a lot of delicate diplomacy is done. Back-channel talks opened the way to the U.S. relationship with China in 1972, the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement in 1993 and other lesser breakthroughs.
But what will Obama's message say? That's one of the crucial issues Dennis Ross, the administration's new Iran strategist, is wrestling with. Demand too much, and the Iranians may refuse to play. Give away too much, and they may simply ask for more.
So Ross and Undersecretary of State William Burns have been huddling with Iran experts and European diplomats to formulate a strategy.
The administration hasn't decided exactly what form the message should take. It could be a personal letter from Obama to Khamenei, or an oral communication from one diplomat to another. However it's conveyed, it will be a diplomatic version of the "extended hand" Obama offered in his inaugural address. In effect, it will say: We are ready to talk. Just name a time and place.
Beyond that, the message may be notable for what it doesn't say. It may not even mention the touchiest issue between the two countries: nuclear weapons. Obama's goal at this point is to get talks started, not to define their substance.
European diplomats have pushed for Obama's message to Khamenei to explicitly renounce any U.S. ambition of "regime change," a basic condition for talks in the Iranians' eyes. That's an assurance the Bush folks couldn't bring themselves to make, even after they finally recognized that ousting Khamenei was beyond their grasp. It's not yet clear how the Obama team will handle that issue.
One subject of debate is just how tough the U.S. should be. Before assuming his current post, Ross advocated a fairly hard line, writing in a 2007 New Republic article that "penalties, more than [positive] inducements, are the key to altering the Iranian position." But one European diplomat who met with him last week argued that new sanctions should be delayed at least through the spring to allow negotiations a better chance to get off the ground.
On one key point, everyone agrees: Negotiations must be with Khamenei, the cleric who is Iran's supreme leader, not with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or any lesser official.
So will Khamenei bite? The Iranian leader has sent contradictory signals. He has said that Iran has never opposed talking with the U.S. as long as the two countries were on an equal footing. But he also has denounced Obama for supporting Israel and for following "the same wrong path" as George W. Bush.
The strongest impetus for Khamenei to engage is his country's economic crisis. With an official inflation rate of 26% and an unemployment rate of more than 12.5%, Iran has a desperate need for foreign capital and technology to boost oil production. The global economic collapse has had at least one silver lining: It has deprived Iran of the economic power it enjoyed when oil sold for $147 a barrel. Now, with oil below $50, Iran's government is running a deep budget deficit -- and Tehran has a harder time selling bonds than Timothy Geithner.
But even if Iran comes to the table, agreement may be difficult. The U.S. and its allies want Iran to stop enriching uranium and put its nuclear energy program under tighter international control. Iran wants an end to the economic sanctions that have been imposed by the United Nations, the U.S. and the European Union.
But that's not all. Iran wants the United States to stop supporting Iranian rebels in the southern province of Baluchistan. (The CIA has denied funding the groups; the Iranians don't believe the denial.) The United States wants Iran to stop supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both countries are involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both want to reduce the amount of opium and heroin that Afghanistan exports.
If negotiations get underway, the biggest worry is that the Iranians will try to use the talks as a way of running out the clock until their nuclear program is more advanced. That's what frustrated European diplomats believe Tehran did to them over the last five years. So one of the toughest parts of the U.S. strategy will be setting a deadline by which the Iranians must move -- and sticking to it.
Two other potentially difficult scenarios face the United States if Iran agrees to negotiate. One is if the most moderate candidate in Iran's presidential election, Mohammad Khatami, wins. If he were to take office, it would be harder for Obama to walk away from negotiations, even if they were going in circles. A second is if Iran opts for what nuclear experts call the "Japanese option" -- developing a technological capability to produce nuclear weapons without actually making them. That could keep Iran within international rules, making it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to crack down.
During last year's presidential campaign, Obama was criticized by opponents (including Hillary Rodham Clinton) for offering to negotiate with Iran without preconditions. It's now clear that he was right all along; without a more open U.S. approach to Tehran, the international effort to put pressure on the Iranians had reached a dead end. But getting talks started will be only the first hurdle; Iranians pride themselves on their negotiating skill. Obama's real test may be this: If the talks don't make progress, is he willing to walk away from the table?

A 'back channel' appeal to Iran - Los Angeles Times

Roger Cohen: Iran, Jews and pragmatism - Print Version - International Herald Tribune

2009-03-15T06:14:00.001-07:00

Roger Cohen: Iran, Jews and pragmatism

By Roger Cohen

Sunday, March 15, 2009

LOS ANGELES: The Persian New Year, known as Norouz, is celebrated this month, often with great extravagance. Among its traditions is jumping over a bonfire while declaiming: "Take away my yellow complexion and give me your red glow of health."

One way of looking at Iran's particular calendar, its language and its Shiite branch of Islam is as forms of resistance against the Arab and Sunni worlds. Shiism has been a means to independence. The defense of Farsi against Arabic took the form of a medieval epic, Shahnameh, by the poet Ferdowsi.

I have, in a series of columns, and as a cautionary warning against the misguided view of Iran as nothing but a society of mad mullah terrorists bent on nukes, been examining distinctive characteristics of Persian society.

Iran as compared to Arab countries including Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt has an old itch for representative government, evident in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. The June presidential vote will be a genuine contest by the region's admittedly abject standards. This is the Middle East's least undemocratic state outside Israel.

Another Iranian exception is that it had its Islamic Revolution three decades ago. Been there, done that. So its lessons are important.

From Egypt to Algeria to Afghanistan, Islamist movements are radicalized by dreams of establishing everlasting dominion; democracy is feared because it could prove to be their means to power. In Iran, by contrast, life is a daily exercise in compromises that temper Islam with the demands of modern life. Iran is emerging from extremist fervor as clerical absolutism and pluralism spar.

While Bernard Lewis, in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, posits an epochal clash between "Islamic theocracy and liberal democracy" whose outcome will be decisive, I don't see any victor in this fight. Rather, beyond the regional autocratic model, a variety of compromises between the two forces will emerge, as in Iran.

It is therefore in America's strong interest to develop relations with the most dynamic society in the region.

What autocrats from the Gulf to Cairo fear most is an Iranian-American breakthrough, precisely because it will shake up every cozy, static regional relationship, including Washington's with Israel.

Another distinctive characteristic of Iran is the presence of the largest Jewish community in the Muslim Middle East in the country of the most vitriolic anti-Israel tirades.

My evocation of this 25,000-strong community, in the taboo-ridden world of American Middle East debate, has prompted fury, nowhere more so than here in Los Angeles, where many of Iran's Jewish exiles live.

At the invitation of Rabbi David Wolpe of the Sinai Temple, I came out to meet them. The evening was fiery; there was scant meeting of minds. Exile, expropriation and, in some cases, executions have left bitter feelings among the revolution's Jewish victims, as they have among the more than two million Muslims who have fled Iran since 1979. Abraham Berookhim gave me a moving account of his escape and his Jewish uncle's unconscionable 1980 murder by the regime.

Earlier, Sam Kermanian, a leader of the Iranian Jewish community, argued that I had been used, that Iran's Jews are far worse off than they appear, and that my portrayal of them was pernicious in that it "leads people to believe Israel's enemies are not as real as you may think." He called the mullahs brilliantly manipulative: "They know their abilities and limitations."

On at least this last point I agree. Just how repressive life is for Iran's Jews is impossible to know. Iran is an un-free society. But this much is clear: The hawks' case against Iran depends on a vision of an apocalyptic regime with no sense of its limitations so frenziedly anti-Semitic that it would accept inevitable nuclear annihilation if it can destroy Israel first.

The presence of these Jews undermines that vision. It blunts the hawks' case; hence the rage.

I think limitation-aware pragmatism lies at the core of the revolution's survival. It led to cooperation with Israel in Cold War days; it ended the Iraq war; it averted an invasion of Afghanistan in 1996 after Iranian diplomats were murdered; it brought post-9/11 cooperation with America on Afghanistan; it explains the ebb and flow of liberalization since 1979; and it makes sense of the Jewish presence.

Pragmatism is also one way of looking at Iran's nuclear program. A state facing a nuclear-armed Israel and Pakistan, American invasions in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, and noting that North Korea was not hit, might reasonably conclude that preserving the revolution requires nuclear resolve.

What's required is American pragmatism in return, one that convinces the mullahs that their survival is served by stopping short of a bomb.

That, in turn, will require President Obama to jump over his own bonfire of indignation as the Middle East taboos that just caused the scandalous disqualification of Charles Freeman for a senior intelligence post are shed in the name of a new year of engagement and reason.

Readers are invited to comment at my blog: www.iht.com/passages

Roger Cohen: Iran, Jews and pragmatism - Print Version - International Herald Tribune

Iran has not decided to produce nuclear arms, says US intelligence chief

2009-03-11T20:46:00.001-07:00

Iran has not decided to produce nuclear arms, says US intelligence chief

New York, March 11, IRNA -- Iran has not produced the highly enriched uranium necessary for a nuclear weapon and has not decided to do so, U.S. intelligence officials told Congress, according to the Washington Post.

Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair said that Iran has not decided to pursue the production of weapons-grade uranium and the parallel ability to load it onto a ballistic missile.

"The overall situation -- and the intelligence community agrees on this -- [is] that Iran has not decided to press forward . . . to have a nuclear weapon on top of a ballistic missile," Blair told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

"Our current estimate is that the minimum time at which Iran could technically produce the amount of highly enriched uranium for a single weapon is 2010 to 2015."

Blair said there may be no connection between the country's development of missiles and any ambition to have nuclear weapons.

"I believe those are separate decisions," Blair said. "The same missiles can launch vehicles into space. They can launch warheads, either conventional or nuclear, onto . . . land targets, and Iran is pursuing those -- for those multiple purposes. Whether they develop a nuclear weapon which could then be put in that . . . warhead, I believe, is a . . . separate decision which Iran has not made yet."

Blair said Israel was working from the same facts but had drawn a different interpretation of their meaning.

"The Israelis are far more concerned about it, and they take more of a worst-case approach to these things from their point of view," he said.

IRNA diplomatic correspondent said that the US has to admit that the propaganda campaign over Iranian nuclear program had been fabricated by Israel prior to mending ties with Iran.

"The US methodology has focused on admission of the mistakes of the past and that the US had embarked on unfair propaganda against Iran under the so-called intelligence provided by Israel."

Iran is a signatory to Non-Proliferation Treaty and cameras of the International Atomic Energy Agency are monitoring Iranian nuclear sites round-the-clock.

IAEA has verified non-diversion of Iranian nuclear program and Iran renounced nuclear weapons as forbidden in Islam.

Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei in a religious decree has banned production of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

"Any weapons which kills or poisons a large number of people are forbidden in Islam," the Supreme Leader said.

The Supreme Leader said that Iran refrained from reciprocal action when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers in 1980s, because such weapons are forbidden in Islam.

Ex-US envoy to UN backs Iranian-led multinational enrichment program
Berlin, March 10, IRNA -- Iran should be able to own and operate its nuclear facility as part of a multinational program, the former US ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering said Tuesday.
Talking to the website of the weekly Der Spiegel news magazine, Pickering said, "Under this approach, the Iranian government would agree to allow two or more additional governments -- for example, France and Germany -- to participate in the management and operation of those activities within Iran."

"In exchange, Tehran would be able to jointly own and operate an enrichment facility without facing international sanctions," he added.

Pickering stressed resolving the nuclear issue would, in turn, make it possible to end sanctions and for Iran "to enjoy a variety of other benefits, such as membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), increased trade with Europe and, perhaps, normalized relations with the United States."

The ex-US official has repeatedly said sanctions and threats have failed to force Iran to abandon its enrichment program to which it is entitled under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Iran has not decided to produce nuclear arms, says US intelligence chief

Report: Iran Can Get Material to Make 50 Nukes - First 100 Days of Presidency - Politics FOXNews.com

2009-03-05T04:30:00.001-08:00

Another deceptive cage rattling news by FOX and friends

Iran can develop a nuclear weapon within a year and has ready access to enough fissile material to produce up to 50 nuclear weapons, according to a panel of current and former U.S. officials advising the Obama administration.

William Schneider, Jr., chairman of the Defense Science Board and a former under secretary of state in the Reagan administration, offered those estimates Wednesday during a news conference announcing the release of a new "Presidential Task Force" report on Iran by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The report, entitled "Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress," was signed by a team of policymakers, former officials and Iran scholars that included Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind..

Also signing on to the early draft form were two individuals expected to play significant roles in the development of the Obama administration's foreign policy: former Ambassador Dennis Ross, named last month by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as a special envoy on the Iran issue, and Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of state who is expected to accept a senior position dealing with non-proliferation issues.

The "cascade" refers to a set of 164 high-speed centrifuges used to enrich uranium to the high levels necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. The United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, recently reported that Iran has enough low enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon, and currently has 5,600 centrifuges operating at its pilot enrichment facility in Natanz. Iran has declared its intention to add another 45,000 centrifuges over the next five years.

But Schneider said Iran has already "perfected the industrial aspects of enriching uranium," and can easily develop a nuclear weapon long before 2014.

"The ability to go from low enriched uranium to highly enriched uranium, especially if [the Iranians] expand the number of centrifuges, would be a relatively brief period of time, perhaps a year or so, before they'd be able to produce a nuclear weapon," Schneider said at the news conference. "So it's not a long-distance kind of problem."

Moreover, Schneider warned that the fundamentalist Islamic regime in Tehran -- which has threatened to wipe Israel off the map and equipped and funded regional terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah -- has access to significant amounts of the raw fissile material that would be the core ingredient in such a nuclear arsenal.

These indigenous natural resources include "yellowcake," the raw uranium ore that is converted to gas and then fed into the cascades of centrifuges. "Iran has enough yellowcake in the country to perhaps produce enough highly enriched uranium, if they go to that length, to produce perhaps fifty nuclear weapons," Schneider said.

Neither of the other two panel members who appeared alongside Schneider at the news conference -- Eugene Habiger, a retried four-star general and former commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, and Nancy Soderberg, a former ambassador to the U.N. and National Security Council staffer during the Clinton administration -- disputed Schneider's claims.

The Washington Instiyute's nine-page report also warned that Israel "may feel compelled" to take military action to try to destroy or retard the Iranian nuclear program if Russia sells the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran.

"Israeli leaders seem convinced that at least for now, they have a military option," the report states.

"However, Israelis see the option fading over the next one to two years, not only because of Iran's nuclear progress and dispersion of its program but also because of improved Iranian air defenses, especially the expected delivery of the S-300. ... Israel therefore may feel compelled to act before the option disappears."

Schneider, who along with Habiger and Soderberg conferred with high-level officials from Israel, Jordan, Qatar, and Bahrain during a trip to the Middle East last December, reported that the Israeli military still believes it can hold the Iranian nuclear apparatus "at risk," but will no longer hold that view if Tehran acquires more sophisticated air defense technology from Moscow.

"It is the transfer of the S-300 that is likely to be a trigger for Israeli action," Schneider said. "The time frame is getting compressed and we need to act quickly if we are going to be successful [in resolving the issue peacefully]."

"Time is not on our side," agreed Habiger. "We've been mucking about on this issue for years now."

Habiger and Soderberg said it remains possible for the U.S., by working with Russia, China and Arab allies in the Persian Gulf, to persuade Iran not to obtain a nuclear weapon.

"They are a rational actor," Soderberg said of the Iranian regime. "They are deterrable." If the costs of pursuing the nuclear program are made sufficiently high, the panel said -- particularly through the imposition of sanctions on Iran's oil and gas sector -- Tehran's "cost-benefit analysis" could be changed.

Iran's defense minister visited Moscow last month to press for the Russian state-controlled arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, to sell Iran the S-300 system. Russian officials, at least publicly, were non-committal.

However, Iran signed a $700 million contract with Russia in 2005 to purchase 29 low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missiles, which were delivered the following year and became operational in early 2007.

Report: Iran Can Get Material to Make 50 Nukes - First 100 Days of Presidency - Politics FOXNews.com

Iran's Fist Is Clenched for a Reason

2009-03-04T17:48:00.001-08:00

By Muhammad Sahimi

Presidential candidate Barack Obama promised during his campaign that his administration will take a new approach to the crises in the Middle East and, in particular, to the long-standing confrontation with Iran. He promised that his administration would negotiate with Iran without any preconditions. Most recently, President Obama told the al-Arabiya TV, "If countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us."

Like all of his predecessors, however, Obama is not explaining to the American public why Iran's fist is clenched in the first place. If the reason for this were understood and put in the proper context, it would represent a quantum leap toward resolving most, if not all, of the important issues between Iran and the United States, which would then contribute greatly to stability and peace in the Middle East. It all comes down to Iran's historical sense of insecurity, and U.S. policy toward Iran since 1979.

A glance at history tells us why Iranians have a long-lasting sense of national insecurity. Iran is in one of the most strategic areas of world. This was as true 2,000 years ago as it is today. Because of its location, as well as its natural resources, Iran has been invaded and occupied many times by foreign powers, from Alexander the Great and his army to the Arabs, Moguls, Turks, Russians, and British. Over the last 200 years alone, Russia, Britain, and the U.S. have tried to control Iran.

Two Russo-Persian wars that resulted in the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 enabled Russia to separate and occupy a large part of Iran in the Caucasus region (the present Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia), and the British empire ended Iran's political influence in Afghanistan through the Treaty of Peshawar in 1855. In the late 1800s and early 1900s Russia and Britain divided Iran into their spheres of influence. Russia supported the forces that were opposed to Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1908, and it opposed the industrialization of Iran, in particular, the construction of railways. Britain played the key role in the 1921 coup that brought Reza Shah to power in Iran and established his dictatorship. British and Russian forces invaded and occupied Iran during World War II. The CIA-sponsored coup of 1953 overthrew Iran's democratically elected government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh and started the era of U.S. influence in Iran. The U.S. helped establish and train the SAVAK, the shah's dreaded security services. These events ultimately led to the revolution of 1979.

The hostage crisis of November 1979-January 1981, during which 53 American diplomats and embassy staff were taken hostage by Iranian students, should be viewed in light of Iran's bitter experience of the 1953 CIA coup. As one of the student hostage-takers told Bruce Laingen, chief U.S. diplomat in Tehran at that time, "You have no rights to complain, because you took our whole nation hostage in 1953."

The history of Iran-U.S. relations since the resolution of the hostage crisis in 1981 shows that the U.S.' goal has been to hamper Iran's economic development and prevent its integration with the rest of the Middle East. This has meant only one thing to Iranian leaders: the U.S. has never recognized the legitimacy of the 1979 revolution and has always been intent on overthrowing their government. This perception, backed by Iran's historical sense of insecurity, is not difficult to understand.

The U.S. directly encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in September 1980, hoping that the invasion would topple Iran's revolutionary government. When the war started, the U.S. refused to supply Iran with the spare parts for the weapons that it had sold to the shah of Iran, even though Iran had already paid for them (the funds paid to the U.S., lawfully Iran's, are still frozen after 29 years). After the war began, the U.S. prevented the United Nations Security Council for several days to convene an emergency meeting, and after the UNSC finally met, the U.S. prevented it from declaring Iraq the aggressor, or even calling for a cease-fire. Only after Iranian forces pushed back Saddam's army out of most of Iran in the spring of 1982 did the UNSC call for a cease-fire. President Ronald Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Iran in 1983, in violation of the Algiers Agreement of January 1981 that ended the hostage crisis.

The U.S. dropped its pretense of neutrality in December 1983 when President Reagan sent Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad to offer Saddam U.S. support. It kept silent as Iraq showered Iranian troops with chemical weapons. While Iraq was attacking Iran's oil installations in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. and other members of NATO sent their naval forces to the Persian Gulf to protect Arab oil tankers that had provided Iraq with $50 billion in aid to keep fighting Iran. The U.S. destroyed a significant part of Iran's navy in the Persian Gulf, as well as several of Iran's offshore oil platforms.

The U.S. intervention in the war culminated with the shootdown of Iran Air's Airbus A300B2 on Sunday July 3, 1988, by the USS Vincennes. The civilian aircraft, which was flying from Bandar Abbas to Dubai, was carrying 290 passengers and crew, including 66 children, and was flying within Iranian airspace, while the Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters in the Straits of Hormuz. All 290 passengers were killed.

The war finally ended in July 1988, with 1 million Iranian casualties (at least 273,000 dead) and $1 trillion in damage to Iran's economy and infrastructure. At the same time, Iran's extreme Right used the war to suppress progressive forces, stopping Iran's evolution toward democracy.

When it came to compensating the Vincennes victims' families and showing remorse, the Clinton administration exhibited utter contempt for any sense of justice. Although the U.S. agreed in 1996 to pay $61.8 million as compensation for the Iranians killed, it never accepted responsibility nor apologized for the shootdown. In addition, the compensation paid to the Iranians should be compared to what the U.S. forced Libya to pay for the victims of Pan Am Flight 103, which was destroyed on Dec. 21, 1988, over Lockerbie, Scotland: $10 million for each victim.

But the hostility of the U.S. government toward Iran did not end with the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war. Every subsequent move toward Iran � small or large � has been meant to either strangle Iran's economy or prevent Iran from making political gains in the region. Consider, for example, the U.S. government's refusal, in violation of its international obligations, to supply the spare parts for the civilian aircraft that it sold to Iran. The U.S. has also prevented the European Union from selling civilian aircraft to Iran. As a result, Iran's civilian fleet consists mostly of old and obsolete Russian aircraft, many of which have crashed, resulting in high casualties.

While preaching that Iran does not need nuclear energy because it has vast oil and natural gas reserves, the U.S. has made every effort to prevent foreign companies from investing in Iran's oil and gas industry and helping Iran develop its untapped natural gas reservoirs. The U.S. also prevented the transportation of Azerbaijan's oil by a pipeline through Iran and instead pushed for a purely political pipeline through Georgia and Turkey.

Whereas, according to every report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has abided by its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Safeguards Agreement, the U.S. has repeatedly, and without presenting any credible evidence, accused Iran of having a secret nuclear weapons program, even though its own latest National Intelligence Estimate from November 2007 stated that Iran stopped its weapons program in 2003 (and there is actually no evidence that Iran had such a program even prior to 2003). In violation of the IAEA Statute, the U.S. forced its Board of Governors to demand the suspension of Iran's legal uranium enrichment program. The Board of the IAEA has no legal authority to make such a demand.

Such baseless accusations, together with the U.S. blackmail of some members of the IAEA Board, were the primary reasons for sending Iran's nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council (UNSC). But, this was illegal, because it was against Article 12(c) of the IAEA Statute, which clearly states the conditions under which a member state's nuclear dossier should be sent to the UNSC. As Michael Spies of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms has explained [.pdf]:

"Verification and enforcement of the non-proliferation objectives contained in the NPT are limited, in part to maintain the balance of rights and obligations of state parties. NPT Safeguards, administered by the IAEA, are limited to verifying that no nuclear material in each non-weapon state has been diverted to weapons or unknown use. These safeguards allow for the IAEA to report a case of non-compliance to the Security Council only if nuclear material is found to have been diverted."

According to every report of the IAEA, such a diversion has never occurred in Iran's case. As a result, even the legality of the three UNSC resolutions against Iran is in doubt, because they are based on the illegal actions of the IAEA Board. Regardless, not only has the U.S. pressured others to enforce the resolutions, it has also imposed unilateral sanctions and blackmailed others to do the same. Moreover, the U.S. has opposed Iran's membership in the World Trade Organization, hence preventing integration of its economy with the rest of the world.

Iran provided crucial help to the U.S. to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan, but the Bush administration rewarded it by making Iran a member of the "axis of evil." The Shi'ite groups that spent their exile years in Iran, and were supported and funded by it, are now in power in Iraq and are considered allies of the U.S. But, instead of recognizing and appreciating this fact, the U.S. has accused Iran of aiding "special groups" in Iraq, meaning extremists and radicals. And in a show of force, in addition to surrounding Iran with the U.S. forces on three sides, the Bush administration dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf in May 2007. Dick Cheney used the deck of the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis to threaten Iran: "We'll stand with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region. We'll stand with our friends in opposing extremism and strategic threats."

The U.S. has also pushed for the formation of regional alliances against Iran, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, and has sold tens billions of dollars' worth of weapons to the Council's members, weapons that they neither have the capability nor the need to ever use.

Even now that the supposedly realist Obama administration has taken over and the president is looking for Iran's unclenched fist, the threats have not stopped nor changed in nature. Asked if the military option was still on the table with regard to Iran, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said on Jan. 28, "The president hasn't changed his viewpoint that he should preserve all his options. We must use all elements of our national power to protect our interests as it relates to Iran."

Given decades of hostility, sanctions, threats, and attacks, is it any wonder that Iran's fist is still clenched? How is Iran supposed to forget 55 years of hostility without even a simple apology by the U.S. for its misdeeds?

About the author:

Muhammad Sahimi, professor of chemical engineering and materials science, and the NIOC professor of petroleum engineering at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, has published extensively on Iran's political developments and its nuclear program.

Iran's Fist Is Clenched for a Reason

Georgia banks' problems 'alarming,' data show | ajc.com

2009-03-02T08:09:00.001-08:00

In ‘brutal’ third quarter, 26 banks had Texas ratios over 100%

By RUSSELL GRANTHAM

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

Sunday, January 11, 2009

More Georgia banks faced deeper problems from souring loans and other challenges in the third quarter, based on a commonly used measure of their financial health.

The number of banks with high “Texas ratios” — a figure that attempts to gauge how likely institutions are to face insolvency — grew during the quarter ended in September. Most banks’ ratios also got worse.

“The third quarter was brutal,” said Walt Moeling, an Atlanta attorney who represents many of the state’s banks and the Georgia Bankers Association, a trade group.

Georgia once again had the largest number of troubled banks in the nation, with 26 banks with Texas ratios over 100 percent, said Brett Villaume, a research analyst at Atlanta bank consulting firm FIG Partners, which produced the quarterly update based on third-quarter data, the latest available.

“It’s just alarming,” he said. “No other state came close.” He said Florida had seven problem banks, the next largest concentration. Georgia and California tied for the biggest share of the nation’s 26 bank failures last year, with five each.

Moeling said 90 percent of local banks reported increases in problem loans or foreclosures during the quarter as the economy worsened and home sales and building activity remained virtually frozen. More home builders’ and developers’ loans went unpaid, and most local banks booked bigger charges for expected loan losses.

Previously, “there was a lot of denial” among some bankers who hoped home builders could catch up on late loan payments if the real estate market improved, said Moeling, with law firm Bryan Cave Powell Goldstein. “The third quarter ended the period of denial.”

The Texas ratio — developed during the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, when far larger numbers of financial institutions failed — attempts to measure a financial institution’s health by comparing its total defaulted loans and foreclosed properties to total cash reserves and other funds it has available to absorb potential losses. A ratio over 100 percent suggests “you owe more than you have,” Villaume said.

Critics of the Texas ratio say it provides a one-time snapshot and doesn’t reflect the bankers’ ability to shore up cash reserves by raising capital, selling foreclosed houses, cutting expenses and generating additional revenue.

“A lot of things could have changed” since the third quarter ended in September, said David Oliver, spokesman for the Georgia Bankers Association. “We advise people to exercise caution when looking at those numbers.”

Georgia’s bumper crop of problem banks has its roots in the creation of more than 100 new banks since 2000, mostly in metro Atlanta. Those and older banks in turn bet heavily on metro Atlanta’s then-booming residential real estate market by bankrolling developers and home builders. Many of those loans imploded after the real estate market crashed.

“There was an oversupply of new banks. And needless to say, when times got tough, they were the first victims,” Villaume said. “Everyone on the street who was watching for bank failures was surprised there weren’t more [failures] in 2008,” he said.

Still, he and other industry players argue that there are glimmers of hope despite continued grim industry trends. A handful of Georgia’s banks recently have snagged federal bailout money, shoring up their capital reserves.

Outside investors also have injected money or shown interest in a few of the state’s banks. Some troubled banks said they have made some progress toward digging out of their holes by cutting expenses and selling foreclosed properties or other troubled assets.

Five Georgia banks have announced that they were getting federal bailout money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, including Atlanta’s SunTrust Banks and Fidelity Bank, Columbus-based Synovus, and United Community Banks in Blairsville.

None of those banks were on FIG Partners’ troubled bank list. However, industry insiders said some banks on the list have also applied for TARP money. They expect more that currently don’t qualify because of their legal structure — typically the smallest community banks — to apply as well if the U.S. Treasury Department broadens its program rules to cover them.

The parent company of Jackson-based McIntosh State Bank, which landed on the Texas ratio list for the first time in September with a ratio of 101 percent, announced late last month that it is raising up to $14 million from private investors, including Atlanta-based Redemptus Group. McIntosh also said it has applied for $10.7 million from the federal TARP program.

“We feel real good, even though we did creep onto the list,” said William “Pete” Malone, McIntosh’s chairman and CEO.

David D. Stovall, chief executive of Habersham Bancorp., said the Clarkesville bank holding company likewise is applying for roughly $11 million in TARP money after raising new capital at year-end from a private investor.

“We’ve already injected $3 million of private money. … That should bode well in our favor,” said Stovall, whose bank had a 115 percent Texas ratio in September. He said the bank has been “fairly aggressive about addressing issues” by also selling about three foreclosed homes per month.

“We have plenty of capital and plenty of liquidity to ride it out,” he said.

Dan Baker, president of First Security National Bank, with a Texas ratio of 273 percent, said the Norcross-based bank has been able to sell most of its foreclosed homes with modest losses. But the pace is slow because “the public wants to buy them for nothing,” he said.

The 25-employee bank has cut four employees and foreclosed on more than a dozen home builders in recent months.

“It’s a shame, because they’re good people,” he said.

The bank’s federal regulators, who want the institution to raise additional capital, “have been working very closely with us,” Baker said. “I think we’re probably in for a slow 2009. I think we’ve got a ways to go to work through this real estate.”

State banking regulators “obviously want us to raise capital,” said Vincent Cater, chief executive of Freedom Bank of Georgia. The state Department of Banking and Finance hit the Commerce-based bank with a cease-and-desist order last month requiring several improvements. Cater said the bank, which had a Texas ratio of 175 percent, is “talking to several potential investors.” Meanwhile, it has been able to sell foreclosed homes relatively quickly and deposits “remain very stable,” he said.

“I think we’re seeing some leveling off. The problems don’t seem to be getting worse. They’re not getting any better,” he added. “I think we would obviously not like to be on the next [Texas ratio] list.”

Stephen Klein, chief executive of Omni National Bank, said its recent Texas ratio, 219 percent, “doesn’t do justice” to the Atlanta bank.

“We do not have a liquidity problem,” he said, noting that the bank has “$105 million of cash in the bank” and rent coming in from about 70 percent of the roughly 500 foreclosed homes in its portfolio.

Unlike most banks, he said, Omni isn’t rushing to sell those homes because prices fell too far. Following an unusual strategy, the bank made most loans to home builders who were rehabilitating homes in inner-city Atlanta neighborhoods populated primarily by low-income black families.

But those neighborhoods were especially hard-hit, he said, after the market for subprime home loans froze up, sidelining many would-be buyers.

Omni foreclosed on the builders and now rents the houses out until it can work through its problems, Klein said.

“If something happens to the bank, there’s going to be a … void in inner-city Atlanta,” he said.

PROBLEMS GROWING FOR GEORGIA BANKS

More Georgia banks have landed on a list of troubled institutions, as measured by a statistic known as the “Texas ratio.” The formula, used with some modifications by Atlanta-based FIG Partners, attempts to gauge risk levels at banks — the higher the number, the bigger the potential problems.

Bankers want to avoid a score above 100 percent, which indicates that a bank’s problem loans exceed the capital it has to absorb losses.

Bank
Third Q
Second Q

Integrity Bank, Alpharetta
Failed, Aug. 29
510%

FirstCity Bank, Stockbridge
281%
217%

Alpha Bank & Trust, Alpharetta
Failed, Oct. 24
214%

FirstBank Financial Services, McDonough
276%
159%

First Security National Bank, Norcross
273%
201%

First Georgia Community Bank, Jackson
Failed, Dec. 5
199%

Security Bank of Gwinnett County, Suwanee
228%
268%

Community Bank, Loganville
Failed, Nov. 21
237%

Omni National Bank, Atlanta
219%
153%

Southern Community Bank, Fayetteville
209%
196%

First Piedmont Bank, Winder
189%
147%

Neighborhood Community Bank, Newnan
186%
177%

Security Bank of North Metro, Woodstock
181%
94%

Freedom Bank of Georgia, Commerce
175%
124%

Gordon Bank Gordon
149%
80%

McIntosh Commercial Bank, Carrollton
139%
113%

American Southern Bank, Roswell
137%
107%

First National Bank of Georgia, Carrollton
125%
121%

Peoples Bank Lithonia
124%
117%

First Cherokee State Bank, Woodstock
122%
107%

First National Bank of Griffin, Griffin
119%
92%

Chestatee State Bank, Dawsonville
118%
102%

United Security Bank, Sparta
118%
117%

Haven Trust Bank, Duluth
Failed, Dec. 12
116%

Community Bank of West Georgia, Villa Rica
116%
71%

Habersham Bank, Clarkesville
115%
107%

Community Capital Bank, Jonesboro
112%
122%

First Covenant Bank, Norcross 111%
69%

Farmers & Merchants Bank, Lakeland
103%
86%

Tattnall Bank, Reidsville
102%
85%

McIntosh State Bank, Jackson
101%
90

Georgia banks' problems 'alarming,' data show | ajc.com

Why the diplomats are having a hard time explaining Dennis Ross's job - By Laura Rozen | The Cable

2009-02-27T19:32:00.001-08:00

Wed, 02/25/2009 - 9:59pm

When Dennis Ross's job title as "special advisor on the Gulf and Southwest Asia" was finally announced in an after-hours State Department press release Monday evening, it wasn't exactly the high-profile rollout that U.S. special envoys Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell, presented side-by-side with President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Clinton, had previously received.

Indeed, the three-paragraph State Department press release on Ross's job was so vague that State Department spokesman Robert Wood soon found himself besieged by questions about what tasks and indeed what countries exactly were included in Ross's portfolio.

"Is it Iran? And if it's not Iran -- if it's Iran, why is it not written in the statement?" one journalist asked Wood Tuesday.

"Well, let me just start off by saying, the secretary is very happy that Dennis Ross agreed to serve as her special advisor for the Gulf and Southwest Asia," Wood answered gingerly. "What Dennis is going to be charged with doing is trying to integrate policy development and implementation across a number of offices and officials in the State Department. And, you know, he is going to be providing the secretary with strategic advice. He will be also trying to ensure that there's a coherence in our policies and strategies across the region."

"Let me be clear," Wood added. "He's not an envoy. He will not be negotiating. He'll be working on regional issues. He will not be -- in terms of negotiating, will not be involved in the peace process. But again, he is going to be advising the secretary on long-term strategic issues across the region."

On Wednesday, Wood provided more clarity on the list of countries that fall into Ross's portfolio -- Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen, apparently -- but it was hard to escape the impression that State is diplomatically flummoxed about how to describe Ross's job.

Sources suggested a variety of explanations. Some had to do with the fact that the U.S. government is currently in the midst of an intensive policy review on Iran, which is not expected to be ready until early March. (March 10, one source said). Therefore, to describe Ross now as an "envoy" on or to Iran would be premature, they said, since the policy hasn't yet been articulated. Ross might gain the "envoy" title after the policy review is complete, another source suggested.

Other sources suggested the U.S. government was sensitive to Iran's perception that Ross, a former senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is a pro-Israel hawk whose writings on U.S. policy toward Iran have suggested a high degree of continuity with the Bush administration's approach of carrots and sticks.

"I understand the Iranians have let it be known that they won't deal with him," said one former senior U.S. official who has dealt with Persian Gulf issues.

"I think the stealth nature of the announcement and the fuzzy job description indicate that folks in the administration are aware" that the Ross appointment is problematic, the former senior official continued. "But that will not make it more workable -- even if the real heavy lifting is done by [Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William] Burns, as some insiders claim.

"Perception is important," he added.

But Patrick Clawson, deputy director of research at the Washington Institute, stressed that each side gets to designate who they would send for negotations. "Iranian government officials designate who they want, and the U.S. designates who we want. We are very open to having negotiations," he said.

Regarding an idea Ross espoused in recent paper about exploring options for engagement with Iran, beginning with an initial secret backchannel, Clawson said that history demonstrates that such "pre-negotiations" are often conducted clandestinely, "spy to spy." Asked whether such a secret backchannel was even possible given the likely intense international scrutiny regarding what Obama would do on Iran, Clawson said he thought it was conceivable. It might increase confidence on both sides to have an initial channel outside the public eye, he said.

In a September 2008 paper (pdf) published by the Center for a New American Security, "Iran: Assessing US strategic options," Ross recommended a hybrid approach toward Iran of engagement without preconditions but with pressures. "When I say engagement without conditions, I mean that there would be no preconditions for the United States talking to Iran," Ross wrote. "Iran would not, for example, have to suspend its uranium enrichment first. But to avoid Iran misreading this as a sign of weakness, pressures must be maintained. [...]

"So how to talk and preserve the pressures without making either side appear weak?" Ross continued. "One way to do so would be for the United States to go to the Europeans and offer to join the talks with Iran without Iran having to suspend uranium enrichment. To avoid misleading the Iranians into thinking they had won, the price for our doing this would not be with Iran but with Europe. The European Union would adopt more stringent sanctions on investments, credits, and technology transfer vis-à-vis Iran in general or at least on the Iranian energy sector. The Iranians would be informed that the United States is joining the talks but that these sanctions are now being adopted by all European countries."

State Department sources said that Ross was deeply involved in the Iran policy review, but was not the only figure by any means. Other key officials with a stake in the policy, they said, include Secretary Clinton, Undersecretary Burns (who has been serving as the U.S. envoy to the multilateral talks on Iran's nuclear program and met with Iranian officials in Geneva last summer), and officials from State's Iran office.

Also involved, other sources told The Cable, is Puneet Talwar, the new NSC senior director on Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf and a long time Middle East staffer on the Democratic staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who is considered a moderate. Also thought to be involved, although it's not clear to what degree, are Gary Samore, the NSC's nonproliferation coordinator, and Robert Einhorn, the expected State Department undersecretary of state for nonproliferation.

(The Cable previously reported that Samore, among other new Obama administration officials, had participated in track two meetings with Iranian officials last year in Europe. Talwar also attended some of the meetings, The Cable has learned.)

Sources noted that Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan, has hired Vali Nasr, a noted expert on Shiism, and has expressed his intention to involve Iran in regional discussions about stabilizing Afghanistan.

Asked at the Wednesday press briefing whether Holbrooke and Ross would be jostling for turf regarding Iran and Afghanistan, Wood, the State Department spokesman, said no.

"Afghanistan is one of those issues where you have a lot of individuals who have some interests and equities in dealing with it," Wood said. "If we get to a point where there is a need to have both Ambassador Ross and Ambassador Holbrooke engaging on different elements of [Afghanistan] they will," Wood said. "There's no turf war going on here."

UPDATE: David Ignatius writes in his Washington Post column Thursday: "The administration official who oversees the Iran file is William Burns, the undersecretary of state for political affairs. Although Dennis Ross will take a broad strategic look at the region in his new post of State Department adviser, senior officials stress that Burns is the address for Iran policy."

Why the diplomats are having a hard time explaining Dennis Ross's job - By Laura Rozen | The Cable

Tehran Bureau: Who's Telling the Truth About Iran's Nuclear Program?

2009-02-27T19:23:00.001-08:00

By MUHAMMAD SAHIMI
Tehran Bureau | a⋅nal⋅y⋅sis
Since February 2003, Iran's nuclear program has undergone what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) itself admits to be the most intrusive inspection in the agency's history. After thousands of hours of inspections by some of the most experienced IAEA experts, the Agency has verified time and again that (1) there is no evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran, and (2) all the declared nuclear materials have been accounted for; there has been no diversion of such materials to non-peaceful purposes. Iran has a clean bill of health, as far as its nuclear program is concerned.
This is not what Israel, its lobby in the United States, and its neoconservative allies had expected. Such a clean bill of health deprives them of any justification for advocating military attacks on Iran. The illegal act of sending Iran's nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council and the subsequent, highly dubious UNSC resolutions against Iran have also not been effective. So what is the 'War Party' to do?
It has resorted to an international campaign of exaggerations, lies, and distortions. This campaign involves planting lies in the major media and on the Internet, making absurd interpretations of what the IAEA reports on Iran, and issuing dire -- but bogus -- warnings about the speed at which Iran's uranium-enrichment program is progressing. Such warnings have been around for more than two decades. In 1984, West German intelligence predicted that Iran would make a nuclear bomb within two years.
The campaign uses all the instruments of the U.S. political establishment to advance its agenda. The Bush administration routinely talked about "Iran's nuclear weapon program," or "Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons," without ever bothering to present any credible evidence for their assertion. Iran's drive for nuclear weapons has become an article of faith even to President Obama, who, in my opinion, is not pro-war. Leon Panetta, the new CIA director, recently said, "From all the information I've seen, I think there is no question that they [Iranians] are seeking that [nuclear weapon] capability." What information, Mr. Panetta? Enlighten us, please.
An important base for the campaign has been the U.S. Congress. Take, for example, the report by Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.), the then chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, issued on Aug. 23, 2006. The first bullet on page four of the report stated, "Iran has conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement, and despite its claim to the contrary, Iran is seeking nuclear weapons."
Not a single word in this statement is true. Iran did not violate its Safeguards Agreement, signed in 1974 with the IAEA, when it did not declare the construction of the Natanz facility for uranium enrichment. The agreement stipulated that Iran was only obligated to declare the existence of the facility 180 days prior to introducing nuclear materials into the facility. Iran did just that in February 2003, and nuclear materials were brought into the facility during the summer in 2003. The assertion that Iran is seeking nuclear weapon was a lie then, as it is now. No evidence of a secret nuclear weapons program has been discovered. Although the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate released in early December 2007 stated that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it did not present any evidence that the program existed prior to 2003.
A caption to a figure on page nine of Hoekstra's report stated that "Iran is currently enriching uranium to weapons grade using a 164-machine centrifuge cascade at this facility in Natanz." This was another lie. Neither then nor now, when there are more than 5,000 centrifuges at Natanz, has Iran enriched uranium to weapons grade.
According to the bullet at the top of page 11, "Spent fuel from the LWR [light water reactor] that Russia is building for Iran in the city of Bushehr can produce enough weapons-grade plutonium for 30 weapons per year if the fuel rods were diverted and reprocessed." First of all, according to the Iran-Russia agreement, the spent fuel will be returned to Russia. Second, the plutonium from LWR spent fuel is not suitable for making nuclear weapons. Even if it were, it should not be labeled as "weapons grade," because converting it to weapons grade is costly, laborious, and time-consuming. Third, the IAEA monitors the Bushehr reactor operations. There is no possibility of overtly or covertly diverting any nuclear materials.
Such lies and distortions forced the IAEA to take the unusual step of sending an angry letter to Hoekstra. Signed by Vilmos Cserveny, a senior official at the IAEA, the letter took "strong exception to the incorrect and misleading assertion" that the IAEA had removed a senior safeguards inspector for "allegedly raising concerns about Iranian deception," and branded as "outrageous and dishonest" the report's suggestion that he was removed for not adhering "to an unstated IAEA policy barring IAEA officials from telling the truth" about Iran.
The U.S. mainstream media, and in particular the New York Times, has played a leading role in the campaign of lies and deceptions against Iran's nuclear program. One would think that, after all the lies and exaggerations that Judith Miller and Michael Gordon planted in the Times about Iraq's nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, the Times would learn its lesson. Apparently not.
For example, after the Nov. 15, 2007, IAEA report on Iran, which, once again, gave Iran a clean bill of health, Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad of the Times declared, "Nuclear report finds Iran's disclosures were inadequate." This was while the IAEA report itself stated several times that the information provided by Iran was "consistent" with the IAEA findings. The word "inadequate" was not used even once in the report.
Why did Sciolino and Broad -- the "top" interpreters of what the IAEA really says in its reports -- think that Iran's disclosures were "inadequate"? Because, according to them, Iran had asked the IAEA for a meeting in December 2007 to provide information about its P-2 centrifuges, and, therefore, had missed the November deadline. However, the December meeting was about Iran's current activities on its P-2 centrifuge, whereas the November 2007 report was about Iran's past activities. In fact, regarding Iran's past activities on the design of the P-2 centrifuge, the same November 2007 report stated, "Based on visits made by the Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshops in 2004, examination of the company's owner contract [the company contracted to build the P-2 centrifuge], progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement inquiries, the agency has concluded that Iran's statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D activities are consistent with the agency's findings." So, the IAEA said one thing, but Sciolino and Broad claimed a completely different thing. By the way, the article has disappeared from the Times' archives! Even the Times itself does not believe in it.
But Sciolino did not stop there. After the IAEA issued a new report on Iran on May 26, 2008, Sciolino claimed in an article the next day that the IAEA had expressed concerns about Iran's "willful lack of cooperation." No such words or their equivalent can be found in the report. The report stated that the IAEA was trying to understand the role of Iran's military in its nuclear program. Sciolino did not ask any IAEA official why the agency was not concerned about Brazil's navy controlling its uranium-enrichment program and limiting IAEA access to its nuclear facilities (in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). She did not ask any U.S. official why the U.S. was not protesting Brazil's violations of its NPT obligations. Instead, she fabricated nonexistent statements about Iran.
The campaign has an international dimension too. The Australian claimed on Aug. 7, 2006, that Iran had tried to import uranium ore from Congo. Nothing came out of this "report." The conservative British newspaper the Daily Telegraph has made some of the most blatantly false claims. For example, on Nov. 16, 2006, David Blair reported in the Telegraph that Iran tried to get uranium from Somalia's Islamic forces, in return for arms. To give his report credibility, Blair quoted UN officials about Iran's military helping Somali forces. But his claim that Iran wanted uranium in return included no direct quote. It was just a lie. Even the Bush hawks did not buy it.
The Telegraph cooked up another falsehood about Iran's nuclear program, which provoked an angry IAEA response. On Sept. 14, 2008, Con Coughlin, the Telegraph's liar-in-chief, claimed that the IAEA could not account for 50-60 tons of uranium, which was supposed to be in Isfahan, where "Iran enriches its uranium." As the Persian proverb goes, "a liar has a short memory." Coughlin had apparently forgotten the simple and well-known fact that Iran enriches uranium at Natanz, not Isfahan (where the yellowcake is converted to uranium hexafluoride). The IAEA immediately issued a statement through its spokeswoman, Melissa Fleming, rejecting the report. Two days earlier, in another article in the Telegraph, Con Coughlin and Tim Butcher claimed that there were "fresh signs" that Iran had renewed work on developing nuclear weapons.
Typically, Coughlin quoted unnamed sources, the existence of whom can never be verified. In other articles in the Telegraph, Coughlin claimed a link between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence; he alleged that North Korea was helping Iran to prepare a nuclear weapon test, and said that Iran was "grooming" bin Laden's successor, none of which turned out to be true.
Then there is the rabid anti-Iran "group" called United Against Nuclear Iran. It is supposedly a "non-partisan, broad-based coalition" from "diverse ethnicities, faith communities, [and] political and social affiliations." But, the group's Web site is registered to Henley MacIntyre, who was involved in the Republican National Committee/White House e-mail scandal during George W. Bush's presidency. Its executive director is Mark Wallace, who worked with John "Bomb-Iran-for-Israel's-Sake" Bolton when he was the U.S. ambassador at the UN. Others involved are Richard Holbrooke, who is now President Obama's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Dennis Ross, a longtime instrument of the Israel lobby. The group has produced a video asserting that Iran has produced highly enriched uranium, a claim that has been debunked thoroughly not only by the IAEA, but also by others.
Another tactic of the War Party has been spreading rumors and innuendoes about the existence of an internal row in the IAEA over Iran. For example, in February 2008, just as the IAEA was going to report that it had clarified Iran's past nuclear activities, unnamed "senior Western officials" started being quoted saying that some experts within the IAEA were not happy about the report to be released. It forced the IAEA to depart from its routine mode of operation and have a senior official call Reuters to deny the rumors.
In yet another exaggeration of Iran's nuclear potential, much has been said recently about the accumulation of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in Iran. The suggestion is that Iran can enrich its stockpile of LEU to highly enriched uranium (HEU) for bomb-making. This claim has been thoroughly debunked. Briefly, all of Iran's LEU is safeguarded by the IAEA. Its conversion to HEU would require extensive new designs, reconfiguration, and reconnection of the centrifuges in Natanz, none of which can evade the IAEA's watching eyes. Even if Iran could somehow do all of these things, it would only be enough HEU for one nuclear device, which would have to be detonated in a test. Going from a device to a bomb is a difficult task by itself.
In the latest attempt to cast doubt on Iran's nuclear program, suddenly cyberspace and the mainstream media are full of stories about Iran running out of uranium. Up to now, Iran has been using the 600 tons of uranium oxide, or yellowcake, it purchased in the 1970s from South Africa for conversion to uranium hexafluoride and enrichment at Natanz. The stories are based on a report by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel (Dec. 15, 2008). The Rupert Murdoch-owned Times of London, another British newspaper in the business of fabricating stories on Iran's nuclear program, picked up the story and ran with it. Then there was a third report by the Institute for Science and International Security to the same effect. The argument is that if Iran does not have enough yellowcake and cannot import it, then why does Iran bother to have a uranium-enrichment program, unless it is for bomb-making?
Iran has been constructing a facility in Ardakan, which will come online sometime this year, for processing uranium ore into yellowcake. Clearly, had Iran thought that it would not have enough uranium ore, it would not have undertaken the construction of the Ardakan plant. In fact, in December 2006, Iran announced that there are 1,400 uranium mines in Iran, and last month it announced the discovery of uranium ore reserves at three new sites in central Iran. While many sources put Iran's known reserves of uranium ore at about 3,000 tons, the actual number is at least 30,000 tons.
The above is only a small part of all the lies, exaggerations, and distortions of the facts about Iran's nuclear program. All the sound bites about the West respecting Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology are just that, sound bites. The truth is, the West does not want Iran to have access to advanced nuclear technology. Now that Iran has succeeded in setting up a domestic nuclear fuel cycle, including designing new centrifuges, the West wants Iran to dismantle them. Why should Iran give up its legal rights under the NPT and its sovereign rights to develop its uranium resources and indigenous nuclear industry?

Posted by Golnoush at 12:52 PM

Labels: IAEA, Nuclear program

1 comments:

Anonymous said...

Nicely explained. Iran need nuclear energy or is economy and ecosystem gonna suffer a lot.
But as i said always, Iran need a better face in the world. A new moderate president can achieve this, if the Supreme lider get ride of the group Shahrudi-Rafsanjani (corrupted inside the power in my humble opinion), then people like Larijani, Jannati may start thinking to help Khatami to get the Jun election. If not... maybe one day the army get tired of the fanatics and set up a real democracy (islamic of course). Is silence for last 30 years make Iran just a good friend for the Russian interest. Not good enough anymore. Iran Need to by considered by others country's as a partner (and also we need forget helping out revolutions abroad and keep in mind that the former Sha and actual mollah's at the end are the same... Repression... And Evin still there...). In this situation is difficult to make USA and Eu to Understand this. But still, Iran need nuclear energy.

Tehran Bureau: Who's Telling the Truth About Iran's Nuclear Program?

The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop: Dennis Ross and Iran

2009-02-27T19:13:00.001-08:00

By Sasan Fayazmanesh

Sasan Fayazmanesh is the author of The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment - Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2008 (buy from amazon)

In October 2008 I presented a paper, entitled "What the Future has in Store for Iran," at a conference on Middle East Studies. The paper, which was subsequently posted at Payvand.com, examined what the US policy toward Iran might look like if either Barak Obama or John McCain came to office. The conclusion of my essay, stated in its last two lines, was: "In the case of McCain, the war [waged against Iran] might come sooner than later. In Obama's case, one might see a period of 'tough' or 'aggressive diplomacy' before hostilities begin."

            My conclusion was based on the argument that the US foreign policy toward the Middle East has become institutionalized and it makes very little difference who is the president. The starting point of the argument was an analysis that appeared in The Jerusalem Post just before the Bush Administration took office, predicting that the US Middle East policy would be made more by the neoconservative forces within the new administration than anyone else. In one essay, on December 8, 2000, The Jerusalem Post wrote that both Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz "are the type of candidates the pro-Israel lobby is pushing." In another article on January 19, 2001, entitled "All the president's Middle East men," The Jerusalem Post expressed how the "Jewish and pro-Israel communities are jumping for joy," knowing that people like Wolfowitz will be in the new administration. The essay predicted: "What you will have are two institutions grappling for control of policy." It then added: "It is no secret in Washington�or anywhere else for that matter�that the policies will be determined less by Bush himself and more by his inner circle of advisers."

            The message of the Israeli analysts was clear: the Middle East foreign policy of the US has become institutionalized; and rather than watching the US president, one has to watch the institutions that would make the policy. Given this message, my analysis of what the future has in store for Iran concentrated on a few neoconservative institutions and individuals. In particular, I predicted that if Obama were to be elected, the US policy on Iran would be made mostly by Dennis Ross, the "consultant" to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP or simply Washington Institute), a "think tank" affiliate of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). That prediction has now come true. On February 23, 2009, it became official that Dennis Ross is the "Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Gulf and Southwest Asia."[1] The title, as will be explained below, is not what Ross had hoped for, but he would still be in a position to influence the US policy toward Iran.

            Who is Dennis Ross, what does he advocate, how was he positioned to become the adviser on Iran in the Obama Administration and what will he do to Iran if he gets the chance? Let me briefly review the case.

            Dennis Ross is best known as the dishonest broker who led the so-called negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the Clinton Administration. He was "Israel's lawyer," to use Aaron David Miller's apt description of the role that Ross's "negotiating team" played in the Clinton era, particularly in 1999-2000.[2]

            Ross, along with Martin Indyk�who was Clinton's national security advisor and the US Ambassador to Israel�is a cofounder of the Washington Institute.[3] After leaving office in 2000, Ross became the director of the WINEP. Once the 2008 presidential election approached, Ross jockeyed for a position, left his directorship job and became a "Consultant" to the institute.[4] Originally, Ross and Indyk represented one wing of the WINEP, a wing which appeared to be close to the Israeli Labor Party. Another wing, closer to the Likud Party, and particularly Benjamin Netanyahu, consisted of individuals such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, individuals who played a pivotal role in planning the invasion of Iraq.[5] The difference between the Likud and the Labor wing of the Washington Institute was mostly one of the means employed rather than the end sought.[6] Both wings of the WINEP, similar to Kadima, strove toward a "Greater Israel" (Eretz Yisrael) that includes all or most of "Judea and Samaria." They both saw Iran's support for the Palestinian resistance as the biggest obstacle in achieving that goal. As such, the charge that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and posing an "existential threat" to Israel became a convenient tool for "containing" Iran and stopping its support for the Palestinians.[7] What separated the two sides was that the Labor wing believed that sanctions will eventually bring Iran to its knees, cause either a popular uprising to overthrow the Iranian "regime" or make Iran ripe for a US invasion. The Likud wing, however, had very little patience for sanctions. It wanted an immediate result, a series of military attacks against Iran, replacing the Iranian "regime" with a US-Israeli friendly government, as was done in Iraq. With the emergence of the Kadima Party in Israel in 2005, which brought together the likes of the Likud Party member Ariel Sharon and Labor Party member Shimon Peres, the differences between the two wings of the Washington Institute has mostly disappeared. Clinton's Middle East men, such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk and Richard Holbrooke, are hardly distinguishable from Bush's men, such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. But since the latter group is temporarily out of office, the former is filling in. Ross has become the designated senior Israeli lobby man in Obama's Administration. He has no expertise when it comes to Iran. But he knows that for the cause of Eretz Yisrael Iran must be contained; and given this goal, he knows how to recite, ad nauseum, all the usual lines of Israel and its lobby groups against Iran.

            After breaking the back of the Palestinians and pushing for the invasion of Iraq, the Israeli lobby groups concentrated their forces to contain Iran. Given the Iraq fiasco and the neoconservatives falling from grace, the Israeli lobby groups settled on Dennis Ross, "Israel's lawyer," to lead the task of containing Iran. Since Ross has no knowledge of Iran, other members of the lobby, particularly their Iran "experts," have been assisting Ross in his new role. Among these is the ex-Trotskyite, neoconservative Patrick Clawson, WINEP's "deputy director for research" and an anti-Iran zealot who has been obsessed for decades with the containment of Iran and Iraq.[8] Over the years, with the help of these individuals Ross has developed a strategy to contain Iran. The strategy consists of arguing that: 1) Iran is developing nuclear weapons; 2) Iran is a threat to the US and an existential threat to Israel, and Israel will not tolerate "mullahs with nukes" (Sydney Morning Herald, October 16, 2004); 3) "nuclear deterrent rules that governed relations between the United States and the Soviet Union" do not hold when it comes to Iran, since Iranians, especially their president, are irrational and believe in the "coming of the 12^th Imam" (The Washington Post, May 1, 2006); 4) Iran's nuclear ambitions will start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; 5) the Bush Administration's policy of dealing with Iran did not work, because it did not have enough sticks or carrots; 6) the US should push for a direct, but "tough" or aggressive diplomacy to stop Iran from enriching uranium and supporting "terrorism" (Newsweek, December 8, 2008)[9]; 7) the aggressive diplomacy should include pressuring the Europeans, as well as the Chinese and Russians, to stop trading with Iran; 8) the prohibition of trade should include preventing Iran from importing refined oil products and, ultimately, blockading Iran; and 9) once this tough and aggressive diplomacy fails and Iran does not change its "behavior," then the US could legitimately launch military attacks against Iran, arguing that the it did everything in its power to resolve the situation peacefully.

            The above arguments were summarized on March 13, 2008, in a news report in The Jerusalem Post, entitled "Visiting Obama Middle East adviser: He'd be great for Israel." According to this report, Mel Levine�a "staunchly pro-Israel" former congressman from Los Angeles and, along with Dennis Ross, "one of Obama's seven Middle East advisers"�told The Jerusalem Post during a visit to Israel that Obama believes that "the way to stop Iran was with a combination of carrots and sticks." Levine was further quoted as saying: "He believes that if you use carrots and sticks and engage in multilateral aggressive diplomacy then if you need to use the military option or do anything that needs to be done you are much more likely to get support of allies, more international support and broader American support." Mr. Levin had cut to the chase and stated clearly what Dennis Ross had been advocating for years, but in a more convoluted and diplomatic language. The "tough" and "aggressive diplomacy," as Mr. Levin had made clear, was nothing but a series of motions that would set the stage for military action against Iran.

            Ross's arguments are often devoid of any factual content, as I have shown in "What the Future has in Store for Iran." For example, in June 2008 the Washington Institute published a "Presidential Study Group Reports" entitled "Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge."[10] One of the two "co-convenors" of the report was Dennis Ross.[11] Subsequently, the advisors to both presidential candidates endorsed the report.[12] As I argued in my October essay, this 6-page WINEP report�which was funded by a foundation supporting neoconservative causes, and was drafted in consultation with the WINEP's "Israeli counterparts"�contains almost nothing factual and, indeed, in several places contains errors. For example, like much of Ross's other writings, this report tries to give the reader the false impression that Iran is building nuclear weapons. Yet, anyone familiar with the International Atomic Energy Agency's reports knows that after many years of inspection, the IAEA has been unable to show any evidence of diversion of nuclear material in Iran. Or the report claims that the UN Security Council resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment program have been "unanimous." As I have stated in my essay, even a cursory look at the news would reveal that this claim is false. For example, the third UN Security Council resolution, Resolution1803, did not pass unanimously. Indonesia abstained during the vote.[13] Furthermore, as most news sources pointed out, "Libya, South Africa and Vietnam joined Indonesia in expressing reservations [about the resolution]" (AFP, March 3, 2008). Ross's arguments, as I have shown in my October essay, are also often quite illogical. It is, for example, not at all clear why Iran's nuclear ambitions will start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, while Israel's decades-old possession of nuclear weapons has not led to such an arms race. Similarly, it is not clear why Iranians, who might have certain religious beliefs, are irrational, but Israelis, who justify the existence of Israel on religious grounds, are rational.

            After the June 2008 "Presidential Study Group Reports," which was endorsed by Obama's and McCain's advisors, Ross and company wrote the September 2008 "report of an independent task force sponsored by the bipartisan policy center" on "U.S. policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development."[14] In this report they put forward the same falsehoods and illogical arguments. At the same time a neoconservative campaign was launched, under the title "United Against Nuclear Iran" (UANI), in which Ross played a prominent role as the "Co-Founder and Co-Chairman." The "Advisory Board" of UANI included, beside Ross, such notable figures as the neoconservative Mark Wallace, the President of UANI, advisor to Sarah Palin and a John Bolton recruit for a position at the UN; R. James Woolsey the neoconservative and member of the advisory board of The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs; Henry Sokolski the neoconservative signatory of the "Project for the New American Century signatory"; and Richard C. Holbrooke, another "Co-Founder and Co-Chairman" of UANI.[15] The neoconservative campaign included a slick and scary video advertisement, which is still available on the web.[16] The video started with the message "Stop Terrorism, Stop Human Rights Abuses, Stop Nuclear Iran." Small prints at the bottom of the message read "Paid for by the American Coalition Against Nuclear Iran, Inc." Following the introduction six hands appeared, black and white, joining in a circle around a map of Iran. The viewer was asked to "join the cause" by clicking on the video. If followed, a note would appear that read: "Send a message to the nation that Iran's nuclear program is unacceptable. Join United Against Nuclear Iran today and receive news updates and event reminders." Then the viewer was asked for name and email address. This was followed by an ominous video about Iran's alleged development of nuclear weapons, repeating the same falsehoods and illogical arguments put forward by Dennis Ross and company on behest of the Israeli lobby groups.

            After President Obama took office, the media was filled with the news of the impending appointment of Dennis Ross as Iran envoy. Yet the appointment appeared to be postponed. Various explanations appeared in the media for the postponement. Some reasoned that the postponement was at least partly due to Ross's close ties with Israel. For example, on February 3, 2009, Robert Naiman wrote in the Huffington Post that "allegation of 'dual loyalty' is being raised against Dennis Ross." He further mentioned that Ross is "still chair of the board of the Jerusalem-based 'Jewish People Policy Planning Institute,' as indicated by that organization's website."[17] Others emphasized the fact that as far as Iran is concerned Ross's appointment might kill any chance of rapprochement between Iran and the US. For example, The Christian Science Monitor reported on February 5, 2009, that from an Iranian perspective Ross is the "pioneer of the American-Zionist lobby" and under his leadership during the Clinton years the US policy was "not one millimeter different from Israeli policy." The report quoted a "Western diplomat" as saying: "There is no doubt they [Iranians] are all going to look at Ross as an Israeli proxy."

            Some of the explanations given for the postponement of Ross's appointment also explain his vague and broad job title, "Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Gulf and Southwest Asia." Before the end of the 2008 presidential election there were rumors that Ross might be considered for the position of the Secretary of State (Haaretz, October 24, 2008). Once Obama was elected, and Hilary Clinton became Secretary of State, Ross apparently hoped to become at least the "special envoy to Iran." But given his close ties with Israel and the fact that his containment plans were well known to the Iranians, he had to settle for a less provocative title. Needless to say that the new title, "Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Gulf and Southwest Asia," is still quite provocative as far as Iran is concerned, since changing the name of the Persian Gulf to simply "Gulf" is offensive to many Iranians.

            Whatever the reason for the postponement of Ross's appointment and change of title, one thing is clear: the sly fox is now guarding the chicken coop. As Mel Levine said about Ross: "He'd be great for Israel." With the help of Richard Holbrooke, Stuart Levey�Bush's Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, who is now in Obama's Administration�and all the other "president's Middle East men," Dennis Ross might be able to finish the unfinished business of the neoconservatives, the containment of Iraq and Iran. The Israelis and pro-Israel communities must be jumping with joy once again!

Sasan Fayazmanesh is Professor of Economics at California State University, Fresno. He can be reached at: sasan.fayazmanesh@gmail.com

Notes

[1] See Daily Press Briefing, The U.D. Department of States: or The Washington Post

[2] See "Israel's Lawyer," The Washington Post, May 23, 2005:

[3] See Swisher, Clayton E., 2004, The truth about Camp David: the untold story about the collapse of the Middle East peace process, New York: Nation Books, p.35.

[4] See Washington Institute.

[5] The name of these individuals appears on the "Board of Advisors." See "About the Institute," available at: Washington Institute.

[6] Ross, for example, supported the invasion of Iraq, even though he was critical of some of the post-invasion policies of the Bush Administration (see "Obama's Conservative Mideast Pick," Time, July16, 2008).

[7] For different meanings of "containment" see my book: The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment, Routledge, 2008.

[8] For Clawson's relentless attempt to contain Iran see The United States and Iran Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment Routledge, 2008.

[9] Dennis Ross, "Iran: Talk Tough With Tehran," Newsweek. .

[10] The report's title was: "2008 Presidential task Forces: Task Force on the Future of U.S.-Israel Relations: Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen the US-Israel Cooperation on The Iranian Nuclear Challenge." It is available at: Washington Institute.

[11] The other "co-convenors" was Robert Satloff. The two Washington Institute participants, who apparently wrote the piece, were the neoconservatives Patrick Clawson, "deputy director of research," and David Makovsky, "senior fellow and director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process."

[12] On behest of Obama Anthony Lake and Susan Rice endorsed it, and on behalf of McCain former congressman Vin Weber and the neoconservative R. James Woolsey signed the document.

[13] See Security Council Resolution 1803, March 3, 2008:

[14] See "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development"

[15] See "Leadership" of "United Against Nuclear Iran":

[16] See www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/video/view/4.

[17] See www.jpppi.org.il and www.jpppi.org.il

The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop: Dennis Ross and Iran

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

2009-02-27T04:38:00.001-08:00

By Richard M Bennett
There now appears to be a growing consensus of expert opinion that Iran is but a few short months away from being capable of producing its first crude nuclear weapon.
Some may choose to see this event as "crossing the red line" and even as a trigger for military action as the threat of a nuclear capable Iran may well simply not be tolerated in some quarters.
However, before such an argument can be easily accepted, it would be wise to consider just what actually constitutes a threat.
So is Iran now or likely to be anytime soon a genuine "clear and present danger" to either Israel or the West?
To many within the Intelligence community, only a genuine capability and a clear intent equates to an actual threat.
Failing to learn the lesson of Iraq
Failure to stick to this essential truth sadly provided the backdrop to the gross mistake made over Iraq and Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.
British premier Tony Blair and president George W Bush in their head-long gallop towards war made much of the claim that there was a threat and it would seem, perverted such intelligence information that was available to support this otherwise unsubstantiated claim.
Their respective national intelligence services, the Central Intelligence Agency and SIS (MI6) had significantly failed to provide incontrovertible proof of either a genuine Iraqi WMD capability or a clear intent to use such weapons.
This factor was deliberately ignored or perhaps even suppressed by the US and British governments and this deceit would only emerge much later in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion.
In the time-honored political blame avoidance game, both Bush and Blair moved quickly to ensure that the intelligence services themselves would carry the main responsibility for this failure, neatly sidestepping any serious chance of being held to account for their own incompetence and culpability by their respective electorates.
Indeed, the British government remains so worried about the exposure of these unpalatable facts that even in 2009 current Justice Minister Jack Straw will reportedly exercise veto powers to block publication of key cabinet minutes under freedom of information laws.
Straw added that he could not permit the release of records from 2003 discussions over the invasion of Iraq because it would cause too much "damage" to democracy.
Iran's nuclear progress
So does Iran instead provide a genuine threat or is it still more of a danger to itself?
There is now probably sufficient information available to world bodies such as the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency for many observers to finally accept that within a matter of months Iran may be capable of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to build its first crude nuclear weapon.
That said, Iran almost certainly remains five years or more away from having a genuine war-fighting nuclear capability.
It would though now appear likely that Iran has finally managed to overcome most of its outstanding technical difficulties in weaponizing uranium.
This is still not a newly discovered fact, despite the constant changes in position on the subject by the US intelligence community and the advice it offers to the White House.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies predicted in September 2005 that by feeding the uranium it produces back through a minimum of 1,000 centrifuges at Natanz, Iran may only take as little as three years to produce some 25 kilograms of weaponized uranium. This is assumed to be enough for a prototype nuclear weapon.
Iran now has about 50,000 fast-spinning centrifuges; including increasing numbers of the much improved IR2 working round the clock and this in theory should be more than sufficient for a full-scale nuclear-weapons program.
However, simply having enough suitability modified material does not in itself produce a workable weapon and the problems still facing Tehran's reported nuclear weapons program remain immense.
The level of sophisticated engineering involved in producing a viable weapon takes years to evolve and would almost certainly require external scientific help from Iran's known allies, Pakistan, North Korea and Russia, which is building a nuclear plant for Iran that is near completion.
An effective trigger to detonate the weapon must still be manufactured and tested. Then the weapon must be tested, a major problem in itself. Keeping such a test secret would effectively be nigh on impossible, and despite claims that tremors recorded by the United States Geological Survey on October 21 and 25 last year were the result of Iranian underground nuclear explosions, it is highly unlikely that Iran has attempted such a test yet.
Any nuclear device would also need to be produced in a somewhat miniaturized form to create a weapon capable of being deployed in the warhead of the types of long-range missiles now available or carried under the wings of one of Iran's increasingly elderly fleet of jet strike aircraft.
Even then, further and lengthy testing would certainly be required to ensure that any WMD that might be fired at Israel or any of Iran's Arab neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, would indeed explode or that the missiles used were accurate enough to actually hit their target areas.
Then there is the small matter of producing enough of these weapons to create a genuine and believable nuclear threat or indeed a putative deterrent. And this still assumes that the Iranian government has developed suicidal tendencies and that the nation as a whole has a death wish.
Consequences of using nuclear weapons
Any nuclear attack on Israel would probably see the prevailing winds carry much of the radioactive fallout back across the Palestinian-controlled West Bank; Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, the oil fields of northern Saudi Arabia and much of Iran itself.
However, the main consequences of any such nuclear strike on the cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa and such important strategic targets as the nuclear facilities at Dimona, would be Israel's own immediate nuclear response and the inevitable near total destruction of many strategically important targets in Iran.
Tehran's military, economic and civilian infrastructure would be devastated and this could involve the deaths of as many as 30-50% of its entire population within just a few short years after the nuclear attack.
Indeed, with an almost guaranteed and probably even more devastating US response to any such attack on Israel or indeed one of Washington's Arab allies, Iran may even effectively cease to exist altogether as a functioning country.
The immense fallout from such a devastating nuclear retaliation would also gravely endanger much of Pakistan and northern India, and pose a potentially catastrophic threat to many hundreds of millions of the citizens of those two countries alone.
Nuclear weapons – a false hope for Iran?
Simply put, the mere possession of the nuclear bomb will not automatically give Iran a greater usable military power or increase its overall influence in the region, as its leadership apparently anticipates.
While if Tehran's leadership were actually foolish enough to use nuclear weapons, it would undoubtedly ensure the near total destruction of the Islamic Republic of Iran, turning it into an uninhabitable wasteland.
A genuine nuclear capability could in all probability turn out to be a greater long-term threat to Iran's own survival than to any of its neighbors.
Nuclear weapons for deterrence?
It could be argued that the possession of a small number of nuclear-tipped missiles could provide Iran with a deterrent against attack.
Indeed, this belief may well have helped drive Iran's ally North Korea to produce such weapons in the face of continued international condemnation.
However, few rational observers could seriously argue that North Korea would risk actually using them against its southern neighbor as such an action would ensure its own destruction at the hands of South Korea's ally, the US.
This same rationale could be applied to Iran, unless an argument can be made for Tehran welcoming its own nuclear annihilation.
Taking Iran's security requirements seriously
Much attention is paid, and rightly so, to the security of Israel and to the interests of the United States, but little attention has been given to Iran's security needs - the regional problems facing Iran are indeed serious.
Not only does Iran have an ongoing Kurdish (Party For a Free Life in Kurdistan - PJAK) insurgency in its northwestern provinces and a growing Baloch insurgency in the southeastern border areas with Pakistan, the government in Tehran is also deeply concerned at being surrounded by countries that are in various states of collapse or conflict - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and the former Soviet Central Asian countries and by potentially hostile forces such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and the massive US military presence in the Gulf.
However, it remains difficult to find an enemy likely to need deterring from an attack on Iran by its possession of nuclear weapons. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are unlikely foes, while the chances of Saudi Arabia or Israel attempting an invasion are quite laughable.
Only the US has the military power to attempt such an attack and Washington would probably only feel it necessary to do so to prevent Tehran achieving just such a nuclear capability.
It seems likely, though, that against this backdrop of perceived insecurity, Iran will still continue to pursue a nuclear insurance strategy at whatever cost to its international relations.
Iran as a future nuclear supermarket
Perhaps one of the greatest causes for Western and Israeli concern is the prospect of Iran's nuclear technology and weapons-grade material being passed to other states such as Syria or to even less scrupulous groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and worst of all, al-Qaeda.
The same counter-argument must, however, be deployed once again.
With modern forensic techniques allied to continual surveillance by Western intelligence, it remains highly unlikely that the technology and materials used in any terrorist attack would not be quickly traced to Tehran.
The same devastating response could be expected as it is almost inconceivable that Iran would be allowed to escape its punishment and ultimate destruction.
The last resort - the military option
Iran is well aware that its WMD facilities could be targets. Israel destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and laid waste another similar facility in Syria in 2007.
Tehran's nuclear program is therefore widely dispersed, well hidden and often buried up to 25 meters underground. It is also increasingly well defended by a sophisticated air defense system.
The Israeli air force could seriously damage many of Iran's important facilities with conventional weapons, but not destroy it. Only the United States has the numbers and range of weapons needed to demolish the entire program, which is stretched across more than 100 sites, in a massive pre-emptive strike. However, such an all-out attack would create extensive collateral damage and large numbers of civilian casualties.
An alternative may be for constant relatively small-scale attacks on the main facilities at Bushehr, Natanz and other strategically important targets to cripple Iran's nuclear ambitions.
In other words, a campaign of attrition using a combination of closely targeted air and cruise missile attacks and sabotage operations on the ground to simply wear down Tehran's resistance.
This may be Israel's preferred method and one that Washington could be more prepared to buy into. Whatever action Israel and the US may eventually decide on, time is still running out and the military option could well have a sell-by-date of mid-2010 at the latest.
The Iran problem
Except in the highly unlikely circumstance that it has already managed to produce a significant number of nuclear weapons in complete secrecy, then Iran is not yet a clear and present danger to its neighbors or to Western interests.
There can be little doubt that Iran is a potentially major destabilizing factor in the Middle East, it has a more than irrational foreign policy and quite openly supports groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas in Palestine, and it may indeed eventually become a nuclear threat.
But in the long run possession of nuclear weapons is unlikely to be of any tangible benefit to the mullahs, while their actual use would bring the quick and completely justified destruction of the state of Iran.
Whatever the Western powers or Israel finally decide is the appropriate diplomatic, economic or military action to take in response, it must be hoped that it will be made only on the basis of sound intelligence, after careful evaluation has been made of all the proven information available and in the absence of any truly viable alternative.
To repeat the mistakes of 2003 would be to invite disaster not only for Iran, but for the remaining creditability and long-term security of the Western democracies themselves.
Richard M Bennett, intelligence and security analyst, AFI Research.

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

Interview - Iran May Achieve Capability to Make A Nuclear Weapon in 2009 - NYTimes.com

2009-02-26T04:24:00.001-08:00

Interviewee: David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security

Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

David Albright, a long-time expert on Iran's nuclear program, says that Iran will probably accumulate enough low-enriched uranium this year to "reach the first level of breakout capability, namely enough low-enriched uranium to make one nuclear weapon." And in an ironic twist, he says even though Iran's stated goal is to have a nuclear program for domestic power, it appears to be running out of uranium for such a plan. "It's one of the unfortunate ironies of the situation that while they don't have enough uranium for a civil nuclear energy program, they have plenty for a weapons program," Albright says. "Even if Iran runs out of uranium, they have more than enough to eventually produce tens of nuclear weapons." He urges the United States to seek tougher sanctions, but also to open wide-ranging negotiations with Iran.

You've been following Iran's nuclear activities for years. Could you provide an update on its progress so far?

Iran continues to move forward on developing its nuclear capabilities, and it is close to having what we would call a 'nuclear breakout capability.' That's a problem because once Iran reaches that state then it could make a decision to get nuclear weapons pretty rapidly. In as quickly as a few months, Iran would be able to have enough weapons-grade uranium for nuclear weapons. And if a breakout occurred, they would not likely do so at the well-known Natanz enrichment plant. Rather, the Iranians would most likely take low-enriched uranium that's produced at that plant and then divert it at a secret facility that we wouldn't know anything about. And at this secret facility, the Iranians would produce this weapons-grade uranium. And so if you were in the camp that said, 'Well, we'll have to strike militarily,' you won't actually know where to strike because you won't know where that secret facility is. Whatever camp you are in, the situation is bound to grow more tense. So for 2009, probably the big technical issue is when Iran establishes this breakout capability. It could be soon. They don't need that much more low-enriched uranium before they reach the first level of breakout capability, namely enough low-enriched uranium to make one nuclear weapon.

So you think it could happen even within the next year or so?

Within this year, it could happen. Once Iran reaches that breakout capability, countries will have different responses. Some, like Russia, will probably say, 'So what? They're still not building nuclear weapons.' The United States will have to worry that they don't know Iran's intentions. The U.S. government has believed Iran would eventually seek nuclear weapons and it would have to face the prospect that it could happen with little notice, complicating any negotiation process. A country like Israel will see it as a major threat because they'll worry that if things do go bad and Iran decides to get nuclear weapons, they can do so quickly, and Israel wouldn't know what or where to strike. For Israel, an Iranian nuclear breakout capability brings up existential questions.

Your organization, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), recently published a report (PDF) saying essentially that Iran was running out of uranium oxide, so-called yellowcake. It had just enough to make some nuclear weapons, but it didn't have enough for electrical power, their ostensible purpose in enriching uranium. How should an American official interpret that report?

Iran has some domestic uranium resources, and it's constructed two uranium mines. But for some reason, it's way behind opening the larger one. But it is operating the smaller one. But even if you look at the total capacity of those mines, it's not large enough if you want to have a full-blown nuclear electricity program. And for that kind of program, with up to eight 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors, you need a lot more uranium than what Iran can produce. Iran has never really had the uranium resources to support an indigenous nuclear electricity program. So they are dependent on importing the fuel. If you consider the Bushehr reactor, that's what they did. They bought the reactor from Russia, and they also bought the fuel for at least ten years. What they've been doing so far to operate the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility is depending on a stock of roughly six hundred tons of "yellowcake" that they imported from South Africa in the 1970s. They've been using it to make uranium hexafluoride at the Isfahan facility, and if they operate Isfahan anywhere near capacity, then they're going to run out pretty soon. They don't produce enough in their own mines for a civil electricity program. Their stock of imported yellowcake is running out and so, they're reaching a point where they're going to have to take some steps to improve their situation. They could try to smuggle in uranium, and that is something to watch for. From our point of view, the best thing they can do is work out a solution with the international community so they can proceed with the nuclear electricity program and import the low-enriched uranium fuel that they need for those reactors. Once they have a deal, and the West and Russia are fully prepared to guarantee the Iranians their supply of low-enriched uranium, then that will free them from this bind of too little uranium. Now, on the other hand, it's one of the unfortunate ironies of the situation that while they don't have enough uranium for a civil nuclear energy program, they have plenty for a weapons program. Even if Iran runs out of uranium, they have more than enough to eventually produce tens of nuclear weapons. It's a situation where you have to wonder whether Iran's intention all along was to have the infrastructure to have a bomb program and it was never intending to achieve an indigenous civil nuclear electricity program.

All right, now you're in the White House, and you're on the National Security Council staff, which is trying to come up with an Iran policy. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gave a speech today where he says that we might be interested in talking to the United States, but don't ask us to stop our nuclear program because that's not negotiable. ISIS made some recommendations (PDF). What is your opinion?

Don't accommodate Iran with short-term solutions. Iran is determined to move forward right now. Compromises that the United States may offer, such as settling for merely slowing down the enrichment program, are guaranteed not to work. The important thing is to maintain the U.S. goal of an Iranian suspension of uranium enrichment. It is also important to increase the sanctions on Iran in order to try to get Iran to rethink its calculation on whether an enrichment program is in their interest. It's critical to also negotiate directly with Iran, so Iran understands what the United States wants, and the United States understands what Iran wants. And then it's important to broaden this issue to the entire Middle East. It's very important right now to start talking about a Middle East free of enrichment plants and reprocessing plants [that can separate plutonium], which could be used in nuclear weapons. And so, you want to achieve a region that doesn't have nuclear weapons capabilities. Then inevitably, bring in other players, some very much of concern to Iran. Israel would be number one, but also Egypt and Turkey-they're not going to respond favorably as Iran develops nuclear weapons. You need to bring in more players striving for a goal of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons capabilities.

Do you think it's at all possible that Israel would agree to be involved in such a thing?

They have in the past. In the 1990s, they were willing to consider achieving a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, if the conditions were right. In the 1990s, the key issues revolved around Iraq and Iran and the security threats they posed. And so, the threat of Iran remains for Israel, but Israel doesn't see many military options out there. It could be open to this idea. It's also not asking Israel to give up its nuclear weapons. It's asking Israel to give up production of plutonium and any highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. They've already got plenty of nuclear explosive material. <em />

How do you get Iran to agree to a freeze if Iran keeps saying it won't do it?

You have to change the conditions, and you also have to accept that achieving this goal is going to take a long time. It is useful to think of the examples of Pakistan and South Africa. In the case of Pakistan, in the 1970s when Pakistan was working all-out on an enrichment program, the U.S. position was initially, 'No, we can't tolerate that.' And then it started to accommodate itself to Pakistan's enrichment program because of other priorities; first, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We eventually got Pakistan to cap its enrichment output at 5 percent or so. And that didn't hold once Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998.

But in the South Africa case, the vision held. The goal was a South Africa without nuclear weapons, and sanctions were put on South Africa. South Africa, under tremendous pressure, because of its isolation internationally, decided that it had to do two things. One of which was to give up apartheid and the other [was] to give up nuclear weapons. The key factor was that the United States and the others didn't falter on pressing South Africa. What do we have in Pakistan? The opposite. Now we have to fear Pakistan for many reasons. One of which would be a nuclear war with India, and the other, it could be the place where the wherewithal to build nuclear weapons is acquired by terrorists which use these weapons against us. So the accommodation approach, unfortunately, is by no means guaranteed to be successful, and it's better to focus on what we really want and work on that. But it's a long-term issue. You have to maintain your resolve, and tensions are going to increase like they did in southern Africa.

You're saying it would be helpful to talk to Iran, but you have to put the nuclear freeze up front?

I would. It is essential that the United States talk to Iran directly. And talk to them on many fronts. The United States should allow diplomats to engage with Iranians around the world.

There's still discussion about whether there should be an interests section in Tehran [a U.S. office that would fall short of diplomatic recognition]. I guess that's all going to come out of this policy review.

The interests section is a step forward, but there's a more fundamental decision that's needed. Is the United States going to allow negotiations with Iran? That's the more fundamental issue, and also, it allows more freedom in making the next decision. How do you actually have negotiations with Iran? Many would probably argue that we secretly start mid-level negotiations rather than having some top-level envoy approach Iran in a visible way. It's just harder to negotiate when everyone is watching you, but you can't do either unless you permit these discussions to take place-government to government-and create the mechanisms for that to happen.

It's also important in this to remember that you want to avoid setting up this situation with Iran where you are forced to two choices, namely capitulation or military strikes. Military strikes are very unlikely to be effective unless you're willing to launch massive campaigns against the country and that means going to war against Iran. I don't think anyone wants to do that. And I'll also say, even in that case, you might not stop Iran from building nuclear weapons because in the end, the places that they would need to make nuclear weapons are not that large. And after being attacked, they would likely launch a Manhattan-style program [the code name for the U.S. secret program during World War II to produce the atomic bomb]. So I would still say that military options are just not feasible. That doesn't mean you can't apply pressure on Iran, and I would argue that if you're not going to favor military strikes, then you need to focus more on sanctions to get Iran to rethink its priorities on enrichment.

How do you get the Russians to be be more cooperative on this?

One way is what [Vice President Joe] Biden said, "push the reset button" on relations with Russia. The Obama administration should look again on all the issues involved with missile defense and arms control, in particular the START treaty. The United States can engage with Russia in a less confrontational mode and see if in the process, Russia will be more helpful in Iran. It may not, but the approach taken by the Bush administration clearly didn't work, because if you increase the tension with Russia, particularly on nuclear issues, they're less likely to help you on Iran. So it's worth trying. Now, it's not necessary to get Russia, although it would be very helpful to get Russia to put a bit more pressure on Iran. You at least don't want to create situations where Russia has more incentive to work against U.S. interests on Iran. More productive engagement on nuclear arms-control issues can go a long way in stopping that.

Interview - Iran May Achieve Capability to Make A Nuclear Weapon in 2009 - NYTimes.com

Israel launches campaign against UN nuke watchdog chief - Haaretz - Israel News

2009-02-26T04:15:00.001-08:00

Israel launches campaign against UN nuke watchdog chief

By Yossi Melman

Tags: IAEA, syria, iran

Israel's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) recently intensified its attacks on the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. The AEC, one of the most classified bodies in Israel that is also, among other things, responsible for operating the Dimona nuclear reactor, does not often issue public statements, and usually plays down its activities.
But in recent months, given the IAEA director's actions relating to all aspects of Syria and Iran's nuclear programs, the committee decided, with the consent of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, to stop tiptoeing around the issue. The AEC now hurries to respond to ElBaradei's interviews, in which he often speaks of Israeli in critical tones.
The latest expression of this new policy is a letter to be published this week in the latest issue of the American weekly magazine, Newsweek, written by the AEC spokeswoman Nili Lifshitz. Lifshitz is leaving her post at the end of the week after years on the job to assume a different position in human resources at the Nuclear Research Center (NRC, the Nahal Sorek nuclear reactor, which the AEC also oversees). But she does not hesitate to criticize the IAEA director sharply.

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According to her, ElBaradei, "failed in his attempts to persuade Syria to allow visits by IAEA inspectors to three sites in Syria with suspected links to Syria's confidential nuclear program."
Even the IAEA director's attempt to arrange for a true investigation into Syria's efforts to obfuscate and cover up the evidence at the site bombed in September 2007 failed, Lifshitz wrote. Syria hustled the building rubble and dirt from the site so that it would not be possible to uncover what was built there and what was going on.
The AEC spokeswoman stressed in her letter that the suspicion is that Syria set up a North Korean-made nuclear reactor at the site, an action that is contrary to its agreements with the IAEA.
But instead of focusing on these issues, ElBaradei has deemed it appropriate to denounce and criticize the State of Israel.
"Unfortunately, this has become typical behavior on the part of the IAEA director," Lifshitz wrote, "as part of his efforts to divert attention away from his failed attempts to arrange for a fitting and appropriate investigation given the accumulated information and proof that Middle Eastern states are clearly violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."
Soft on Iran
Israel's pointed criticism takes on a special significance against the backdrop of the most recent IAEA report and a briefing on Syria and Iran for reporters presented by a senior agency official. The report and the briefing presented additional evidence that the bombed site in Syria was built as a nuclear reactor resembling one in North Korea. The IAEA report also rejected Damascus' claims that the uranium traces found at the site were from the missiles that destroyed the structure, i.e., that they are part of the Israeli Air Force's armaments.
The letter to Newsweek follows a previous letter also sent by the Israeli AEC to The Wall Street Journal in response to another ElBaradei interview. In that interview, he also claimed that Israel, like Iran, is not cooperating with his organization, and in so doing attempted to draw a parallel between the two countries.
ElBaradei, an Egyptian legalist and veteran diplomat who has been affiliated with the United Nations in general for over 35 years, has been considered for many years to be a "red flag" by the AEC. He is perceived by senior AEC officials, which is responsible for contacts with the IAEA, as someone not known for his pro-Israel views, to put it mildly.
According to diplomatic and defense officials in Israel, ElBaradei was negligent in handling all matters relating to the Iranian nuclear crisis. In reports he wrote, which were written in soft, evasive and conciliatory language, he allowed Iran to evade over the course of six years its commitments according to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its agreements with the IAEA.
The United States was also not overly pleased with the IAEA director. About four years ago, the Bush administration tried to bar his reelection to the post, but failed due to the tremendous support for ElBaradei from the bloc of Third World countries, with the backing of Russia and China.
As a result, for years, Israel, even though it was not satisfied with ElBaradei's handling of the job, had to act diplomatically. Israel was hesitant about openly airing its reservations and tried to maintain favorable ties with him, and keep up a professional working relationship.
ElBaradei visited Israel more than four years ago, met with the leaders of the AEC, visited the Nuclear Research Center, but was not permitted to visit Dimona, because Israel (unlike, for example, Iran and Syria) is not a signatory to the NPT and therefore is not obligated to allow international oversight of the Dimona reactor.
Nevertheless, in recent months, as noted, the policy has shifted prompted by the AEC director, Dr. Shaul Horev, and with the approval of the prime minister. Presumably, the attacks are coming due to the report that ElBaradei will leave his position at the end of the year and be replaced by a new director, with representatives from South Africa and Japan vying for the spot.

Israel launches campaign against UN nuke watchdog chief - Haaretz - Israel News

kenny's sideshow: Drum Machine: Spinning for War with Iran

2009-02-25T06:09:00.001-08:00

Chris Hedges, Truthdig, Feb. 23:
There is a lot riding on whom President Obama names as his special envoy to Iran. If, as expected, it is Dennis Ross...we will be in deep trouble....

The New York Times, Feb. 24:
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Monday appointed Dennis B. Ross, a seasoned Middle East negotiator under Republican and Democratic presidents, as her special adviser for the [Persian Gulf] and Southwest Asia, a portfolio that will include Iran....Mr. Ross had advocated a tough approach toward Iran that included persuading Europe to increase economic pressure on the government in Tehran. He is a co-founder of United Against Nuclear Iran, a group dedicated to stopping the country from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The drumbeat for an attack on Iran -- pounded by American and Israeli militarists, and their multitude of sycophants -- never ceases. At times it blends into the background noise of other events that surface to dominate the howling cacaphony of the corporate media bubble, but it never goes away. Very weighty factions in the American power structure, and their Israeli allies, are strongly committed to making such an attack happen, and they continue to press their agenda -- patiently, relentlessly -- no matter who is temporarily managing the empire.
In recent days, they have upped the volume, bringing the issue back to the fore. As many others have pointed out (most notably Arthur Silber, in this powerful piece), the warmongers have seized on an unremarkable report by the International Atomic Energy Agency noting that it had underestimated the amount of enriched uranium at Iran's nuclear facilities. The IAEA said this kind of undercounting was not uncommon in dealing with nascent nuclear programs. And in any case, the undercounted uranium was not missing or "hidden;" it was there, in plain sight, open to international inspectors -- who, in the due course of a thorough inspection, found it and added it to the total.

The IAEA also reported the fact that Iran has deliberately slowed the pace of its nuclear enrichment program, leaving it even further away from developing a nuclear weapon -- if, in fact, it were developing a nuclear weapon, which both the IAEA and the U.S. intelligence appartus says it is not. In short, the IAEA report was good news that could have provided a clear and fruitful opening to any administration seeking a "new approach" to Iran.
But none of this mattered to the warmongers, who immediately seized upon the drums that are always at their command in the higher reaches of the national media. As Kaveh L Afrasiabi reports in the Asia Times:

From the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and London's Mirror, the Guardian and the Financial Times, among other leading international newspapers, the reaction has been a steady stream of alarmist commentaries. Many reports regard this an Iranian "milestone" in reaching "nuclear break-out capability".
....A Los Angeles Times report was headlined "Iran has enriched enough to make a bomb, report says" while the New York Times went out of its way to convey the impression that Iran had deliberately "understated" the magnitude of its enriched uranium. The New York Times added serious fuel to this raw information by citing an "anonymous" IAEA official who claimed that "theoretically" Iran is capable of making a nuclear bomb...
The US government spokesperson, Gordon Duguid, was quick to denounce Iran and parrot the line that Iran must suspend all its "uranium-enrichment related reprocessing". This despite the fact that all the IAEA reports - including this most recent one - state categorically that "there are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities" at Iran's nuclear facilities.
Wouldn't it be nice if the US officials first bothered to read - or read carefully - the reports that they rely on to sledgehammer Iran?

Oh, they read them, all right. They read them very carefully -- then cherry-pick phrases and factoids to twist as they see fit. Silber nails it thusly:

If our rulers are determined to go to war, they will go to war. It may take them years or even a decade, but if the war is important enough to them, they'll get to the war eventually. As needed to prevent significant protest from a docile, easily manipulated public, they will lie about every significant aspect of the alleged threat we face and about what we "must" do. And what we "must" do is always to kill lots and lots of people, most of whom have never even thought of harming us.

And let's be clear about one thing: the United States is already at war with Iraq. Washington is already sponsoring terrorist attacks inside Iranian territory by extremist groups, including Jundullah, America's own little al Qaeda. As Hedges notes:

Iran has endured our covert support for armed militant groups from the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) to the Free Life Party of Kurdistan to the repugnant Jundullah, also known as the Army of God, a Sunni fundamentalist group that operates with U.S. support out of Pakistan. Jundullah has carried out a series of bombings and ambushes inside Iran. The militant group has a habit of beheading Iranians it captures, including a recent group of 16 Iranian police officials, and filming and distributing the executions.

As you can see, bombings and beheadings and deathporn videos are not inherently evil; they can also be a force for good -- as long as they put to the service of America's ever-noble, ever-lofty foreign policy ideals.
With the appointment of Dennis Ross, the Obama Administration has given its response to Iran's gesture of slowing down the enrichment of uranium for its nuclear energy program. As Hedges wrote:

“For the US to shape a peaceful relationship with Iran will be difficult under any circumstances,” Stephen Kinzer, author of “All the Shah’s Men,” wrote recently. “If the American negotiating team is led by Ross or another conventional thinker tied to dogmas of the past, it will be impossible.”
...Obama has an opportunity to radically alter the course we have charted in the Middle East. The key will be his administration’s relationship with Iran. If he gives in to the Israel lobby, if he empowers Ross, if he defines Iran as the enemy before he begins to attempt a negotiated peace, he could ignite a fuse that will see our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolve into a regional conflagration. This may be the most important decision of his presidency. Let’s pray he does not blow it.

Well, he has "blown it" -- although the use of that phrase assumes that Obama ever intended to "radically alter the course we have charted in the Middle East." He gave zero evidence of such an intention throughout the campaign -- rather the opposite -- and so his appointment of Ross, and his reaction to the non-story about the IAEA inspection, do not constitute a "mistake" on his part, at least not on his own terms.
For example, the Obama administration has now fully embraced the subtle shift made by the Bush Administration regarding Iran's atomic ambition, from declaring that Iran will not be allowed to build a nuclear weapon to declaring that it will not be allowed to develop any nuclear program at all. This allowed the Bushists, and now the Obamaniks, to elide the uncomfortable fact that there is no evidence of any nuclear weapons program in Iran. As we noted here back in December 2007:

Anyone hoping that the "no nukes in Iran" NIE report might hobble the Administration's armed march toward Persia should take note of how George W. Bush moved the goal posts in his warmongering game during a press conference on Tuesday.
As the New York Times reports, Bush declared that Iran will not be "allowed" to acquire even the "scientific knowledge" required to build a nuclear weapon. Previous "red lines" which could trigger an attack had been based on Iran actually building a weapon; now even nibbling at the forbidden fruit of nuclear knowledge could serve as "justification" for a "pre-emptive strike" to quell the "danger." After all, as Bush rather illiterately told reporters, "What's to say they couldn't start another covert nuclear weapons program?" Better safe than sorry, right?
And at the very least, moving the goalposts in this manner will allow the Bush Regime to portray Iran as a dangerous, defiant menace for merely carrying on with its fully legal nuclear power program, as authorized by international treaty and monitored by the IAEA. Thus no matter what Iran actually does – or doesn't do – the Bushists will continue to use the "Persian menace" as fodder for the imperial war machine.

Now here is Obama's envoy to the UN, Susan Rice, speaking in February 2009:

The US envoy to the United Nations, Susan Rice, meanwhile said in a radio interview that the IAEA report "confirms what we all have feared and anticipated, which is that Iran ... remains in pursuit of its nuclear program."
"There's no ambiguity about that, and our aim is to combine enhanced pressures, and indeed the potential for direct engagement to try to prevent Iran from taking its program to fruition," Rice said in remarks to be aired later Friday on National Public Radio's All Things Considered program.

Note what is being said here. The United States is declaring its intent to prevent Iran from taking its "nuclear program" to fruition. Rice, following Bush, is careful not to say "nuclear weapons program," because Washington's own intelligence agencies affirm there is no evidence for such a thing. But, as Arthur Silber noted, this doesn't matter. The very notion of Iran having a nuclear program of any kind is now the issue -- an issue justifying "enhanced pressures." And considering that the United States is already maintaining a near-complete economic and diplomatic blockade of Iran -- and killing Iranians with terrorist attacks -- what could those "enhanced pressures" be, other than overt military action? As the saying goes, there is not a sliver of daylight between the Bush and Obama position on this point.
The Bush Administration said it was willing to contemplate and if need be countenance war if Iran continued to pursue its treaty-sanctioned, internationally inspected nuclear energy program. The Obama Administration has just said the same thing -- even after Iran had slowed its nuclear energy program as a gesture toward the "new approach" that Obama mentioned in the campaign. Obama has appointed a secretary of state who publicly vowed to "obliterate" Iran -- and its 70 million human beings -- if Tehran launched an attack on Israel. He has now given this secretary of state a special envoy who is one of the fiercest anti-Iran hawks in Washington.
As Stephen Kinzer notes, Obama has just made the task of shaping a peaceful relationship with Iran well-nigh impossible. A cynic might suspect that this was his intention all along.
But let us not be cynical in the still-blazing dawn of our new era. Let us give the new president every benefit of the doubt, and say that he is indeed committed to a peaceful relationship with Iran -- as long as Iran capitulates to all of America's demands, gratefully accepts American hegemony and cheerfully countenances America's blowing up and beheading of its citizens.
Still hard to see that sliver though, ain't it?

kenny's sideshow: Drum Machine: Spinning for War with Iran

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

2009-02-25T05:49:00.001-08:00

By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is increasingly appearing like a dysfunctional fire station - it's become an agency designed to put out fires triggered by the heat of nuclear proliferation, and yet can't help but ignite a few flare-ups along the way.
The recent handling of Iran's

nuclear issue has been such a brushfire for the United Nations' watchdog. The latest report by director general Mohammad ElBaradei has instigated a media furor over the disclosure that the IAEA had previously underestimated the volume of enriched uranium at Iran's nuclear facilities by some 30%.
From the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and London's Mirror, the Guardian and the Financial Times, among other

leading international newspapers, the reaction has been a steady stream of alarmist commentaries. Many reports regard this an Iranian "milestone" in reaching "nuclear break-out capability".
At a crucial time when the Barack Obama administration is pursuing carefully quilted diplomacy to reach out to Tehran, such new alarms are bound to impact the tempo and speed of the White House's approach. Israel has already criticized Washington's tactics as "too slow".
Small wonder then that last Friday the news about Iran's "nuclear milestone" coincided with news from Israel that prime minister-designate Benjamin Netanyahu has prioritized Iran's nuclear program as "the greatest existential threat to Israel".
Netanyahu and his hawkish colleagues in the emerging new Israeli government have much to thank from the IAEA for maintaining a cloud of question marks over Iran and its true nuclear "ambitions". Such uncertainties are turned all the more potent by the alarmist spins in the pages of the New York Times and other leading dailies.
And spin they did ever so expertly. A Los Angeles Times report was headlined "Iran has enriched enough to make a bomb, report says" while the New York Times went out of its way to convey the impression that Iran had deliberately "understated" the magnitude of its enriched uranium. The New York Times added serious fuel to this raw information by citing an "anonymous" IAEA official who claimed that "theoretically" Iran is capable of making a nuclear bomb. However, the unnamed source was careful to include important qualifiers, such as "if" Iran kicks out the IAEA or switches off the IAEA surveillance cameras.
More important, such reports give the IAEA a sour reputation. After all, it is fully outside the norms and standards of the UN atomic agency to have one of its senior officials brief reporters and yet refuse to go on the record officially in the name of "diplomatic sensitivities". The anonymous official seems completely oblivious to the double standard of engaging in such "theoretical" posturing that militates against the IAEA's own norms and principles.
"Theoretically, if you count how many uranium 235 atoms there are in 1,000 kilograms of LEU, you will have enough uranium 235 atoms for a significant quantity of [highly enriched uranium]. So in theory, this is possible, but if they use [Natanz], they are not there yet," the senior IAEA official was quoted as saying.
Have any of these high-brow gentlemen at the IAEA ever openly entertained such guess work about other countries, such as Japan, which has enough enriched uranium to manufacture a couple of dozen bombs within months? Why focus only on Iran? Hasn't the time come for the IAEA to level the playing field now that the era of the George W Bush administration's frenzy of Iran disinformation has formally, if not actually, come to a close?
A glance at the Obama administration's reaction to the IAEA report raises issues about the latter question. The US government spokesperson, Gordon Duguid, was quick to denounce Iran and parrot the line that Iran must suspend all its "uranium-enrichment related reprocessing". This despite the fact that all the IAEA reports - including this most recent one - state categorically that "there are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities" at Iran's nuclear facilities.
Wouldn't it be nice if the US officials first bothered to read - or read carefully - the reports that they rely on to sledgehammer Iran? It would be equally important for Washington, and the wealth of Iran-bashers in the Western media, to ponder the IAEA clarification on the issue of Iran's under-reporting the volume of its enriched uranium that has been communicated to this author by the agency's spokeswoman, Melissa Fleming.
IAEA's clarification
Fleming's letter to this author, dated February 22, 2009, states: "There have been a number of reports in the media commenting that Iran has under-reported the production of low enriched uranium at Natanz. In this regard, it is important to note that:

As clearly indicated, 'estimates' of production quoted in IAEA reports to the Board of Governors have been just that, ie best estimates made by the operator (this is also the case for the estimate of production - 171 kg between 18 November 2008 and 31 January 2009 - given in the latest report);

Such estimates are based on the operator's predictions of how the plant will perform - they are not formal declarations by the country;

In contrast, the figures given in the IAEA's latest report for the amount of low enriched uranium actually produced as of 17 November 2008 (839 kg of UF6) were based on actual measurement made by the operator that have been carefully verified by the Agency.
It is also important to note that:

No nuclear material could have been removed from the facility without the Agency's knowledge since the facility is subject to video surveillance and the nuclear material has been kept under seal;

The Agency has no reason at all to believe that the estimates of the low enriched uranium produced in the facility were an intentional error by Iran - they are inherent in the early commissioning phases of such a facility when it is not known in advance how it will perform in practice;

Iran has provided good cooperation on this matter and will be working to improve its future estimates."
Despite the IAEA's candid reaction to the erroneous media spin on its latest report, the question of fair play and the need for the agency to stop playing politics with the Iran file continue to loom large. The same applies to respected nuclear scientists, such as David Albright who has expressed serious "surprise" at the IAEA's finding about the magnitude of enriched uranium in Iran (which is not half as surprising and certainly not uncommon, according to Fleming's letter).
Albright's exaggerated response, as well as the distorted spins seen in the New York Times, raise serious questions about the ability of the Obama administration to pull off anything meaningful from its diplomatic track with Iran, especially considering the constant bombarded of such Iran-phobic feedback.
As long as the US media, experts and key players in the "administration of knowledge" about nuclear Iran continue to churn out alarmist reports it is doubtful that any meaningful change in the US's approach toward Iran will be forthcoming. Still, the IAEA's timely clarification gives some small hope that the brushfire of Iran's nuclear stand-off may be fading out - rather than spinning out of control.
After all, the same IAEA report repeatedly confirms that there is no evidence of military diversion and that the environmental samplings at the enrichment facilities confirm Iran's declaration.
As for the thorny issue of Iran's heavy-water reactor under construction in Arak - where Iran has unilaterally rewritten the scripts for IAEA inspections in reaction to the UN sanctions deemed "unjustified" - it is fairly certain that as part of a quid pro quo to normalize Iran's file, Tehran is willing to re-adopt those provisions of the subsidiary agreement with the IAEA that permit the latter's verification of design information.
Iran is in the mood for compromise. This stance is reflected in the IAEA report that Iran has de-accelerated its enrichment-related activities as a gesture to the Obama administration. This important information should have had the upper spot in the Western media's stories on the IAEA report. Yet only the Washington Post saw fit to highlight this angle in the headline of one of its news articles on Iran.
Hopefully, after learning of the IAEA's important clarification - which in essence exonerates Iran of any nuclear foul play - the rest of the Western media will follow suit.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry, click here. His latest book, Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing , October 23, 2008) is now available.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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BBC NEWS | Middle East | Q&A: Iran and the nuclear issue

2009-02-22T18:06:00.001-08:00

Iran is defying Security Council resolutions ordering it to suspend the enrichment of uranium.

Why is Iran defying the Security Council?

Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a country has the right to enrich uranium to be used as fuel for civil nuclear power, but not to the much higher level needed for a nuclear weapon. It has to remain under inspection from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Iran says it is simply doing what it is allowed to do. It argues that it needs nuclear power and wants to control the whole process itself. It says it will not break its obligations under the NPT and will not use the technology to make a nuclear bomb.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly stressed that Iran will not yield to international pressure: "The Iranian nation will not succumb to bullying, invasion and the violation of its rights," he has said.

So why is the Security Council ordering Iran to stop enrichment?

The Council is concerned because the technology used for producing fuel for nuclear power can be used to enrich the uranium to the higher level needed to produce a nuclear explosion.

Iran hid an enrichment programme for 18 years, so the Council says that until Iran's peaceful intentions can be fully established, it should stop enrichment and certain other nuclear activities. The Council's order is obligatory and supersedes other rights.

What precisely does the Security Council and the IAEA want Iran to do?

It wants Iran to stop all enrichment activities, including the preparation of uranium ore, the installation of the centrifuges in which a gas from the ore is spun to separate the richer parts and the insertion of the gas into the centrifuges. It also has to suspend its work on heavy water projects, notably the construction of a heavy water reactor. Such a reactor could produce plutonium, an alternative to uranium for a nuclear device.

The IAEA has also called on Iran to ratify and implement an additional protocol allowing more extensive inspections as a way of establishing confidence.

What does the IAEA say?

The IAEA has Iran's fuel enrichment plant under its surveillance and says in its latest report in February 2009 that Iran is continuing to enrich uranium, though the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says this is not at such a high rate as earlier. The IAEA also says that, following a detailed examination, it had found that Iran has accumulated more low-enriched uranium than had been thought - more than 1000 kilograms. This is regarded as enough basic material from which to make a nuclear device. However the uranium would have to be enriched further and the IAEA is watching. It says it has found no evidence that Iran has diverted material for weapons purposes.

The IAEA also reports that Iran is not cooperating with its request for an answer to questions about possible studies on nuclear warheads carried out in the past.

Incentives are being offered to Iran. What are these?

A renewed offer was made in summer 2008 by the US, Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany, known as the P5+1 (the permanent five on the Security Council plus Germany) or the E3+3 (the European three plus the three others from the Security Council). It builds on a previous offer of 2006 and says that if Iran suspends uranium enrichment, then talks can start about a long-term agreement.

On offer is recognition of Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the treatment of Iran in "the same manner" as other states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Iran would get help with developing nuclear power stations and be guaranteed fuel for them. It would also be offered trade concessions, including the possible lifting of US sanctions preventing it from buying new civilian aircraft and parts.

What was Iran's reply?

Iran said publicly that its position was unchanged, suggesting that it would not suspend enrichment, the condition set for any talks. President Ahmadinejad said the demand was "illegitimate".

What about an interim negotiation known as the "freeze-freeze"?

Under this idea, Iran would freeze its enrichment programme at the current level and the P5+1 would agree not to impose further sanctions for a limited period. The hope is that this would help substantive talks but the P5+1 insistence on the suspension of enrichment would still need to be dealt with.

What sanctions were imposed on Iran in March 2008?

Resolution 1803 extends asset restrictions and travel bans on more Iranian individuals said to be involved in nuclear work and on more Iranian companies. It bans the sale to Iran of so-called dual-use items - items which can have either a military or civilian purpose - as well as calling on governments to withdraw financial backing from companies trading with Iran, to inspect cargo going into and out of the country, and to monitor the activities of two Iranian banks.

What sanctions were imposed earlier?

Resolution 1737 was passed in December 2006. It mandates all UN member states "to prevent the supply, sale or transfer... of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems".

In March 2007, the Council passed resolution 1747. This seeks to tighten the squeeze on Iran's nuclear and missile programmes by preventing dealings with the state Bank Sepah and 28 named people and organisations, many connected to the elite Revolutionary Guard. Member states have been told to exercise restraint in and to report the travel of individuals connected to these programmes.

Imports of arms from Iran are banned and member states are told to exercise restraint in selling major arms systems to Iran. Loans are supposed to be limited to humanitarian and development purposes.

What about further sanctions?

On 10 June 2008, the US and the EU announced at a summit in Slovenia that they were ready "to supplement (UN) sanctions with additional measures."

On 23 June, the EU agreed to freeze assets of Iran's largest bank, Bank Melli, and to extend visa bans to more Iranians involved in nuclear and missile development.

On 27 September 2008, the Security Council reaffirmed existing sanctions but did not impose new ones.

What does the US intelligence assessment say about Iran?

The National Intelligence Estimate plays down any early threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon. It assesses "with high confidence" that Iran did have a nuclear weapons programme until 2003, but this was discovered and Iran stopped it.

The NIE adds: "We do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons." The assessment admits that Iran appears "less determined" to develop nuclear weapons than US intelligence had previously thought.

It says that the earliest date by which Iran could make a nuclear weapon would be late 2009 but that this is "very unlikely".

Does the report lessen the chances of an attack on Iran?

It did for a time but more recently, talk has grown again, especially from Israel. President Bush still refuses to rule out any "option".

And Israel has reportedly carried out a major air force exercise, seen as practice for a raid on Iran.

Does everyone accept the NIE report?

No. Israel does not. The Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said on 12 February 2008 that Israel thought Iran was aiming to create "a capacity for non-conventional weapons."

And in London on 5 March 2008, a senior British diplomat said: "Many of us were surprised by how emphatic the writers [of the NIE] were... I haven't seen any intelligence that gives me even medium confidence that these programmes haven't resumed."

Even the Director of US National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, appeared to backtrack on 28 February 2008, in evidence to the Senate Armed Forces Committee.

In this evidence, he said that Iran had probably halted warhead design and weaponisation, but pointed out that Iran's continued enrichment of uranium meant that it was continuing with "the most difficult challenge in nuclear production." He said: "We remain concerned about Iran's intentions... Tehran at a minimum is keeping the option open to develop nuclear weapons."

What other pressure has there been on Iran?

While the sanctions were being negotiated, the US was also applying pressure on its international partners to restrict their trade with Iran. The US has banned most trade with Iran itself since its diplomats were seized in Tehran in 1979.

On 17 October 2007, the US designated part of the Revolutionary Guard as a "supporter of terrorism" and the Guard as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction for its alleged work on ballistic missiles. The US imposed further sanctions on the Guards' commercial activities and on several Iranian banks.

Is it not too late now to stop Iran from acquiring enrichment technology?

Iran thinks so and has said so. Its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has called this a "great victory".

According to Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, events have overtaken the current strategy and he thinks that Iran should now be allowed to undertake limited enrichment but under strict supervision. This approach has been rejected by the US and its supporters.

Doesn't the Non-Aligned Movement support Iran?

The NAM, representing 120 nations, issued a statement in July 2008 supporting Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear power. Iran said this reflected international support for its position.

The statement did not directly criticise UN sanctions against Iran, though it said that any issues should be dealt within the IAEA. It also appeared to accept that there are some problems remaining when it said: "Diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means must continue to find a comprehensive and long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue."

What is the background to this confrontation?

The IAEA reported in 2003 that Iran had hidden a uranium enrichment programme for 18 years, and the current dispute dates back to then.

Iran says its nuclear regime is peaceful

Western members of the IAEA called on Iran to commit itself to stopping all enrichment activities permanently, but it has refused to do so and later abandoned a temporary halt as well.

The clash with Iran escalated in February 2006, when the IAEA as a whole reported Iran to the Security Council.

A month later, the Security Council decided to take up the issue after receiving a copy of an IAEA report on Iran which said that it could not "conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran".

Could Iran leave the NPT?

Yes. Article X gives a member state the right to declare that "extraordinary events" have "jeopardised the supreme interests of the state". It can then give three months notice to quit. That would leave it free to do what it wanted.

And, in fact, on 7 May, its parliament threatened to force the government to withdraw if the stand-off was not resolved "peacefully".

Don't existing nuclear powers have obligations to get rid of their weapons under the NPT?

Article VI commits them to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". The nuclear powers claim they have done this by reducing their warheads, but critics say they have not really moved towards nuclear disarmament.

Critics also argue that the US and UK have broken the treaty by transferring nuclear technology from one to another. The US and UK say that this is not affected by the NPT.

Doesn't Israel have a nuclear bomb?

Yes. Israel, however, is not a party to the NPT, so is not obliged to report to it. Neither are India or Pakistan, both of which have developed nuclear weapons. North Korea has left the treaty and has announced that it has acquired a nuclear weapons capacity.

BBC NEWS | Middle East | Q&A: Iran and the nuclear issue

NIAC - National Iranian American Council - Are Our Carrots Big Enough?

2009-02-14T22:36:00.001-08:00

Written by Sahar Jooshani

Friday, 06 February 2009

Washington DC - “Iran is not a donkey, bigger sticks won’t work,” said James Dobbins, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation. He made it clear Wednesday that Iran is not a country that can be wooed using the carrot or stick metaphor. Dobbins was joined by Kenneth M. Pollack and Danielle Pletka in a conference hosted by American Enterprise Institute and moderated by Jackson Diehl. The panel was visibly divided with the conservative voice of Pletka on one end and the more moderate opinions of Dobbins and Pollack on the other.

Daniella Pletka was quick to communicate her uncertainty of how successful future talks with Iran would play out. The overarching theme of her discussion was best expressed in her opening comment, “Can we offer carrots that are big enough?” Her main concern was rooted in the US government’s ability to offer big enough incentives to please the Iranian appetite.

The upcoming administration faces many obstacles in the Middle East. Pletka raised many concerns about the willingness of the American government to allow Iran to have a prominent role in regional affairs, a step that could prove to be a major factor in negotiations. In reference to the Palestinian issue, she stated, “Iran wants a dominant role in the region. Are we willing to see Iran at the table?”

If the US is to engage Iran, it must define its boundaries and designate areas on which it is and is not willing to budge. Kenneth M. Pollock, the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution stated, “We need to recognize what they want from us. There is a right way to go about this.” He went on to state that the US should be prepared to put everything on the table, knowing beforehand that Iran “might not take it.”

On a more optimistic note, James Dobbins, used a period of communication between the US and the Soviet Union to support his confidence in the importance of dialogue as a key tool in future relations between the US and Iran. Dobbins stated, “Talk, but don’t expect a lot in the short term and don’t threaten to bomb if you don’t get what you want.” He spoke at length about diplomatic strategies and tools, and made sure to restate that “threatening preemption” was not included in his list of successful diplomatic bargaining wagers.

The conference concluded with a panel confident in the necessity of organized and guided dialogue. If the US is looking to open conversation with Iran, it should first decide what it can and cannot live without, because as Pletka stated, “Iran knows what it wants and the government thinks it has the upper hand.”

NIAC - National Iranian American Council - Are Our Carrots Big Enough?

This Is Change? 20 Hawks, Clintonites and Neocons to Watch for in Obama's White House | | AlterNet

2009-02-14T14:43:00.001-08:00

A who's who guide to the people poised to shape Obama's foreign policy.

U.S. policy is not about one individual, and no matter how much faith people place in President-elect Barack Obama, the policies he enacts will be fruit of a tree with many roots. Among them: his personal politics and views, the disastrous realities his administration will inherit, and, of course, unpredictable future crises. But the best immediate indicator of what an Obama administration might look like can be found in the people he surrounds himself with and who he appoints to his Cabinet. And, frankly, when it comes to foreign policy, it is not looking good.

Obama has a momentous opportunity to do what he repeatedly promised over the course of his campaign: bring actual change. But the more we learn about who Obama is considering for top positions in his administration, the more his inner circle resembles a staff reunion of President Bill Clinton's White House. Although Obama brought some progressives on board early in his campaign, his foreign policy team is now dominated by the hawkish, old-guard Democrats of the 1990s. This has been particularly true since Hillary Clinton conceded defeat in the Democratic primary, freeing many of her top advisors to join Obama's team.

"What happened to all this talk about change?" a member of the Clinton foreign policy team recently asked the Washington Post. "This isn't lightly flavored with Clintons. This is all Clintons, all the time."

Amid the euphoria over Obama's election and the end of the Bush era, it is critical to recall what 1990s U.S. foreign policy actually looked like. Bill Clinton's boiled down to a one-two punch from the hidden hand of the free market, backed up by the iron fist of U.S. militarism. Clinton took office and almost immediately bombed Iraq (ostensibly in retaliation for an alleged plot by Saddam Hussein to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush). He presided over a ruthless regime of economic sanctions that killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, and under the guise of the so-called No-Fly Zones in northern and southern Iraq, authorized the longest sustained U.S. bombing campaign since Vietnam.

Under Clinton, Yugoslavia was bombed and dismantled as part of what Noam Chomsky described as the "New Military Humanism." Sudan and Afghanistan were attacked, Haiti was destabilized and "free trade" deals like the North America Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade radically escalated the spread of corporate-dominated globalization that hurt U.S. workers and devastated developing countries. Clinton accelerated the militarization of the so-called War on Drugs in Central and Latin America and supported privatization of U.S. military operations, giving lucrative contracts to Halliburton and other war contractors. Meanwhile, U.S. weapons sales to countries like Turkey and Indonesia aided genocidal campaigns against the Kurds and the East Timorese.

The prospect of Obama's foreign policy being, at least in part, an extension of the Clinton Doctrine is real. Even more disturbing, several of the individuals at the center of Obama's transition and emerging foreign policy teams were top players in creating and implementing foreign policies that would pave the way for projects eventually carried out under the Bush/Cheney administration. With their assistance, Obama has already charted out several hawkish stances. Among them:

-- His plan to escalate the war in Afghanistan;

-- An Iraq plan that could turn into a downsized and rebranded occupation that keeps U.S. forces in Iraq for the foreseeable future;

-- His labeling of Iran's Revolutionary Guard as a "terrorist organization;"

-- His pledge to use unilateral force inside of Pakistan to defend U.S. interests;

-- His position, presented before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), that Jerusalem "must remain undivided" -- a remark that infuriated Palestinian officials and which he later attempted to reframe;

-- His plan to continue the War on Drugs, a backdoor U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Central and Latin America;

-- His refusal to "rule out" using Blackwater and other armed private forces in U.S. war zones, despite previously introducing legislation to regulate these companies and bring them under U.S. law.

Obama did not arrive at these positions in a vacuum. They were carefully crafted in consultation with his foreign policy team. While the verdict is still out on a few people, many members of his inner foreign policy circle -- including some who have received or are bound to receive Cabinet posts -- supported the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Some promoted the myth that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. A few have worked with the neoconservative Project for the New American Century, whose radical agenda was adopted by the Bush/Cheney administration. And most have proven track records of supporting or implementing militaristic, offensive U.S. foreign policy. "After a masterful campaign, Barack Obama seems headed toward some fateful mistakes as he assembles his administration by heeding the advice of Washington's Democratic insider community, a collective group that represents little 'change you can believe in,'" notes veteran journalist Robert Parry, the former Associated Press and Newsweek reporter who broke many of the stories in the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s.

As news breaks and speculation abounds about cabinet appointments, here are 20 people to watch as Obama builds the team who will shape U.S. foreign policy for at least four years:

Joe Biden

There was no stronger sign that Obama's foreign policy would follow the hawkish tradition of the Democratic foreign policy establishment than his selection of Sen. Joe Biden as his running mate. Much has been written on Biden's tenure as head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his role in the invasion and occupation of Iraq stands out. Biden is not just one more Democratic lawmaker who now calls his vote to authorize the use of force in Iraq "mistaken;" Biden was actually an important facilitator of the war.

In the summer of 2002, when the United States was "debating" a potential attack on Iraq, Biden presided over hearings whose ostensible purpose was to weigh all existing options. But instead of calling on experts whose testimony could challenge the case for war -- Iraq's alleged WMD possession and its supposed ties to al-Qaida -- Biden's hearings treated the invasion as a foregone conclusion. His refusal to call on two individuals in particular ensured that testimony that could have proven invaluable to an actual debate was never heard: Former Chief United Nations Weapons Inspector Scott Ritter and Hans von Sponeck, a 32-year veteran diplomat and the former head of the U.N.'s Iraq program.

Both men say they made it clear to Biden's office that they were ready and willing to testify; Ritter knew more about the dismantling of Iraq's WMD program than perhaps any other U.S. citizen and would have been in prime position to debunk the misinformation and outright lies being peddled by the White House. Meanwhile, von Sponeck had just returned from Iraq, where he had observed Ansar al Islam rebels in the north of Iraq -- the so-called al-Qaida connection -- and could have testified that, rather than colluding with Saddam's regime, they were in a battle against it. Moreover, he would have pointed out that they were operating in the U.S.-enforced safe haven of Iraqi Kurdistan. "Evidence of al-Qaida/lraq collaboration does not exist, neither in the training of operatives nor in support to Ansar-al-Islam," von Sponeck wrote in an Op-Ed published shortly before the July 2002 hearings. "The U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA know perfectly well that today's Iraq poses no threat to anyone in the region, let alone in the United States. To argue otherwise is dishonest."

With both men barred from testifying, rather than eliciting an array of informed opinions, Biden's committee whitewashed Bush's lies and helped lead the country to war. Biden himself promoted the administration's false claims that were used to justify the invasion of Iraq, declaring on the Senate floor, "[Saddam Hussein] possesses chemical and biological weapons and is seeking nuclear weapons."

With the war underway, Biden was then the genius who passionately promoted the ridiculous plan to partition Iraq into three areas based on religion and ethnicity, attempting to Balkanize one of the strongest Arab states in the world.

"He's a part of the old Democratic establishment," says retired Army Col. Ann Wright, the State Department diplomat who reopened the U.S. embassy in Kabul in 2002. Biden, she says, has "had a long history with foreign affairs, [but] it's not the type of foreign affairs that I want."

Rahm Emanuel

Obama's appointment of Illinois Congressman Rahm Emanuel as Chief of Staff is a clear sign that Clinton-era neoliberal hawks will be well-represented at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. A former senior Clinton advisor, Emanuel is a hard-line supporter of Israel's "targeted assassination" policy and actually volunteered to work with the Israeli Army during the 1991 Gulf War. He is close to the right-wing Democratic Leadership Council and was the only member of the Illinois Democratic delegation in the Congress to vote for the invasion of Iraq. Unlike many of his colleagues, Emanuel still defends his vote. As chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2006, Emanuel promoted the campaigns of 22 candidates, only one of who supported a swift withdrawal from Iraq, and denied crucial Party funding to anti-war candidates. "As for Iraq policy, at the right time, we will have a position," he said in December 2005. As Philip Giraldi recently pointed out on Antiwar.com, Emanuel "advocates increasing the size of the U.S. Army by 100,000 soldiers and creating a domestic spying organization like Britain's MI5. More recently, he has supported mandatory paramilitary national service for all Americans between the ages of 18 and 25."

While Obama has at times been critical of Clinton-era free trade agreements, Emanuel was one of the key people in the Clinton White House who brokered the successful passage of NAFTA.

Hillary Rodham Clinton

For all the buzz and speculation about the possibility that Sen. Clinton may be named Secretary of State, most media coverage has focused on her rivalry with Obama during the primary, along with the prospect of her husband having to face the intense personal, financial and political vetting process required to secure a job in the new administration. But the question of how Clinton would lead the operations at Foggy Bottom calls for scrutiny of her positions vis-a-vis Obama's stated foreign-policy goals.

Clinton was an ardent defender of her husband's economic and military war against Iraq throughout the 1990s, including the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which ultimately laid the path for President George W. Bush's invasion. Later, as a U.S. senator, she not only voted to authorize the war, but aided the Bush administration's propaganda campaign in the lead-up to the invasion. "Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile-delivery capability and his nuclear program," Clinton said when rising to support the measure in October 2002. "He has also given aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaida members … I want to insure that Saddam Hussein makes no mistake about our national unity and for our support for the president's efforts to wage America's war against terrorists and weapons of mass destruction."

"The man who vowed to deliver us from 28 years of Bushes and Clintons has been stocking up on Clintonites," New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd recently wrote. "How, one may ask, can he put Hillary -- who voted to authorize the Iraq war without even reading the intelligence assessment -- in charge of patching up a foreign policy and a world riven by that war?"

Beyond Iraq, Clinton shocked many and sparked official protests by Tehran at the United Nations when asked during the presidential campaign what she would do as president if Iran attacked Israel with nuclear weapons. "I want the Iranians to know that if I'm the president, we will attack Iran," she declared. "In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them."

Clinton has not shied away from supporting offensive foreign policy tactics in the past. Recalling her husband's weighing the decision of whether to attack Yugoslavia, she said in 1999, "I urged him to bomb. … You cannot let this go on at the end of a century that has seen the major holocaust of our time. What do we have NATO for if not to defend our way of life?"

Madeleine Albright

While Obama's house is flush with Clintonian officials like former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defense Secretary William Perry, Director of the State Department Office of Policy Planning Greg Craig (who was officially named Obama's White House Counsel) and Navy Secretary Richard Danzig, perhaps most influential is Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton's former Secretary of State and U.N. ambassador. Albright recently served as a proxy for Obama, representing him at the G-20 summit earlier this month. Whether or not she is awarded an official role in the administration, Albright will be a major force in shaping Obama's foreign policy.

"It will take time to convince skeptics that the promotion of democracy is not a mask for imperialism or a recipe for the kind of chaos we have seen in the Persian Gulf," Albright recently wrote. "And it will take time to establish the right identity for America in a world that has grown suspicious of all who claim a monopoly on virtue and that has become reluctant to follow the lead of any one country."

Albright should know. She was one of the key architects in the dismantling of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In the lead-up to the 1999 "Kosovo war," she oversaw the U.S. attempt to coerce the Yugoslav government to deny its own sovereignty in return for not being bombed. Albright demanded that the Yugoslav government sign a document that would have been unacceptable to any sovereign nation. Known as the Rambouillet Accord, it included a provision that would have guaranteed U.S. and NATO forces "free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout" all of Yugoslavia -- not just Kosovo -- while also seeking to immunize those occupation forces "from any form of arrest, investigation or detention by the authorities in [Yugoslavia]." Moreover, it would have granted the occupiers "the use of airports, roads, rails and ports without payment." Similar to Bush's Iraq plan years later, the Rambouillet Accord mandated that the economy of Kosovo "shall function in accordance with free-market principles."

When Yugoslavia refused to sign the document, Albright and others in the Clinton administration unleashed the 78-day NATO bombing of Serbia, which targeted civilian infrastructure. (Prior to the attack, Albright said the U.S. government felt "the Serbs need a little bombing.") She and the Clinton administration also supported the rise to power in Kosovo of a terrorist mafia that carried out its own ethnic-cleansing campaign against the province's minorities.

Perhaps Albright's most notorious moment came with her enthusiastic support of the economic war against the civilian population of Iraq. When confronted by Lesley Stahl of “60 Minutes” that the sanctions were responsible for the deaths of "a half-million children … more children than died in Hiroshima," Albright responded, "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price -- we think the price is worth it." (While defending the policy, Albright later called her choice of words "a terrible mistake, hasty, clumsy, and wrong.")

Richard Holbrooke

Like Albright, Holbrooke will have major sway over U.S. policy, whether or not he gets an official job. A career diplomat since the Vietnam War, Holbrooke's most recent government post was as President Clinton's ambassador to the U.N. Among the many violent policies he helped implement and enforce was the U.S.-backed Indonesian genocide in East Timor. Holbrooke was an Assistant Secretary of State in the late 1970s at the height of the slaughter and was the point man on East Timor for the Carter Administration.

According to Brad Simpson, director of the Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project at the National Security Archive at George Washington University, "It was Holbrooke and Zbigniew Brzezinski [another top Obama advisor], both now leading lights in the Democratic Party, who played point in trying to frustrate the efforts of congressional human-rights activists to try and condition or stop U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, and in fact accelerated the flow of weapons to Indonesia at the height of the genocide."

Holbrooke, too, was a major player in the dismantling of Yugoslavia and praised the bombing of Serb Television, which killed 16 media workers, as a significant victory. (The man who ordered that bombing, now-retired Army Gen. Wesley Clark, is another Obama foreign policy insider who could end up in his cabinet. While Clark is known for being relatively progressive on social issues, as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, he ordered bombings and attacks that Amnesty International labeled war crimes.)

Like many in Obama's foreign policy circle, Holbrooke also supported the Iraq war. In early 2003, shortly after then-Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the UN, where he presented the administration's fraud-laden case for war to the UN (a speech Powell has since called a "blot" on his reputation), Holbrooke said: "It was a masterful job of diplomacy by Colin Powell and his colleagues, and it does not require a second vote to go to war. … Saddam is the most dangerous government leader in the world today, he poses a threat to the region, he could pose a larger threat if he got weapons of mass destruction deployed, and we have a legitimate right to take action."

Dennis Ross

Middle East envoy for both George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, Ross was one of the primary authors of Obama's aforementioned speech before AIPAC this summer. He cut his teeth working under famed neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz at the Pentagon in the 1970s and worked closely with the Project for the New American Century. Ross has been a staunch supporter of Israel and has fanned the flames for a more hostile stance toward Iran. As the lead U.S. negotiator between Israel and numerous Arab nations under Clinton, Ross' team acted, in the words of one U.S. official who worked under him, as "Israel's lawyer."

"The 'no surprises' policy, under which we had to run everything by Israel first, stripped our policy of the independence and flexibility required for serious peacemaking," wrote U.S. diplomat Aaron David Miller in 2005. "If we couldn't put proposals on the table without checking with the Israelis first, and refused to push back when they said no, how effective could our mediation be? Far too often, particularly when it came to Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, our departure point was not what was needed to reach an agreement acceptable to both sides but what would pass with only one -- Israel." After the Clinton White House, Ross worked for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a hawkish pro-Israel think tank, and for FOX News, where he repeatedly pressed for war against Iraq.

Martin Indyk

Founder of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Indyk spent years working for AIPAC and served as Clinton's ambassador to Israel and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, while also playing a major role in developing U.S. policy toward Iraq and Iran. In addition to his work for the U.S. government, he has worked for the Israeli government and with PNAC.

"Barack Obama has painted himself into a corner by appealing to the most hard-line, pro-Israel elements in this country," Ali Abunimah, founder of ElectronicInifada.net, recently told Amy Goodman of Democracy Now!, describing Indyk and Dennis Ross as "two of the most pro-Israel officials from the Clinton era, who are totally distrusted by Palestinians and others across the Middle East, because they're seen as lifelong advocates for Israeli positions."

Anthony Lake

Clinton's former National Security Advisor was an early supporter of Obama and one of the few top Clintonites to initially back the president-elect. Lake began his foreign policy work in the U.S. Foreign Service during Vietnam, working with Henry Kissinger on the "September Group," a secret team tasked with developing a military strategy to deliver a "savage, decisive blow against North Vietnam."

Decades later, after working for various administrations, Lake "was the main force behind the U.S. invasion of Haiti in the mid-Clinton years," according to veteran journalist Allan Nairn, whose groundbreaking reporting revealed U.S. support for Haitian death squads in the 1990s. "They brought back Aristide essentially in political chains, pledged to support a World Bank/IMF overhaul of the economy, which resulted in an increase in malnutrition deaths among Haitians, and set the stage for the current ongoing political disaster in Haiti." Clinton nominated Lake as CIA Director, but he failed to win Senate confirmation.

Lee Hamilton

Hamilton is a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and was co-chairman of both the Iraq Study Group and 9/11 Commission. Robert Parry, who has covered Hamilton's career extensively, recently ran a piece on Consortium News that characterized him this way: "Whenever the Republicans have a touchy national-security scandal to put to rest, their favorite Democratic investigator is Lee Hamilton. … Hamilton's carefully honed skill for balancing truth against political comity has elevated him to the status of a Washington Wise Man."

Susan Rice

Former Assistant Secretary of Sate Susan Rice, who served on Bill Clinton's National Security Council, is a potential candidate for the post of ambassador to the U.N. or as a deputy national security advisor. She, too, promoted the myth that Saddam had WMDs. "It's clear that Iraq poses a major threat," she said in 2002. "It's clear that its weapons of mass destruction need to be dealt with forcefully, and that's the path we're on." (After the invasion, discussing Saddam's alleged possession of WMDs, she said, "I don't think many informed people doubted that.")

Rice has also been a passionate advocate for a U.S. military attack against Sudan over the Darfur crisis. In an op-ed co-authored with Anthony Lake, she wrote, "The United States, preferably with NATO involvement and African political support, would strike Sudanese airfields, aircraft and other military assets. It could blockade Port Sudan, through which Sudan's oil exports flow. Then U.N. troops would deploy -- by force, if necessary, with U.S. and NATO backing."

John Brennan

A longtime CIA official and former head of the National Counterterrorism Center, Brennan is one of the coordinators of Obama's intelligence transition team and a top contender for either CIA Director or Director of National Intelligence. He was also recently described by Glenn Greenwald as "an ardent supporter of torture and one of the most emphatic advocates of FISA expansions and telecom immunity." While claiming to oppose waterboarding, labeling it "inconsistent with American values" and "something that should be prohibited," Brennan has simultaneously praised the results achieved by "enhanced interrogation" techniques. "There has been a lot of information that has come out from these interrogation procedures that the agency has, in fact, used against the real hard-core terrorists," Brennan said in a 2007 interview. "It has saved lives. And let's not forget, these are hardened terrorists who have been responsible for 9/11, who have shown no remorse at all for the death of 3,000 innocents."

Brennan has described the CIA's extraordinary rendition program -- the government-run kidnap-and-torture program enacted under Clinton -- as an absolutely vital tool. "I have been intimately familiar now over the past decade with the cases of rendition that the U.S. Government has been involved in," he said in a December 2005 interview. "And I can say without a doubt that it has been very successful as far as producing intelligence that has saved lives."

Brennan is currently the head of Analysis Corporation, a private intelligence company that was recently implicated in the breach of Obama and Sen. John McCain's passport records. He is also the current chairman of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), a trade association of private intelligence contractors who have dramatically increased their role in sensitive U.S. national security operations. (Current Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell is former chairman of the INSA.)

Jami Miscik

Miscik, who works alongside Brennan on Obama's transitional team, was the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in the run-up to the Iraq war. She was one of the key officials responsible for sidelining intel that contradicted the official line on WMD, while promoting intel that backed it up.

"When the administration insisted on an intelligence assessment of Saddam Hussein's relationship to al-Qaida, Miscik blocked the skeptics (who were later vindicated) within the CIA's Mideast analytical directorate and instructed the less-skeptical counterterrorism analysts to 'stretch to the maximum the evidence you had,' " journalist Spencer Ackerman recently wrote in the Washington Independent. "It's hard to think of a more egregious case of sacrificing sound intelligence analysis in order to accommodate the strategic fantasies of an administration. … The idea that Miscik is helping staff Obama's top intelligence picks is most certainly not change we can believe in." What's more, she went on to a lucrative post as the Global Head of Sovereign Risk for the now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers.

John Kerry and Bill Richardson

Both Sen. Kerry and Gov. Richardson have been identified as possible contenders for Secretary of State. While neither is likely to be as hawkish as Hillary Clinton, both have taken pro-war positions. Kerry promoted the WMD lie and voted to invade Iraq. "Why is Saddam Hussein attempting to develop nuclear weapons when most nations don't even try?" Kerry asked on the Senate floor in October 2002. "According to intelligence, Iraq has chemical and biological weapons … Iraq is developing unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents."

Richardson, whose Iraq plan during his 2008 presidential campaign was more progressive and far-reaching than Obama's, served as Bill Clinton's ambassador to the UN. In this capacity, he supported Clinton's December 1998 bombing of Baghdad and the U.S.-led sanctions against Iraq. "We think this man is a threat to the international community, and he threatens a lot of the neighbors in his region and future generations there with anthrax and VX," Richardson told an interviewer in February 1998.

While Clinton's Secretary of Energy, Richardson publicly named Wen Ho Lee, a scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, as a target in an espionage investigation. Lee was accused of passing nuclear secrets to the Chinese government. Lee was later cleared of those charges and won a settlement against the U.S. government.

Robert Gates

Washington consensus is that Obama will likely keep Robert Gates, George W. Bush's Defense Secretary, as his own Secretary of Defense. While Gates has occasionally proved to be a stark contrast to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he would hardly represent a break from the policies of the Bush administration. Quite the opposite; according to the Washington Post, in the interest of a "smooth transition," Gates "has ordered hundreds of political appointees at the Pentagon canvassed to see whether they wish to stay on in the new administration, has streamlined policy briefings and has set up suites for President-elect Barack Obama's transition team just down the hall from his own E-ring office." The Post reports that Gates could stay on for a brief period and then be replaced by Richard Danzig, who was Clinton's Secretary of the Navy. Other names currently being tossed around are Democratic Sen. Jack Reed, Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel (a critic of the Iraq occupation) and Republican Sen. Richard Lugar, who served alongside Biden on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Ivo H. Daalder

Daalder was National Security Council Director for European Affairs under President Clinton. Like other Obama advisors, he has worked with the Project for the New American Century and signed a 2005 letter from PNAC to Congressional leaders, calling for an increase in U.S. ground troops in Iraq and beyond.

Sarah Sewall

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance during the Clinton administration, Sewall served as a top advisor to Obama during the campaign and is almost certain to be selected for a post in his administration. In 2007, Sewall worked with the U.S. military and Army Gen. David Petraeus, writing the introduction to the University of Chicago edition of the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. She was criticized for this collaboration by Tom Hayden, who wrote, "the Petraeus plan draws intellectual legitimacy from Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, whose director, Sarah Sewall, proudly embraces an 'unprecedented collaboration [as] a human rights center partnered with the armed forces.'”

"Humanitarians often avoid wading into the conduct of war for fear of becoming complicit in its purpose," she wrote in the introduction. "'The field manual requires engagement precisely from those who fear that its words lack meaning."

Michele Flournoy

Flournoy and former Clinton Deputy Defense Secretary John White are co-heading Obama's defense transition team. Flournoy was a senior Clinton appointee at the Pentagon. She currently runs the Center for a New American Security, a center-right think-tank. There is speculation that Obama could eventually name her as the first woman to serve as defense secretary. As the Wall Street Journal recently reported: "While at CNAS, Flournoy helped to write a report that called for reducing the open-ended American military commitment in Iraq and replacing it with a policy of 'conditional engagement' there. Significantly, the paper rejected the idea of withdrawing troops according to the sort of a fixed timeline that Obama espoused during the presidential campaign. Obama has in recent weeks signaled that he was willing to shelve the idea, bringing him more in line with Flournoy's thinking." Flournoy has also worked with the neoconservative Project for the New American Century.

Wendy Sherman and Tom Donilon

Currently employed at Madeline Albright's consulting firm, the Albright Group, Sherman worked under Albright at the State Department, coordinating U.S. policy on North Korea. She is now coordinating the State Department transition team for Obama. Tom Donilon, her co-coordinator, was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Chief of Staff at the State Department under Clinton. Interestingly, Sherman and Donilon both have ties to Fannie Mae that didn't make it onto their official bios on Obama's change.gov website. "Donilon was Fannie's general counsel and executive vice president for law and policy from 1999 until the spring of 2005, a period during which the company was rocked by accounting problems," reports the Wall Street Journal.

***

While many of the figures at the center of Obama's foreign policy team are well-known, two of its most important members have never held national elected office or a high-profile government position. While they cannot be characterized as Clinton-era hawks, it will be important to watch Denis McDonough and Mark Lippert, co-coordinators of the Obama foreign policy team. From 2000 to 2005, McDonough served as foreign policy advisor to Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle and worked extensively on the use-of-force authorizations for the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which Daschle supported. From 1996 to 1999, McDonough was a professional staff member of the House International Relations Committee during the debate over the bombing of Yugoslavia. More recently, he was at the Center for American Progress working under John Podesta, Clinton's former chief of staff and the current head of the Obama transition.

Mark Lippert is a close personal friend of Obama's. He has worked for Vermont Sen. Patrick Leahy, as well as the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Democratic Policy Committee. He is a lieutenant in the Navy Reserve and spent a year in Iraq working intelligence for the Navy SEALs. "According to those who've worked closely with Lippert," Robert Dreyfuss recently wrote in The Nation, "he is a conservative, cautious centrist who often pulled Obama to the right on Iraq, Iran and the Middle East and who has been a consistent advocate for increased military spending. 'Even before Obama announced for the presidency, Lippert wanted Obama to be seen as tough on Iran,' says a lobbyist who's worked the Iran issue on Capitol Hill, 'He's clearly more hawkish than the senator.' "

***

Barack Obama campaigned on a pledge to bring change to Washington. "I don't want to just end the war," he said early this year. "I want to end the mindset that got us into war." That is going to be very difficult if Obama employs a foreign policy team that was central to creating that mindset, before and during the presidency of George W. Bush.

"Twenty-three senators and 133 House members who voted against the war -- and countless other notable individuals who spoke out against it and the dubious claims leading to war -- are apparently not even being considered for these crucial positions," observes Sam Husseini of the Institute for Public Accuracy. This includes dozens of former military and intelligence officials who spoke out forcefully against the war and continue to oppose militaristic policy, as well as credible national security experts who have articulated their visions for a foreign policy based on justice.

Obama does have a chance to change the mindset that got us into war. More significantly, he has a popular mandate to forcefully challenge the militaristic, hawkish tradition of modern U.S. foreign policy. But that work would begin by bringing on board people who would challenge this tradition, not those who have been complicit in creating it and are bound to continue advancing it.

See more stories tagged with: iraq, afghanistan, robert gates, barack obama, hillary clinton, bill clinton, rahm emanuel, joe biden, madeleine albright, richard holbrooke, dennis ross, anthony lake, martin indyk, susan rice, john brennan, jami miscik, sarah sewall, lee hamilton, yugoslavia

Jeremy Scahill pledges to be the same journalist under an Obama administration that he was during Bill Clinton and George Bush's presidencies. He is the author of Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army and is a frequent contributor to The Nation and Democracy Now! He is a Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at the Nation Institute.

This Is Change? 20 Hawks, Clintonites and Neocons to Watch for in Obama's White House | | AlterNet

Is Iran's space programme more advanced than thought? - space - 09 February 2009 - New Scientist

2009-02-10T18:33:00.001-08:00

Iran's first satellite launch aboard a home-grown rocket last week has left observers puzzled over just how it was done. Was the satellite launched by a feeble rocket pushed to its limits, or has Iran's secretive space programme managed to develop a far more powerful launch vehicle without anyone noticing? The answer will affect how soon the country might achieve its stated goal of sending humans into space.

Iran launched its satellite – called Omid, or "Hope" – on 2 February. According to Iranian media, it is a 40-centimetre cube weighing 25-kilograms, and is equipped with radio transmitters.

Foreign tracking stations and amateur sky watchers have been following the craft's relatively low orbit, which is expected to decay over weeks or months due to atmospheric drag.

At first, it was thought that the launch vehicle, called Safir-2, was derived from relatively feeble missiles that burn ambient-temperature liquid fuel, which Iran was already known to have.

Two of these missiles stacked one on top of the other could boost a third, small, solid-fuel rocket that could take a lightweight payload like Omid to orbit.

Two stages

But evidence has begun to emerge that the rocket might be more powerful than this. Amateur observers report that the last stage of the rocket, which is also in orbit, is much brighter than the satellite itself, suggesting it is too large to be the third stage of a relatively modest rocket.

Geoffrey Forden of MIT, who specialises in the analysis of foreign countries' launch capabilities, is one of those now mulling over whether the rocket had just two stages, with a second stage that was much more powerful than anything Iran was known to possess. This would be possible using a cryogenic fuel system involving liquid oxygen.

If true, this would have important implications for Iran's ambition to launch astronauts into space, something Reza Taghipour, head of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization, has said the country hopes to do before 2021.

Suborbital flights

"If they used three stages, there's no way they're going to be getting a man to space anytime soon," Forden says. "If it's two stages, then maybe they could have suborbital flights fairly soon."

Ongoing tracking of the final stage's orbit should help to provide an answer. That's because the speed of the object's drop due to atmospheric drag will provide clues as to its size.

Either way, the launch has heightened concern among those nations that suspect Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons.

Military concerns

A rocket that can put a few dozen kilograms in orbit can also deliver a few hundred kilograms – the mass of a nuclear warhead – as far as western Europe. Iran says its satellite launch was for peaceful purposes.

"It would be very difficult for the spacefaring nations to say that Iran doesn't have a sovereign right for space launch capabilities," says Joan Johnson-Freese of the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

"They have a very legitimate reason for wanting to be able to launch their own satellites for both economic and prestige reasons, but it also gives them an additional military capability," she told New Scientist. "The dual-use aspect really puts you in a dilemma."

If you would like to reuse any content from New Scientist, either in print or online, please contact the syndication department first for permission. New Scientist does not own rights to photos, but there are a variety of licensing options available for use of articles and graphics we own the copyright to.

Is Iran's space programme more advanced than thought? - space - 09 February 2009 - New Scientist

Op-Ed Contributor - Talk to Iran. Then What? - NYTimes.com

2009-02-03T19:16:00.001-08:00

THE presidential campaign failed to address the hard choices America must make to contain the Iranian nuclear threat. By focusing almost exclusively on tactics, the election obscured the questions that really matter: What should the United States demand when it finally talks to Iran? And when Iran rejects our opening position, how much should we compromise to come to a deal?

The opening act, after all, is entirely predictable. The Obama administration will likely begin negotiations by insisting that Iran suspend its efforts to enrich uranium. Compliance with this requirement — imposed by the United Nations Security Council in July 2006 and reiterated several times since — has been the goal of the European-led negotiations with Iran that President Obama faulted the Bush administration for not joining. Iran has consistently rejected the demands of the United Nations and our European allies, however, and it would be naïve to expect a different answer just because the United States is at the negotiating table. Iran will almost certainly say no, presumably calculating that it can eventually force the world to accept its enrichment program.

So what then? After a few unsuccessful meetings, experts both in and outside of government will increasingly express doubts about the American position. They will ask: Aren’t we demanding too much? Perhaps it was reasonable to call for suspension in 2006 when Iran had 164 centrifuges spinning, but is it reasonable now that Iran claims to have more than 5,000 in operation, and more on the way? Some will argue that time is on Iran’s side: As we negotiate, Iranians will continue to install more centrifuges. So shouldn’t we cut the best deal we can now, even if it allows Iran to continue enriching?

The critics will propose fallback positions like allowing enrichment, but under enhanced international safeguards that supposedly can detect the development of nuclear weapons. Perhaps they will propose strict limits on the amount of uranium that Iran can enrich. Or, as suggested last year by the retired diplomat Thomas Pickering and his co-writers William Luers and Jim Walsh: allowing enrichment, but only on the condition that Iran converts its national enrichment efforts into a multinational program that is owned and operated by a consortium of countries.

The problem is that other countries in the region could demand the same treatment. Such is the lesson of the Bush administration’s decision to abandon its opposition to Iran’s construction of a nuclear power reactor at Bushehr. This eliminated the option of opposing civil nuclear power elsewhere in the Middle East. How could we explain to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example, that we trust Iran to have civil nuclear power reactors, but not them?

The same principle applies to enrichment. Once we accept enrichment in Iran, it will become impossible to deny the same arrangement to friendly governments in the region, let alone unfriendly ones like Syria. The result will be the proliferation of dangerous nuclear technologies that we have been seeking to avoid.

The risks will be even greater if we agree to convert Natanz into an international enrichment center. International partners will not invest in a primitive enrichment operation that relies on old and unproven technologies. They will insist on state of the art enrichment equipment, Western management and access to export markets — the absence of which has hindered Iran’s enrichment progress up to now. By contrast, so long as Iran’s nuclear enrichment program remains illegitimate and subject to international censure, it cannot serve as an attractive model for other countries.

For these reasons, the United States cannot be more eager than Tehran to reach a deal, and Mr. Obama must persuade Iran that he can afford to see negotiations fail. Of course, he will have to do so amid the high expectations that he has created by calling for direct, unconditional engagement with Tehran. This may turn out to be the new president’s greatest diplomatic challenge.

Stephen Rademaker was an assistant secretary of state responsible for arms control and nonproliferation from 2002 to 2006.

Op-Ed Contributor - Talk to Iran. Then What? - NYTimes.com

Israeli Envoy: Attack on Gaza a ‘Preintroduction’ to Attack on Iran | News From Antiwar.com

2009-02-01T11:42:00.001-08:00

After ordering a cameraman to turn off his camera, Israeli Ambassador to Australia Yuval Rotem engaged in a very frank discussion about the recent Israeli war in the Gaza Strip, calling it “a preintroduction” to an attack on Iran that Israel apparently expects within the year.

Before the camera was turned off, Ambassador Rotem said “the best thing to do is to have a very open dialogue if there are no reporters or journalists here,” adding “I am far more reserved in the way I am saying my things (on camera).” Unbeknownst to him however Sarah Cummings, a reporter for Australia’s Seven News service, was actually in attendance at the meeting after having been “accidentally” invited.

Israel has repeatedly threatened to attack Iran

Israeli Envoy: Attack on Gaza a ‘Preintroduction’ to Attack on Iran | News From Antiwar.com

Does Barack Obama have Iran's number? - Telegraph

2009-01-21T21:19:00.001-08:00

By David Blair
Last Updated: 11:40PM GMT 21 Jan 2009

Hard on the heels of President Barack Obama's soaring rhetoric comes the cold reality. On his first full day in the Oval office, he takes the helm of an America whose global reputation has sunk lower than at any time since the dismal era of Watergate and Vietnam. Worse, this precipitous decline has taken place at exactly the moment when appealing to the hearts and minds of millions is the indispensable condition for defeating terrorism.

Mr Obama's inaugural address showed that he grasps this only too well. The lengthy passages aimed at an audience beyond America's shores also carried an unspoken theme. "I know that we are losing the battle for world opinion," the new President was subliminally telling us, "and I also know that turning this tide is central to securing the power and safety of the United States."

This is especially so among Muslims, hence Mr Obama declared: "To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect."

Is he the man to do it? After George W Bush alienated much of the world, is Mr Obama the President who can win back global opinion?

On his first working day, it is hard to imagine anyone better qualified. Mr Obama has more goodwill than would have seemed possible for an American president during the Bush years. His oratorical prowess and obvious sensitivity to world opinion, his opposition to the invasion of Iraq and, of course, his race, all count in his favour. His first decision was to draw the sting of Guantanamo by suspending the trials presently being conducted by military tribunals.

"We reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals," said Mr Obama on the steps of the Capitol, adding that the "rule of law and the rights of man" would not be sacrificed "for expedience's sake". These words amounted to a barbed rebuke for Mr Bush, the architect of Guantanamo and the man who authorised the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques".

Meanwhile, the very name of Barack Hussein Obama might be calculated to appeal to Muslims. "Barack" is Arabic for "the blessed one", while "Hussein" was the founder of Islam's Shia faith who died in Iraq during the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD.

Mr Obama's daily security briefings will focus on a stark list of threats. The leading concern will probably be Pakistan's steady descent into a failed state with nuclear weapons, providing a haven for al-Qaeda's core leadership.

This is one conundrum which Mr Obama's reassertion of America's cultural appeal – or "soft power" – will do little to solve. In the end, only military, political and covert power can provide the answer to Pakistan's possible collapse and the closely linked violence in neighbouring Afghanistan. Hence Mr Obama has already decided to deploy another 20,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan and replicate the successful "troop surge" in Iraq.

But there is one crucial foreign policy challenge where Mr Obama's personal charisma and appeal might have a direct and decisive impact. Iran's nuclear programme and its sponsorship of terrorism in the Middle East present America with a threat that comprehensively defeated Mr Bush.

Iran's revolutionary Shia regime might be viscerally anti-American. The same cannot be said, however, of its youthful, culturally Westernised population. About two thirds of Iran's 70 million people are under 30 and their view of America is often the very opposite of the official line.

Ask young Iranians which country they would most like to visit, and they will probably answer America. The superpower's films, music and fashion are all immensely popular inside this revolutionary citadel, where millions of households openly defy an official ban on possessing satellite dishes. Visit the bookshops outside Tehran University and you will find dictionaries of "American English" and even guides to adopting an American accent.

For as long as Mr Bush was in the White House, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could be confident of his ability to rally Iranians against the Washington administration, if not against America itself. At a stroke, Mr Obama's arrival has removed this crucial reassurance.

"Ahmadinejad and the present crowd don't know how to deal with anyone other than Bush," said Dr Ali Ansari, an expert on Iranian politics at St Andrews University. "They would have much preferred it if John McCain had won. Then all they would have had to do is carry on shouting 'death to America'. Now you've got Barack Hussein Obama as President and that's a huge problem for them."

Iran's leaders will be only too aware that Mr Obama's appeal will extend to millions of their own citizens. Place Mr Ahmadinejad alongside America's new leader and he sinks to become a risible figure. If young Iranians were asked to choose between their president and Mr Obama, Dr Ansari said there was no doubt about who would win. "In a popularity poll, certainly among young Iranians, Obama would win. I don't think there would be much of a contest."

In the week last November when Mr Obama was elected, Iran's regime unwittingly revealed its fear of the appeal of America's new leader. A reformist news magazine in Tehran placed his face on its front cover and asked: "Who is Iran's Obama?" The magazine was instantly banned.

Iran will hold presidential elections in June and Mr Ahmadinejad's political career hangs in the balance. His disastrous management of the economy, rendered still worse by the recent collapse in oil prices, has alienated many supporters. A large faction of hardline conservatives has turned against the president, including Ali Larijani, the speaker of parliament, and Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, the mayor of Tehran.

Whether Mr Ahmadinejad will be allowed to seek re-election is ultimately in the hands of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The arrival of Mr Obama might tip the balance of this calculation against Iran's president. "There's a view among the educated in Iran that Ahmadinejad was right for Bush, but he's not right for Obama," said Dr Ansari.

On his first day in office, Mr Obama may already have made Mr Ahmadinejad's survival less likely. If the Iranian president does fall in June, his possible successor is Mohammed Khatami, a liberal cleric. Mr Khatami, who served as Iran's first reformist president between 1997 and 2005, remains extremely popular, despite achieving very little while in office.

If Mr Khatami decides to run for Iran's presidency – and the Supreme Leader, who wields ultimate power, may still be able to thwart this – he would probably win. Despite all the limitations on the authority of Iran's president, whoever holds this post sets the tone of foreign policy and makes key appointments.

The removal of Mr Ahmadinejad and the possible arrival of Mr Khatami – both of which are made more likely by Mr Obama's arrival in the White House – could set the stage for a historic rapprochement between America and Iran. "There's a real window of opportunity, there's no doubt about it," said Dr Ansari.

But Mr Obama will undoubtedly continue with a raft of policies which will offend Muslims across the world, including in Iran. America's support for Israel will remain non-negotiable. Mr Obama might accelerate withdrawal from Iraq, but he will deepen its involvement in Afghanistan by sending yet more US troops to a Muslim country. The signs are that his stance towards Pakistan will be tougher than his predecessor's and US forces in Afghanistan are highly unlikely to stop their cross-border missile strikes into al-Qaeda's strongholds in the Tribal Areas, now almost weekly occurrences.

Mr Obama will eventually find a way of closing Guantanamo and dealing with its existing detainees. He will also ban the CIA and US forces from using any of the "enhanced interrogation techniques" that seem indistinguishable from torture. Yet on any day, he could receive vital information from the intelligence agency of an American ally, perhaps in the Middle East, which was extracted by torturing a suspect. Will he refuse to read this? Or will America under Mr Obama implicitly outsource torture to its less scrupulous allies?

These hard realities may yet jeopardise Mr Obama's appeal in the Muslim world. But in Iran, at least, his powers of oratory and charisma could be a transforming factor.

Does Barack Obama have Iran's number? - Telegraph