Why the diplomats are having a hard time explaining Dennis Ross's job - By Laura Rozen | The Cable

 

Wed, 02/25/2009 - 9:59pm

When Dennis Ross's job title as "special advisor on the Gulf and Southwest Asia" was finally announced in an after-hours State Department press release Monday evening, it wasn't exactly the high-profile rollout that U.S. special envoys Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell, presented side-by-side with President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Clinton, had previously received.

Indeed, the three-paragraph State Department press release on Ross's job was so vague that State Department spokesman Robert Wood soon found himself besieged by questions about what tasks and indeed what countries exactly were included in Ross's portfolio.

"Is it Iran? And if it's not Iran -- if it's Iran, why is it not written in the statement?" one journalist asked Wood Tuesday.

"Well, let me just start off by saying, the secretary is very happy that Dennis Ross agreed to serve as her special advisor for the Gulf and Southwest Asia," Wood answered gingerly. "What Dennis is going to be charged with doing is trying to integrate policy development and implementation across a number of offices and officials in the State Department. And, you know, he is going to be providing the secretary with strategic advice. He will be also trying to ensure that there's a coherence in our policies and strategies across the region."

"Let me be clear," Wood added. "He's not an envoy. He will not be negotiating. He'll be working on regional issues. He will not be -- in terms of negotiating, will not be involved in the peace process. But again, he is going to be advising the secretary on long-term strategic issues across the region."

On Wednesday, Wood provided more clarity on the list of countries that fall into Ross's portfolio -- Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen, apparently -- but it was hard to escape the impression that State is diplomatically flummoxed about how to describe Ross's job.

Sources suggested a variety of explanations. Some had to do with the fact that the U.S. government is currently in the midst of an intensive policy review on Iran, which is not expected to be ready until early March. (March 10, one source said). Therefore, to describe Ross now as an "envoy" on or to Iran would be premature, they said, since the policy hasn't yet been articulated.  Ross might gain the "envoy" title after the policy review is complete, another source suggested.

Other sources suggested the U.S. government was sensitive to Iran's perception that Ross, a former senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is a pro-Israel hawk whose writings on U.S. policy toward Iran have suggested a high degree of continuity with the Bush administration's approach of carrots and sticks.

"I understand the Iranians have let it be known that they won't deal with him," said one former senior U.S. official who has dealt with Persian Gulf issues.

"I think the stealth nature of the announcement and the fuzzy job description indicate that folks in the administration are aware" that the Ross appointment is problematic, the former senior official continued. "But that will not make it more workable -- even if the real heavy lifting is done by [Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William] Burns, as some insiders claim.

"Perception is important," he added.

But Patrick Clawson, deputy director of research at the Washington Institute, stressed that each side gets to designate who they would send for negotations. "Iranian government officials designate who they want, and the U.S. designates who we want. We are very open to having negotiations," he said.

Regarding an idea Ross espoused in recent paper about exploring options for engagement with Iran, beginning with an initial secret backchannel, Clawson said that history demonstrates that such "pre-negotiations" are often conducted clandestinely, "spy to spy." Asked whether such a secret backchannel was even possible given the likely intense international scrutiny regarding what Obama would do on Iran, Clawson said he thought it was conceivable. It might increase confidence on both sides to have an initial channel outside the public eye, he said.

In a September 2008 paper (pdf) published by the Center for a New American Security, "Iran: Assessing US strategic options," Ross recommended a hybrid approach toward Iran of engagement without preconditions but with pressures. "When I say engagement without conditions, I mean that there would be no preconditions for the United States talking to Iran," Ross wrote. "Iran would not, for example, have to suspend its uranium enrichment first. But to avoid Iran misreading this as a sign of weakness, pressures must be maintained. [...]

"So how to talk and preserve the pressures with­out making either side appear weak?" Ross continued. "One way to do so would be for the United States to go to the Europeans and offer to join the talks with Iran without Iran having to suspend uranium enrich­ment. To avoid misleading the Iranians into thinking they had won, the price for our doing this would not be with Iran but with Europe. The European Union would adopt more stringent sanctions on investments, credits, and technol­ogy transfer vis-à-vis Iran in general or at least on the Iranian energy sector. The Iranians would be informed that the United States is joining the talks but that these sanctions are now being adopted by all European countries."

State Department sources said that Ross was deeply involved in the Iran policy review, but was not the only figure by any means. Other key officials with a stake in the policy, they said, include Secretary Clinton, Undersecretary Burns (who has been serving as the U.S. envoy to the multilateral talks on Iran's nuclear program and met with Iranian officials in Geneva last summer), and officials from State's Iran office.

Also involved, other sources told The Cable, is Puneet Talwar, the new NSC senior director on Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf and a long time Middle East staffer on the Democratic staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who is considered a moderate. Also thought to be involved, although it's not clear to what degree, are Gary Samore, the NSC's nonproliferation coordinator, and Robert Einhorn, the expected State Department undersecretary of state for nonproliferation.

(The Cable previously reported that Samore, among other new Obama administration officials, had participated in track two meetings with Iranian officials last year in Europe. Talwar also attended some of the meetings, The Cable has learned.)

Sources noted that Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan, has hired Vali Nasr, a noted expert on Shiism, and has expressed his intention to involve Iran in regional discussions about stabilizing Afghanistan.

Asked at the Wednesday press briefing whether Holbrooke and Ross would be jostling for turf regarding Iran and Afghanistan, Wood, the State Department spokesman, said no.

"Afghanistan is one of those issues where you have a lot of individuals who have some interests and equities in dealing with it," Wood said. "If we get to a point where there is a need to have both Ambassador Ross and Ambassador Holbrooke engaging on different elements of [Afghanistan] they will," Wood said. "There's no turf war going on here."

UPDATE: David Ignatius writes in his Washington Post column Thursday: "The administration official who oversees the Iran file is William Burns, the undersecretary of state for political affairs. Although Dennis Ross will take a broad strategic look at the region in his new post of State Department adviser, senior officials stress that Burns is the address for Iran policy."

Why the diplomats are having a hard time explaining Dennis Ross's job - By Laura Rozen | The Cable

Tehran Bureau: Who's Telling the Truth About Iran's Nuclear Program?

 

By MUHAMMAD SAHIMI
Tehran Bureau | a⋅nal⋅y⋅sis
Since February 2003, Iran's nuclear program has undergone what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) itself admits to be the most intrusive inspection in the agency's history. After thousands of hours of inspections by some of the most experienced IAEA experts, the Agency has verified time and again that (1) there is no evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran, and (2) all the declared nuclear materials have been accounted for; there has been no diversion of such materials to non-peaceful purposes. Iran has a clean bill of health, as far as its nuclear program is concerned.
This is not what Israel, its lobby in the United States, and its neoconservative allies had expected. Such a clean bill of health deprives them of any justification for advocating military attacks on Iran. The illegal act of sending Iran's nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council and the subsequent, highly dubious UNSC resolutions against Iran have also not been effective. So what is the 'War Party' to do?
It has resorted to an international campaign of exaggerations, lies, and distortions. This campaign involves planting lies in the major media and on the Internet, making absurd interpretations of what the IAEA reports on Iran, and issuing dire -- but bogus -- warnings about the speed at which Iran's uranium-enrichment program is progressing. Such warnings have been around for more than two decades. In 1984, West German intelligence predicted that Iran would make a nuclear bomb within two years.
The campaign uses all the instruments of the U.S. political establishment to advance its agenda. The Bush administration routinely talked about "Iran's nuclear weapon program," or "Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons," without ever bothering to present any credible evidence for their assertion. Iran's drive for nuclear weapons has become an article of faith even to President Obama, who, in my opinion, is not pro-war. Leon Panetta, the new CIA director, recently said, "From all the information I've seen, I think there is no question that they [Iranians] are seeking that [nuclear weapon] capability." What information, Mr. Panetta? Enlighten us, please.
An important base for the campaign has been the U.S. Congress. Take, for example, the report by Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.), the then chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, issued on Aug. 23, 2006. The first bullet on page four of the report stated, "Iran has conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement, and despite its claim to the contrary, Iran is seeking nuclear weapons."
Not a single word in this statement is true. Iran did not violate its Safeguards Agreement, signed in 1974 with the IAEA, when it did not declare the construction of the Natanz facility for uranium enrichment. The agreement stipulated that Iran was only obligated to declare the existence of the facility 180 days prior to introducing nuclear materials into the facility. Iran did just that in February 2003, and nuclear materials were brought into the facility during the summer in 2003. The assertion that Iran is seeking nuclear weapon was a lie then, as it is now. No evidence of a secret nuclear weapons program has been discovered. Although the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate released in early December 2007 stated that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it did not present any evidence that the program existed prior to 2003.
A caption to a figure on page nine of Hoekstra's report stated that "Iran is currently enriching uranium to weapons grade using a 164-machine centrifuge cascade at this facility in Natanz." This was another lie. Neither then nor now, when there are more than 5,000 centrifuges at Natanz, has Iran enriched uranium to weapons grade.
According to the bullet at the top of page 11, "Spent fuel from the LWR [light water reactor] that Russia is building for Iran in the city of Bushehr can produce enough weapons-grade plutonium for 30 weapons per year if the fuel rods were diverted and reprocessed." First of all, according to the Iran-Russia agreement, the spent fuel will be returned to Russia. Second, the plutonium from LWR spent fuel is not suitable for making nuclear weapons. Even if it were, it should not be labeled as "weapons grade," because converting it to weapons grade is costly, laborious, and time-consuming. Third, the IAEA monitors the Bushehr reactor operations. There is no possibility of overtly or covertly diverting any nuclear materials.
Such lies and distortions forced the IAEA to take the unusual step of sending an angry letter to Hoekstra. Signed by Vilmos Cserveny, a senior official at the IAEA, the letter took "strong exception to the incorrect and misleading assertion" that the IAEA had removed a senior safeguards inspector for "allegedly raising concerns about Iranian deception," and branded as "outrageous and dishonest" the report's suggestion that he was removed for not adhering "to an unstated IAEA policy barring IAEA officials from telling the truth" about Iran.
The U.S. mainstream media, and in particular the New York Times, has played a leading role in the campaign of lies and deceptions against Iran's nuclear program. One would think that, after all the lies and exaggerations that Judith Miller and Michael Gordon planted in the Times about Iraq's nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, the Times would learn its lesson. Apparently not.
For example, after the Nov. 15, 2007, IAEA report on Iran, which, once again, gave Iran a clean bill of health, Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad of the Times declared, "Nuclear report finds Iran's disclosures were inadequate." This was while the IAEA report itself stated several times that the information provided by Iran was "consistent" with the IAEA findings. The word "inadequate" was not used even once in the report.
Why did Sciolino and Broad -- the "top" interpreters of what the IAEA really says in its reports -- think that Iran's disclosures were "inadequate"? Because, according to them, Iran had asked the IAEA for a meeting in December 2007 to provide information about its P-2 centrifuges, and, therefore, had missed the November deadline. However, the December meeting was about Iran's current activities on its P-2 centrifuge, whereas the November 2007 report was about Iran's past activities. In fact, regarding Iran's past activities on the design of the P-2 centrifuge, the same November 2007 report stated, "Based on visits made by the Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshops in 2004, examination of the company's owner contract [the company contracted to build the P-2 centrifuge], progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement inquiries, the agency has concluded that Iran's statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D activities are consistent with the agency's findings." So, the IAEA said one thing, but Sciolino and Broad claimed a completely different thing. By the way, the article has disappeared from the Times' archives! Even the Times itself does not believe in it.
But Sciolino did not stop there. After the IAEA issued a new report on Iran on May 26, 2008, Sciolino claimed in an article the next day that the IAEA had expressed concerns about Iran's "willful lack of cooperation." No such words or their equivalent can be found in the report. The report stated that the IAEA was trying to understand the role of Iran's military in its nuclear program. Sciolino did not ask any IAEA official why the agency was not concerned about Brazil's navy controlling its uranium-enrichment program and limiting IAEA access to its nuclear facilities (in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). She did not ask any U.S. official why the U.S. was not protesting Brazil's violations of its NPT obligations. Instead, she fabricated nonexistent statements about Iran.
The campaign has an international dimension too. The Australian claimed on Aug. 7, 2006, that Iran had tried to import uranium ore from Congo. Nothing came out of this "report." The conservative British newspaper the Daily Telegraph has made some of the most blatantly false claims. For example, on Nov. 16, 2006, David Blair reported in the Telegraph that Iran tried to get uranium from Somalia's Islamic forces, in return for arms. To give his report credibility, Blair quoted UN officials about Iran's military helping Somali forces. But his claim that Iran wanted uranium in return included no direct quote. It was just a lie. Even the Bush hawks did not buy it.
The Telegraph cooked up another falsehood about Iran's nuclear program, which provoked an angry IAEA response. On Sept. 14, 2008, Con Coughlin, the Telegraph's liar-in-chief, claimed that the IAEA could not account for 50-60 tons of uranium, which was supposed to be in Isfahan, where "Iran enriches its uranium." As the Persian proverb goes, "a liar has a short memory." Coughlin had apparently forgotten the simple and well-known fact that Iran enriches uranium at Natanz, not Isfahan (where the yellowcake is converted to uranium hexafluoride). The IAEA immediately issued a statement through its spokeswoman, Melissa Fleming, rejecting the report. Two days earlier, in another article in the Telegraph, Con Coughlin and Tim Butcher claimed that there were "fresh signs" that Iran had renewed work on developing nuclear weapons.
Typically, Coughlin quoted unnamed sources, the existence of whom can never be verified. In other articles in the Telegraph, Coughlin claimed a link between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence; he alleged that North Korea was helping Iran to prepare a nuclear weapon test, and said that Iran was "grooming" bin Laden's successor, none of which turned out to be true.
Then there is the rabid anti-Iran "group" called United Against Nuclear Iran. It is supposedly a "non-partisan, broad-based coalition" from "diverse ethnicities, faith communities, [and] political and social affiliations." But, the group's Web site is registered to Henley MacIntyre, who was involved in the Republican National Committee/White House e-mail scandal during George W. Bush's presidency. Its executive director is Mark Wallace, who worked with John "Bomb-Iran-for-Israel's-Sake" Bolton when he was the U.S. ambassador at the UN. Others involved are Richard Holbrooke, who is now President Obama's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Dennis Ross, a longtime instrument of the Israel lobby. The group has produced a video asserting that Iran has produced highly enriched uranium, a claim that has been debunked thoroughly not only by the IAEA, but also by others.
Another tactic of the War Party has been spreading rumors and innuendoes about the existence of an internal row in the IAEA over Iran. For example, in February 2008, just as the IAEA was going to report that it had clarified Iran's past nuclear activities, unnamed "senior Western officials" started being quoted saying that some experts within the IAEA were not happy about the report to be released. It forced the IAEA to depart from its routine mode of operation and have a senior official call Reuters to deny the rumors.
In yet another exaggeration of Iran's nuclear potential, much has been said recently about the accumulation of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in Iran. The suggestion is that Iran can enrich its stockpile of LEU to highly enriched uranium (HEU) for bomb-making. This claim has been thoroughly debunked. Briefly, all of Iran's LEU is safeguarded by the IAEA. Its conversion to HEU would require extensive new designs, reconfiguration, and reconnection of the centrifuges in Natanz, none of which can evade the IAEA's watching eyes. Even if Iran could somehow do all of these things, it would only be enough HEU for one nuclear device, which would have to be detonated in a test. Going from a device to a bomb is a difficult task by itself.
In the latest attempt to cast doubt on Iran's nuclear program, suddenly cyberspace and the mainstream media are full of stories about Iran running out of uranium. Up to now, Iran has been using the 600 tons of uranium oxide, or yellowcake, it purchased in the 1970s from South Africa for conversion to uranium hexafluoride and enrichment at Natanz. The stories are based on a report by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel (Dec. 15, 2008). The Rupert Murdoch-owned Times of London, another British newspaper in the business of fabricating stories on Iran's nuclear program, picked up the story and ran with it. Then there was a third report by the Institute for Science and International Security to the same effect. The argument is that if Iran does not have enough yellowcake and cannot import it, then why does Iran bother to have a uranium-enrichment program, unless it is for bomb-making?
Iran has been constructing a facility in Ardakan, which will come online sometime this year, for processing uranium ore into yellowcake. Clearly, had Iran thought that it would not have enough uranium ore, it would not have undertaken the construction of the Ardakan plant. In fact, in December 2006, Iran announced that there are 1,400 uranium mines in Iran, and last month it announced the discovery of uranium ore reserves at three new sites in central Iran. While many sources put Iran's known reserves of uranium ore at about 3,000 tons, the actual number is at least 30,000 tons.
The above is only a small part of all the lies, exaggerations, and distortions of the facts about Iran's nuclear program. All the sound bites about the West respecting Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology are just that, sound bites. The truth is, the West does not want Iran to have access to advanced nuclear technology. Now that Iran has succeeded in setting up a domestic nuclear fuel cycle, including designing new centrifuges, the West wants Iran to dismantle them. Why should Iran give up its legal rights under the NPT and its sovereign rights to develop its uranium resources and indigenous nuclear industry?

Posted by Golnoush at 12:52 PM

Labels: IAEA, Nuclear program

1 comments:

Anonymous said...

Nicely explained. Iran need nuclear energy or is economy and ecosystem gonna suffer a lot.
But as i said always, Iran need a better face in the world. A new moderate president can achieve this, if the Supreme lider get ride of the group Shahrudi-Rafsanjani (corrupted inside the power in my humble opinion), then people like Larijani, Jannati may start thinking to help Khatami to get the Jun election. If not... maybe one day the army get tired of the fanatics and set up a real democracy (islamic of course). Is silence for last 30 years make Iran just a good friend for the Russian interest. Not good enough anymore. Iran Need to by considered by others country's as a partner (and also we need forget helping out revolutions abroad and keep in mind that the former Sha and actual mollah's at the end are the same... Repression... And Evin still there...). In this situation is difficult to make USA and Eu to Understand this. But still, Iran need nuclear energy.

Tehran Bureau: Who's Telling the Truth About Iran's Nuclear Program?

The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop: Dennis Ross and Iran

 

By Sasan Fayazmanesh

Sasan Fayazmanesh is the author of The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment - Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2008 (buy from amazon)

In October 2008 I presented a paper, entitled "What the Future has in Store for Iran," at a conference on Middle East Studies. The paper, which was subsequently posted at Payvand.com, examined what the US policy toward Iran might look like if either Barak Obama or John McCain came to office. The conclusion of my essay, stated in its last two lines, was: "In the case of McCain, the war [waged against Iran] might come sooner than later. In Obama's case, one might see a period of 'tough' or 'aggressive diplomacy' before hostilities begin."

            My conclusion was based on the argument that the US foreign policy toward the Middle East has become institutionalized and it makes very little difference who is the president. The starting point of the argument was an analysis that appeared in The Jerusalem Post just before the Bush Administration took office, predicting that the US Middle East policy would be made more by the neoconservative forces within the new administration than anyone else. In one essay, on December 8, 2000, The Jerusalem Post wrote that both Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz "are the type of candidates the pro-Israel lobby is pushing." In another article on January 19, 2001, entitled "All the president's Middle East men," The Jerusalem Post expressed how the "Jewish and pro-Israel communities are jumping for joy," knowing that people like Wolfowitz will be in the new administration. The essay predicted: "What you will have are two institutions grappling for control of policy." It then added: "It is no secret in Washington�or anywhere else for that matter�that the policies will be determined less by Bush himself and more by his inner circle of advisers." 

            The message of the Israeli analysts was clear: the Middle East foreign policy of the US has become institutionalized; and rather than watching the US president, one has to watch the institutions that would make the policy. Given this message, my analysis of what the future has in store for Iran concentrated on a few neoconservative institutions and individuals. In particular, I predicted that if Obama were to be elected, the US policy on Iran would be made mostly by Dennis Ross, the "consultant" to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP or simply Washington Institute), a "think tank" affiliate of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). That prediction has now come true. On February 23, 2009, it became official that Dennis Ross is the "Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Gulf and Southwest Asia."[1] The title, as will be explained below, is not what Ross had hoped for, but he would still be in a position to influence the US policy toward Iran.

            Who is Dennis Ross, what does he advocate, how was he positioned to become the adviser on Iran in the Obama Administration and what will he do to Iran if he gets the chance? Let me briefly review the case.

            Dennis Ross is best known as the dishonest broker who led the so-called negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the Clinton Administration. He was "Israel's lawyer," to use Aaron David Miller's apt description of the role that Ross's "negotiating team" played in the Clinton era, particularly in 1999-2000.[2]

            Ross, along with Martin Indyk�who was Clinton's national security advisor and the US Ambassador to Israel�is a cofounder of the Washington Institute.[3] After leaving office in 2000, Ross became the director of the WINEP. Once the 2008 presidential election approached, Ross jockeyed for a position, left his directorship job and became a "Consultant" to the institute.[4] Originally, Ross and Indyk represented one wing of the WINEP, a wing which appeared to be close to the Israeli Labor Party. Another wing, closer to the Likud Party, and particularly Benjamin Netanyahu, consisted of individuals such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, individuals who played a pivotal role in planning the invasion of Iraq.[5] The difference between the Likud and the Labor wing of the Washington Institute was mostly one of the means employed rather than the end sought.[6] Both wings of the WINEP, similar to Kadima, strove toward a "Greater Israel" (Eretz Yisrael) that includes all or most of "Judea and Samaria." They both saw Iran's support for the Palestinian resistance as the biggest obstacle in achieving that goal. As such, the charge that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and posing an "existential threat" to Israel became a convenient tool for "containing" Iran and stopping its support for the Palestinians.[7] What separated the two sides was that the Labor wing believed that sanctions will eventually bring Iran to its knees, cause either a popular uprising to overthrow the Iranian "regime" or make Iran ripe for a US invasion. The Likud wing, however, had very little patience for sanctions. It wanted an immediate result, a series of military attacks against Iran, replacing the Iranian "regime" with a US-Israeli friendly government, as was done in Iraq. With the emergence of the Kadima Party in Israel in 2005, which brought together the likes of the Likud Party member Ariel Sharon and Labor Party member Shimon Peres, the differences between the two wings of the Washington Institute has mostly disappeared. Clinton's Middle East men, such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk and Richard Holbrooke, are hardly distinguishable from Bush's men, such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. But since the latter group is temporarily out of office, the former is filling in. Ross has become the designated senior Israeli lobby man in Obama's Administration. He has no expertise when it comes to Iran. But he knows that for the cause of Eretz Yisrael Iran must be contained; and given this goal, he knows how to recite, ad nauseum, all the usual lines of Israel and its lobby groups against Iran.  

            After breaking the back of the Palestinians and pushing for the invasion of Iraq, the Israeli lobby groups concentrated their forces to contain Iran. Given the Iraq fiasco and the neoconservatives falling from grace, the Israeli lobby groups settled on Dennis Ross, "Israel's lawyer," to lead the task of containing Iran.  Since Ross has no knowledge of Iran, other members of the lobby, particularly their Iran "experts," have been assisting Ross in his new role. Among these is the ex-Trotskyite, neoconservative Patrick Clawson, WINEP's "deputy director for research" and an anti-Iran zealot who has been obsessed for decades with the containment of Iran and Iraq.[8] Over the years, with the help of these individuals Ross has developed a strategy to contain Iran. The strategy consists of arguing that: 1) Iran is developing nuclear weapons; 2) Iran is a threat to the US and an existential threat to Israel, and Israel will not tolerate "mullahs with nukes" (Sydney Morning Herald, October 16, 2004); 3) "nuclear deterrent rules that governed relations between the United States and the Soviet Union" do not hold when it comes to Iran, since Iranians, especially their president, are irrational and believe in the "coming of the 12^th Imam" (The Washington Post, May 1, 2006); 4) Iran's nuclear ambitions will start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; 5) the Bush Administration's policy of dealing with Iran did not work, because it did not have enough sticks or carrots; 6) the US should push for a direct, but "tough" or aggressive diplomacy to stop Iran from enriching uranium and supporting "terrorism" (Newsweek, December 8, 2008)[9]; 7) the aggressive diplomacy should include pressuring the Europeans, as well as the Chinese and Russians, to stop trading with Iran; 8) the prohibition of trade should include preventing Iran from importing refined oil products and, ultimately, blockading Iran; and 9) once this tough and aggressive diplomacy fails and Iran does not change its "behavior," then the US could legitimately launch military attacks against Iran, arguing that the it did everything in its power to resolve the situation peacefully.

            The above arguments were summarized on March 13, 2008, in a news report in The Jerusalem Post, entitled "Visiting Obama Middle East adviser: He'd be great for Israel."  According to this report, Mel Levine�a "staunchly pro-Israel" former congressman from Los Angeles and, along with Dennis Ross, "one of Obama's seven Middle East advisers"�told The Jerusalem Post during a visit to Israel that Obama believes that "the way to stop Iran was with a combination of carrots and sticks." Levine was further quoted as saying:  "He believes that if you use carrots and sticks and engage in multilateral aggressive diplomacy then if you need to use the military option or do anything that needs to be done you are much more likely to get support of allies, more international support and broader American support." Mr. Levin had cut to the chase and stated clearly what Dennis Ross had been advocating for years, but in a more convoluted and diplomatic language. The "tough" and "aggressive diplomacy," as Mr. Levin had made clear, was nothing but a series of motions that would set the stage for military action against Iran.

            Ross's arguments are often devoid of any factual content, as I have shown in "What the Future has in Store for Iran." For example, in June 2008 the Washington Institute published a "Presidential Study Group Reports" entitled "Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge."[10] One of the two "co-convenors" of the report was Dennis Ross.[11] Subsequently, the advisors to both presidential candidates endorsed the report.[12] As I argued in my October essay, this 6-page WINEP report�which was funded by a foundation supporting neoconservative causes, and was drafted in consultation with the WINEP's "Israeli counterparts"�contains almost nothing factual and, indeed, in several places contains errors.  For example, like much of Ross's other writings, this report tries to give the reader the false impression that Iran is building nuclear weapons. Yet, anyone familiar with the International Atomic Energy Agency's reports knows that after many years of inspection, the IAEA has been unable to show any evidence of diversion of nuclear material in Iran. Or the report claims that the UN Security Council resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment program have been "unanimous." As I have stated in my essay, even a cursory look at the news would reveal that this claim is false.  For example, the third UN Security Council resolution, Resolution1803, did not pass unanimously. Indonesia abstained during the vote.[13] Furthermore, as most news sources pointed out, "Libya, South Africa and Vietnam joined Indonesia in expressing reservations [about the resolution]" (AFP, March 3, 2008). Ross's arguments, as I have shown in my October essay, are also often quite illogical. It is, for example, not at all clear why Iran's nuclear ambitions will start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, while Israel's decades-old possession of nuclear weapons has not led to such an arms race. Similarly, it is not clear why Iranians, who might have certain religious beliefs, are irrational, but Israelis, who justify the existence of Israel on religious grounds, are rational.

            After the June 2008 "Presidential Study Group Reports," which was endorsed by Obama's and McCain's advisors, Ross and company wrote the September 2008 "report of an independent task force sponsored by the bipartisan policy center" on "U.S. policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development."[14] In this report they put forward the same falsehoods and illogical arguments. At the same time a neoconservative campaign was launched, under the title "United Against Nuclear Iran" (UANI), in which Ross played a prominent role as the "Co-Founder and Co-Chairman." The "Advisory Board" of UANI included, beside Ross, such notable figures as the neoconservative Mark Wallace, the President of UANI, advisor to Sarah Palin and a John Bolton recruit for a position at the UN; R. James Woolsey the neoconservative and member of the advisory board of The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs; Henry Sokolski the neoconservative signatory of the "Project for the New American Century signatory"; and Richard C. Holbrooke, another "Co-Founder and Co-Chairman" of UANI.[15] The neoconservative campaign included a slick and scary video advertisement, which is still available on the web.[16] The video started with the message "Stop Terrorism, Stop Human Rights Abuses, Stop Nuclear Iran." Small prints at the bottom of the message read "Paid for by the American Coalition Against Nuclear Iran, Inc." Following the introduction six hands appeared, black and white, joining in a circle around a map of Iran. The viewer was asked to "join the cause" by clicking on the video. If followed, a note would appear that read: "Send a message to the nation that Iran's nuclear program is unacceptable. Join United Against Nuclear Iran today and receive news updates and event reminders." Then the viewer was asked for name and email address. This was followed by an ominous video about Iran's alleged development of nuclear weapons, repeating the same falsehoods and illogical arguments put forward by Dennis Ross and company on behest of the Israeli lobby groups.    

            After President Obama took office, the media was filled with the news of the impending appointment of Dennis Ross as Iran envoy. Yet the appointment appeared to be postponed. Various explanations appeared in the media for the postponement. Some reasoned that the postponement was at least partly due to Ross's close ties with Israel. For example, on February 3, 2009, Robert Naiman wrote in the Huffington Post that "allegation of 'dual loyalty' is being raised against Dennis Ross." He further mentioned that Ross is "still chair of the board of the Jerusalem-based 'Jewish People Policy Planning Institute,' as indicated by that organization's website."[17]  Others emphasized the fact that as far as Iran is concerned Ross's appointment might kill any chance of rapprochement between Iran and the US.  For example, The Christian Science Monitor reported on February 5, 2009, that from an Iranian perspective Ross is the "pioneer of the American-Zionist lobby" and under his leadership during the Clinton years the US policy was "not one millimeter different from Israeli policy." The report quoted a "Western diplomat" as saying: "There is no doubt they [Iranians] are all going to look at Ross as an Israeli proxy."

            Some of the explanations given for the postponement of Ross's appointment also explain his vague and broad job title, "Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Gulf and Southwest Asia." Before the end of the 2008 presidential election there were rumors that Ross might be considered for the position of the Secretary of State (Haaretz, October 24, 2008). Once Obama was elected, and Hilary Clinton became Secretary of State, Ross apparently hoped to become at least the "special envoy to Iran." But given his close ties with Israel and the fact that his containment plans were well known to the Iranians, he had to settle for a less provocative title. Needless to say that the new title, "Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Gulf and Southwest Asia," is still quite provocative as far as Iran is concerned, since changing the name of the Persian Gulf to simply "Gulf" is offensive to many Iranians.

            Whatever the reason for the postponement of Ross's appointment and change of title, one thing is clear: the sly fox is now guarding the chicken coop. As Mel Levine said about Ross: "He'd be great for Israel." With the help of Richard Holbrooke, Stuart Levey�Bush's Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, who is now in Obama's Administration�and all the other "president's Middle East men," Dennis Ross might be able to finish the unfinished business of the neoconservatives, the containment of Iraq and Iran. The Israelis and pro-Israel communities must be jumping with joy once again!

Sasan Fayazmanesh is Professor of Economics at California State University, Fresno. He can be reached at: sasan.fayazmanesh@gmail.com

Notes

[1] See Daily Press Briefing, The U.D. Department of States:  or  The Washington Post

[2] See "Israel's Lawyer," The Washington Post, May 23, 2005:

[3] See Swisher, Clayton E., 2004, The truth about Camp David: the untold story about the collapse of the Middle East peace process, New York: Nation Books, p.35.

[4] See Washington Institute.

[5] The name of these individuals appears on the "Board of Advisors." See "About the Institute," available at: Washington Institute.

[6] Ross, for example, supported the invasion of Iraq, even though he was critical of some of the post-invasion policies of the Bush Administration (see "Obama's Conservative Mideast Pick," Time, July16, 2008).

[7] For different meanings of "containment" see my book: The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment, Routledge, 2008.

[8] For Clawson's relentless attempt to contain Iran see The United States and Iran Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment Routledge, 2008.

[9]  Dennis Ross, "Iran: Talk Tough With Tehran," Newsweek. .

[10] The report's title was: "2008 Presidential task Forces: Task Force on the Future of U.S.-Israel Relations: Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen the US-Israel Cooperation on The Iranian Nuclear Challenge." It is available at: Washington Institute.

[11] The other "co-convenors" was Robert Satloff. The two Washington Institute participants, who apparently wrote the piece, were the neoconservatives Patrick Clawson, "deputy director of research," and David Makovsky, "senior fellow and director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process."

[12]  On behest of Obama Anthony Lake and Susan Rice endorsed it, and on behalf of McCain former congressman Vin Weber and the neoconservative R. James Woolsey signed the document.

[13] See Security Council Resolution 1803, March 3, 2008: 

[14] See "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development"

[15] See "Leadership" of "United Against Nuclear Iran":

[16] See www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/video/view/4.

[17] See www.jpppi.org.il and www.jpppi.org.il

The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop: Dennis Ross and Iran

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

 

By Richard M Bennett
There now appears to be a growing consensus of expert opinion that Iran is but a few short months away from being capable of producing its first crude nuclear weapon.
Some may choose to see this event as "crossing the red line" and even as a trigger for military action as the threat of a nuclear capable Iran may well simply not be tolerated in some quarters.
However, before such an argument can be easily accepted, it would be wise to consider just what actually constitutes a threat.
So is Iran now or likely to be anytime soon a genuine "clear and present danger" to either Israel or the West?
To many within the Intelligence community, only a genuine capability and a clear intent equates to an actual threat.
Failing to learn the lesson of Iraq
Failure to stick to this essential truth sadly provided the backdrop to the gross mistake made over Iraq and Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.
British premier Tony Blair and president George W Bush in their head-long gallop towards war made much of the claim that there was a threat and it would seem, perverted such intelligence information that was available to support this otherwise unsubstantiated claim.
Their respective national intelligence services, the Central Intelligence Agency and SIS (MI6) had significantly failed to provide incontrovertible proof of either a genuine Iraqi WMD capability or a clear intent to use such weapons.
This factor was deliberately ignored or perhaps even suppressed by the US and British governments and this deceit would only emerge much later in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion.
In the time-honored political blame avoidance game, both Bush and Blair moved quickly to ensure that the intelligence services themselves would carry the main responsibility for this failure, neatly sidestepping any serious chance of being held to account for their own incompetence and culpability by their respective electorates.
Indeed, the British government remains so worried about the exposure of these unpalatable facts that even in 2009 current Justice Minister Jack Straw will reportedly exercise veto powers to block publication of key cabinet minutes under freedom of information laws.
Straw added that he could not permit the release of records from 2003 discussions over the invasion of Iraq because it would cause too much "damage" to democracy.
Iran's nuclear progress
So does Iran instead provide a genuine threat or is it still more of a danger to itself?
There is now probably sufficient information available to world bodies such as the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency for many observers to finally accept that within a matter of months Iran may be capable of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to build its first crude nuclear weapon.
That said, Iran almost certainly remains five years or more away from having a genuine war-fighting nuclear capability.
It would though now appear likely that Iran has finally managed to overcome most of its outstanding technical difficulties in weaponizing uranium.
This is still not a newly discovered fact, despite the constant changes in position on the subject by the US intelligence community and the advice it offers to the White House.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies predicted in September 2005 that by feeding the uranium it produces back through a minimum of 1,000 centrifuges at Natanz, Iran may only take as little as three years to produce some 25 kilograms of weaponized uranium. This is assumed to be enough for a prototype nuclear weapon.
Iran now has about 50,000 fast-spinning centrifuges; including increasing numbers of the much improved IR2 working round the clock and this in theory should be more than sufficient for a full-scale nuclear-weapons program.
However, simply having enough suitability modified material does not in itself produce a workable weapon and the problems still facing Tehran's reported nuclear weapons program remain immense.
The level of sophisticated engineering involved in producing a viable weapon takes years to evolve and would almost certainly require external scientific help from Iran's known allies, Pakistan, North Korea and Russia, which is building a nuclear plant for Iran that is near completion.
An effective trigger to detonate the weapon must still be manufactured and tested. Then the weapon must be tested, a major problem in itself. Keeping such a test secret would effectively be nigh on impossible, and despite claims that tremors recorded by the United States Geological Survey on October 21 and 25 last year were the result of Iranian underground nuclear explosions, it is highly unlikely that Iran has attempted such a test yet.
Any nuclear device would also need to be produced in a somewhat miniaturized form to create a weapon capable of being deployed in the warhead of the types of long-range missiles now available or carried under the wings of one of Iran's increasingly elderly fleet of jet strike aircraft.
Even then, further and lengthy testing would certainly be required to ensure that any WMD that might be fired at Israel or any of Iran's Arab neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, would indeed explode or that the missiles used were accurate enough to actually hit their target areas.
Then there is the small matter of producing enough of these weapons to create a genuine and believable nuclear threat or indeed a putative deterrent. And this still assumes that the Iranian government has developed suicidal tendencies and that the nation as a whole has a death wish.
Consequences of using nuclear weapons
Any nuclear attack on Israel would probably see the prevailing winds carry much of the radioactive fallout back across the Palestinian-controlled West Bank; Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, the oil fields of northern Saudi Arabia and much of Iran itself.
However, the main consequences of any such nuclear strike on the cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa and such important strategic targets as the nuclear facilities at Dimona, would be Israel's own immediate nuclear response and the inevitable near total destruction of many strategically important targets in Iran.
Tehran's military, economic and civilian infrastructure would be devastated and this could involve the deaths of as many as 30-50% of its entire population within just a few short years after the nuclear attack.
Indeed, with an almost guaranteed and probably even more devastating US response to any such attack on Israel or indeed one of Washington's Arab allies, Iran may even effectively cease to exist altogether as a functioning country.
The immense fallout from such a devastating nuclear retaliation would also gravely endanger much of Pakistan and northern India, and pose a potentially catastrophic threat to many hundreds of millions of the citizens of those two countries alone.
Nuclear weapons – a false hope for Iran?
Simply put, the mere possession of the nuclear bomb will not automatically give Iran a greater usable military power or increase its overall influence in the region, as its leadership apparently anticipates.
While if Tehran's leadership were actually foolish enough to use nuclear weapons, it would undoubtedly ensure the near total destruction of the Islamic Republic of Iran, turning it into an uninhabitable wasteland.
A genuine nuclear capability could in all probability turn out to be a greater long-term threat to Iran's own survival than to any of its neighbors.
Nuclear weapons for deterrence?
It could be argued that the possession of a small number of nuclear-tipped missiles could provide Iran with a deterrent against attack.
Indeed, this belief may well have helped drive Iran's ally North Korea to produce such weapons in the face of continued international condemnation.
However, few rational observers could seriously argue that North Korea would risk actually using them against its southern neighbor as such an action would ensure its own destruction at the hands of South Korea's ally, the US.
This same rationale could be applied to Iran, unless an argument can be made for Tehran welcoming its own nuclear annihilation.
Taking Iran's security requirements seriously
Much attention is paid, and rightly so, to the security of Israel and to the interests of the United States, but little attention has been given to Iran's security needs - the regional problems facing Iran are indeed serious.
Not only does Iran have an ongoing Kurdish (Party For a Free Life in Kurdistan - PJAK) insurgency in its northwestern provinces and a growing Baloch insurgency in the southeastern border areas with Pakistan, the government in Tehran is also deeply concerned at being surrounded by countries that are in various states of collapse or conflict - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and the former Soviet Central Asian countries and by potentially hostile forces such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and the massive US military presence in the Gulf.
However, it remains difficult to find an enemy likely to need deterring from an attack on Iran by its possession of nuclear weapons. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are unlikely foes, while the chances of Saudi Arabia or Israel attempting an invasion are quite laughable.
Only the US has the military power to attempt such an attack and Washington would probably only feel it necessary to do so to prevent Tehran achieving just such a nuclear capability.
It seems likely, though, that against this backdrop of perceived insecurity, Iran will still continue to pursue a nuclear insurance strategy at whatever cost to its international relations.
Iran as a future nuclear supermarket
Perhaps one of the greatest causes for Western and Israeli concern is the prospect of Iran's nuclear technology and weapons-grade material being passed to other states such as Syria or to even less scrupulous groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and worst of all, al-Qaeda.
The same counter-argument must, however, be deployed once again.
With modern forensic techniques allied to continual surveillance by Western intelligence, it remains highly unlikely that the technology and materials used in any terrorist attack would not be quickly traced to Tehran.
The same devastating response could be expected as it is almost inconceivable that Iran would be allowed to escape its punishment and ultimate destruction.
The last resort - the military option
Iran is well aware that its WMD facilities could be targets. Israel destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and laid waste another similar facility in Syria in 2007.
Tehran's nuclear program is therefore widely dispersed, well hidden and often buried up to 25 meters underground. It is also increasingly well defended by a sophisticated air defense system.
The Israeli air force could seriously damage many of Iran's important facilities with conventional weapons, but not destroy it. Only the United States has the numbers and range of weapons needed to demolish the entire program, which is stretched across more than 100 sites, in a massive pre-emptive strike. However, such an all-out attack would create extensive collateral damage and large numbers of civilian casualties.
An alternative may be for constant relatively small-scale attacks on the main facilities at Bushehr, Natanz and other strategically important targets to cripple Iran's nuclear ambitions.
In other words, a campaign of attrition using a combination of closely targeted air and cruise missile attacks and sabotage operations on the ground to simply wear down Tehran's resistance.
This may be Israel's preferred method and one that Washington could be more prepared to buy into. Whatever action Israel and the US may eventually decide on, time is still running out and the military option could well have a sell-by-date of mid-2010 at the latest.
The Iran problem
Except in the highly unlikely circumstance that it has already managed to produce a significant number of nuclear weapons in complete secrecy, then Iran is not yet a clear and present danger to its neighbors or to Western interests.
There can be little doubt that Iran is a potentially major destabilizing factor in the Middle East, it has a more than irrational foreign policy and quite openly supports groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas in Palestine, and it may indeed eventually become a nuclear threat.
But in the long run possession of nuclear weapons is unlikely to be of any tangible benefit to the mullahs, while their actual use would bring the quick and completely justified destruction of the state of Iran.
Whatever the Western powers or Israel finally decide is the appropriate diplomatic, economic or military action to take in response, it must be hoped that it will be made only on the basis of sound intelligence, after careful evaluation has been made of all the proven information available and in the absence of any truly viable alternative.
To repeat the mistakes of 2003 would be to invite disaster not only for Iran, but for the remaining creditability and long-term security of the Western democracies themselves.
Richard M Bennett, intelligence and security analyst, AFI Research.

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

Interview - Iran May Achieve Capability to Make A Nuclear Weapon in 2009 - NYTimes.com

 

Interviewee: David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security

Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

David Albright, a long-time expert on Iran's nuclear program, says that Iran will probably accumulate enough low-enriched uranium this year to "reach the first level of breakout capability, namely enough low-enriched uranium to make one nuclear weapon." And in an ironic twist, he says even though Iran's stated goal is to have a nuclear program for domestic power, it appears to be running out of uranium for such a plan. "It's one of the unfortunate ironies of the situation that while they don't have enough uranium for a civil nuclear energy program, they have plenty for a weapons program," Albright says. "Even if Iran runs out of uranium, they have more than enough to eventually produce tens of nuclear weapons." He urges the United States to seek tougher sanctions, but also to open wide-ranging negotiations with Iran.

You've been following Iran's nuclear activities for years. Could you provide an update on its progress so far?

Iran continues to move forward on developing its nuclear capabilities, and it is close to having what we would call a 'nuclear breakout capability.' That's a problem because once Iran reaches that state then it could make a decision to get nuclear weapons pretty rapidly. In as quickly as a few months, Iran would be able to have enough weapons-grade uranium for nuclear weapons. And if a breakout occurred, they would not likely do so at the well-known Natanz enrichment plant. Rather, the Iranians would most likely take low-enriched uranium that's produced at that plant and then divert it at a secret facility that we wouldn't know anything about. And at this secret facility, the Iranians would produce this weapons-grade uranium. And so if you were in the camp that said, 'Well, we'll have to strike militarily,' you won't actually know where to strike because you won't know where that secret facility is. Whatever camp you are in, the situation is bound to grow more tense. So for 2009, probably the big technical issue is when Iran establishes this breakout capability. It could be soon. They don't need that much more low-enriched uranium before they reach the first level of breakout capability, namely enough low-enriched uranium to make one nuclear weapon.

So you think it could happen even within the next year or so?

Within this year, it could happen. Once Iran reaches that breakout capability, countries will have different responses. Some, like Russia, will probably say, 'So what? They're still not building nuclear weapons.' The United States will have to worry that they don't know Iran's intentions. The U.S. government has believed Iran would eventually seek nuclear weapons and it would have to face the prospect that it could happen with little notice, complicating any negotiation process. A country like Israel will see it as a major threat because they'll worry that if things do go bad and Iran decides to get nuclear weapons, they can do so quickly, and Israel wouldn't know what or where to strike. For Israel, an Iranian nuclear breakout capability brings up existential questions.

Your organization, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), recently published a report (PDF) saying essentially that Iran was running out of uranium oxide, so-called yellowcake. It had just enough to make some nuclear weapons, but it didn't have enough for electrical power, their ostensible purpose in enriching uranium. How should an American official interpret that report?

Iran has some domestic uranium resources, and it's constructed two uranium mines. But for some reason, it's way behind opening the larger one. But it is operating the smaller one. But even if you look at the total capacity of those mines, it's not large enough if you want to have a full-blown nuclear electricity program. And for that kind of program, with up to eight 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors, you need a lot more uranium than what Iran can produce. Iran has never really had the uranium resources to support an indigenous nuclear electricity program. So they are dependent on importing the fuel. If you consider the Bushehr reactor, that's what they did. They bought the reactor from Russia, and they also bought the fuel for at least ten years. What they've been doing so far to operate the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility is depending on a stock of roughly six hundred tons of "yellowcake" that they imported from South Africa in the 1970s. They've been using it to make uranium hexafluoride at the Isfahan facility, and if they operate Isfahan anywhere near capacity, then they're going to run out pretty soon. They don't produce enough in their own mines for a civil electricity program. Their stock of imported yellowcake is running out and so, they're reaching a point where they're going to have to take some steps to improve their situation. They could try to smuggle in uranium, and that is something to watch for. From our point of view, the best thing they can do is work out a solution with the international community so they can proceed with the nuclear electricity program and import the low-enriched uranium fuel that they need for those reactors. Once they have a deal, and the West and Russia are fully prepared to guarantee the Iranians their supply of low-enriched uranium, then that will free them from this bind of too little uranium. Now, on the other hand, it's one of the unfortunate ironies of the situation that while they don't have enough uranium for a civil nuclear energy program, they have plenty for a weapons program. Even if Iran runs out of uranium, they have more than enough to eventually produce tens of nuclear weapons. It's a situation where you have to wonder whether Iran's intention all along was to have the infrastructure to have a bomb program and it was never intending to achieve an indigenous civil nuclear electricity program.

All right, now you're in the White House, and you're on the National Security Council staff, which is trying to come up with an Iran policy. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gave a speech today where he says that we might be interested in talking to the United States, but don't ask us to stop our nuclear program because that's not negotiable. ISIS made some recommendations (PDF). What is your opinion?

Don't accommodate Iran with short-term solutions. Iran is determined to move forward right now. Compromises that the United States may offer, such as settling for merely slowing down the enrichment program, are guaranteed not to work. The important thing is to maintain the U.S. goal of an Iranian suspension of uranium enrichment. It is also important to increase the sanctions on Iran in order to try to get Iran to rethink its calculation on whether an enrichment program is in their interest. It's critical to also negotiate directly with Iran, so Iran understands what the United States wants, and the United States understands what Iran wants. And then it's important to broaden this issue to the entire Middle East. It's very important right now to start talking about a Middle East free of enrichment plants and reprocessing plants [that can separate plutonium], which could be used in nuclear weapons. And so, you want to achieve a region that doesn't have nuclear weapons capabilities. Then inevitably, bring in other players, some very much of concern to Iran. Israel would be number one, but also Egypt and Turkey-they're not going to respond favorably as Iran develops nuclear weapons. You need to bring in more players striving for a goal of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons capabilities.

Do you think it's at all possible that Israel would agree to be involved in such a thing?

They have in the past. In the 1990s, they were willing to consider achieving a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, if the conditions were right. In the 1990s, the key issues revolved around Iraq and Iran and the security threats they posed. And so, the threat of Iran remains for Israel, but Israel doesn't see many military options out there. It could be open to this idea. It's also not asking Israel to give up its nuclear weapons. It's asking Israel to give up production of plutonium and any highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. They've already got plenty of nuclear explosive material. <em />

How do you get Iran to agree to a freeze if Iran keeps saying it won't do it?

You have to change the conditions, and you also have to accept that achieving this goal is going to take a long time. It is useful to think of the examples of Pakistan and South Africa. In the case of Pakistan, in the 1970s when Pakistan was working all-out on an enrichment program, the U.S. position was initially, 'No, we can't tolerate that.' And then it started to accommodate itself to Pakistan's enrichment program because of other priorities; first, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We eventually got Pakistan to cap its enrichment output at 5 percent or so. And that didn't hold once Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998.

But in the South Africa case, the vision held. The goal was a South Africa without nuclear weapons, and sanctions were put on South Africa. South Africa, under tremendous pressure, because of its isolation internationally, decided that it had to do two things. One of which was to give up apartheid and the other [was] to give up nuclear weapons. The key factor was that the United States and the others didn't falter on pressing South Africa. What do we have in Pakistan? The opposite. Now we have to fear Pakistan for many reasons. One of which would be a nuclear war with India, and the other, it could be the place where the wherewithal to build nuclear weapons is acquired by terrorists which use these weapons against us. So the accommodation approach, unfortunately, is by no means guaranteed to be successful, and it's better to focus on what we really want and work on that. But it's a long-term issue. You have to maintain your resolve, and tensions are going to increase like they did in southern Africa.

You're saying it would be helpful to talk to Iran, but you have to put the nuclear freeze up front?

I would. It is essential that the United States talk to Iran directly. And talk to them on many fronts. The United States should allow diplomats to engage with Iranians around the world.

There's still discussion about whether there should be an interests section in Tehran [a U.S. office that would fall short of diplomatic recognition]. I guess that's all going to come out of this policy review.

The interests section is a step forward, but there's a more fundamental decision that's needed. Is the United States going to allow negotiations with Iran? That's the more fundamental issue, and also, it allows more freedom in making the next decision. How do you actually have negotiations with Iran? Many would probably argue that we secretly start mid-level negotiations rather than having some top-level envoy approach Iran in a visible way. It's just harder to negotiate when everyone is watching you, but you can't do either unless you permit these discussions to take place-government to government-and create the mechanisms for that to happen.

It's also important in this to remember that you want to avoid setting up this situation with Iran where you are forced to two choices, namely capitulation or military strikes. Military strikes are very unlikely to be effective unless you're willing to launch massive campaigns against the country and that means going to war against Iran. I don't think anyone wants to do that. And I'll also say, even in that case, you might not stop Iran from building nuclear weapons because in the end, the places that they would need to make nuclear weapons are not that large. And after being attacked, they would likely launch a Manhattan-style program [the code name for the U.S. secret program during World War II to produce the atomic bomb]. So I would still say that military options are just not feasible. That doesn't mean you can't apply pressure on Iran, and I would argue that if you're not going to favor military strikes, then you need to focus more on sanctions to get Iran to rethink its priorities on enrichment.

How do you get the Russians to be be more cooperative on this?

One way is what [Vice President Joe] Biden said, "push the reset button" on relations with Russia. The Obama administration should look again on all the issues involved with missile defense and arms control, in particular the START treaty. The United States can engage with Russia in a less confrontational mode and see if in the process, Russia will be more helpful in Iran. It may not, but the approach taken by the Bush administration clearly didn't work, because if you increase the tension with Russia, particularly on nuclear issues, they're less likely to help you on Iran. So it's worth trying. Now, it's not necessary to get Russia, although it would be very helpful to get Russia to put a bit more pressure on Iran. You at least don't want to create situations where Russia has more incentive to work against U.S. interests on Iran. More productive engagement on nuclear arms-control issues can go a long way in stopping that.

Interview - Iran May Achieve Capability to Make A Nuclear Weapon in 2009 - NYTimes.com

Israel launches campaign against UN nuke watchdog chief - Haaretz - Israel News

 

Israel launches campaign against UN nuke watchdog chief

By Yossi Melman

Tags: IAEA, syria, iran

Israel's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) recently intensified its attacks on the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. The AEC, one of the most classified bodies in Israel that is also, among other things, responsible for operating the Dimona nuclear reactor, does not often issue public statements, and usually plays down its activities.
But in recent months, given the IAEA director's actions relating to all aspects of Syria and Iran's nuclear programs, the committee decided, with the consent of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, to stop tiptoeing around the issue. The AEC now hurries to respond to ElBaradei's interviews, in which he often speaks of Israeli in critical tones.
The latest expression of this new policy is a letter to be published this week in the latest issue of the American weekly magazine, Newsweek, written by the AEC spokeswoman Nili Lifshitz. Lifshitz is leaving her post at the end of the week after years on the job to assume a different position in human resources at the Nuclear Research Center (NRC, the Nahal Sorek nuclear reactor, which the AEC also oversees). But she does not hesitate to criticize the IAEA director sharply.

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According to her, ElBaradei, "failed in his attempts to persuade Syria to allow visits by IAEA inspectors to three sites in Syria with suspected links to Syria's confidential nuclear program."
Even the IAEA director's attempt to arrange for a true investigation into Syria's efforts to obfuscate and cover up the evidence at the site bombed in September 2007 failed, Lifshitz wrote. Syria hustled the building rubble and dirt from the site so that it would not be possible to uncover what was built there and what was going on.
The AEC spokeswoman stressed in her letter that the suspicion is that Syria set up a North Korean-made nuclear reactor at the site, an action that is contrary to its agreements with the IAEA.
But instead of focusing on these issues, ElBaradei has deemed it appropriate to denounce and criticize the State of Israel.
"Unfortunately, this has become typical behavior on the part of the IAEA director," Lifshitz wrote, "as part of his efforts to divert attention away from his failed attempts to arrange for a fitting and appropriate investigation given the accumulated information and proof that Middle Eastern states are clearly violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."
Soft on Iran
Israel's pointed criticism takes on a special significance against the backdrop of the most recent IAEA report and a briefing on Syria and Iran for reporters presented by a senior agency official. The report and the briefing presented additional evidence that the bombed site in Syria was built as a nuclear reactor resembling one in North Korea. The IAEA report also rejected Damascus' claims that the uranium traces found at the site were from the missiles that destroyed the structure, i.e., that they are part of the Israeli Air Force's armaments.
The letter to Newsweek follows a previous letter also sent by the Israeli AEC to The Wall Street Journal in response to another ElBaradei interview. In that interview, he also claimed that Israel, like Iran, is not cooperating with his organization, and in so doing attempted to draw a parallel between the two countries.
ElBaradei, an Egyptian legalist and veteran diplomat who has been affiliated with the United Nations in general for over 35 years, has been considered for many years to be a "red flag" by the AEC. He is perceived by senior AEC officials, which is responsible for contacts with the IAEA, as someone not known for his pro-Israel views, to put it mildly.
According to diplomatic and defense officials in Israel, ElBaradei was negligent in handling all matters relating to the Iranian nuclear crisis. In reports he wrote, which were written in soft, evasive and conciliatory language, he allowed Iran to evade over the course of six years its commitments according to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its agreements with the IAEA.
The United States was also not overly pleased with the IAEA director. About four years ago, the Bush administration tried to bar his reelection to the post, but failed due to the tremendous support for ElBaradei from the bloc of Third World countries, with the backing of Russia and China.
As a result, for years, Israel, even though it was not satisfied with ElBaradei's handling of the job, had to act diplomatically. Israel was hesitant about openly airing its reservations and tried to maintain favorable ties with him, and keep up a professional working relationship.
ElBaradei visited Israel more than four years ago, met with the leaders of the AEC, visited the Nuclear Research Center, but was not permitted to visit Dimona, because Israel (unlike, for example, Iran and Syria) is not a signatory to the NPT and therefore is not obligated to allow international oversight of the Dimona reactor.
Nevertheless, in recent months, as noted, the policy has shifted prompted by the AEC director, Dr. Shaul Horev, and with the approval of the prime minister. Presumably, the attacks are coming due to the report that ElBaradei will leave his position at the end of the year and be replaced by a new director, with representatives from South Africa and Japan vying for the spot.

Israel launches campaign against UN nuke watchdog chief - Haaretz - Israel News

kenny's sideshow: Drum Machine: Spinning for War with Iran

 

Chris Hedges, Truthdig, Feb. 23:
There is a lot riding on whom President Obama names as his special envoy to Iran. If, as expected, it is Dennis Ross...we will be in deep trouble....

The New York Times, Feb. 24:
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Monday appointed Dennis B. Ross, a seasoned Middle East negotiator under Republican and Democratic presidents, as her special adviser for the [Persian Gulf] and Southwest Asia, a portfolio that will include Iran....Mr. Ross had advocated a tough approach toward Iran that included persuading Europe to increase economic pressure on the government in Tehran. He is a co-founder of United Against Nuclear Iran, a group dedicated to stopping the country from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The drumbeat for an attack on Iran -- pounded by American and Israeli militarists, and their multitude of sycophants -- never ceases. At times it blends into the background noise of other events that surface to dominate the howling cacaphony of the corporate media bubble, but it never goes away. Very weighty factions in the American power structure, and their Israeli allies, are strongly committed to making such an attack happen, and they continue to press their agenda -- patiently, relentlessly -- no matter who is temporarily managing the empire.
In recent days, they have upped the volume, bringing the issue back to the fore. As many others have pointed out (most notably Arthur Silber, in this powerful piece), the warmongers have seized on an unremarkable report by the International Atomic Energy Agency noting that it had underestimated the amount of enriched uranium at Iran's nuclear facilities. The IAEA said this kind of undercounting was not uncommon in dealing with nascent nuclear programs. And in any case, the undercounted uranium was not missing or "hidden;" it was there, in plain sight, open to international inspectors -- who, in the due course of a thorough inspection, found it and added it to the total.

The IAEA also reported the fact that Iran has deliberately slowed the pace of its nuclear enrichment program, leaving it even further away from developing a nuclear weapon -- if, in fact, it were developing a nuclear weapon, which both the IAEA and the U.S. intelligence appartus says it is not. In short, the IAEA report was good news that could have provided a clear and fruitful opening to any administration seeking a "new approach" to Iran.
But none of this mattered to the warmongers, who immediately seized upon the drums that are always at their command in the higher reaches of the national media. As Kaveh L Afrasiabi reports in the Asia Times:

From the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and London's Mirror, the Guardian and the Financial Times, among other leading international newspapers, the reaction has been a steady stream of alarmist commentaries. Many reports regard this an Iranian "milestone" in reaching "nuclear break-out capability".
....A Los Angeles Times report was headlined "Iran has enriched enough to make a bomb, report says" while the New York Times went out of its way to convey the impression that Iran had deliberately "understated" the magnitude of its enriched uranium. The New York Times added serious fuel to this raw information by citing an "anonymous" IAEA official who claimed that "theoretically" Iran is capable of making a nuclear bomb...
The US government spokesperson, Gordon Duguid, was quick to denounce Iran and parrot the line that Iran must suspend all its "uranium-enrichment related reprocessing". This despite the fact that all the IAEA reports - including this most recent one - state categorically that "there are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities" at Iran's nuclear facilities.
Wouldn't it be nice if the US officials first bothered to read - or read carefully - the reports that they rely on to sledgehammer Iran?

Oh, they read them, all right. They read them very carefully -- then cherry-pick phrases and factoids to twist as they see fit. Silber nails it thusly:

If our rulers are determined to go to war, they will go to war. It may take them years or even a decade, but if the war is important enough to them, they'll get to the war eventually. As needed to prevent significant protest from a docile, easily manipulated public, they will lie about every significant aspect of the alleged threat we face and about what we "must" do. And what we "must" do is always to kill lots and lots of people, most of whom have never even thought of harming us.

And let's be clear about one thing: the United States is already at war with Iraq. Washington is already sponsoring terrorist attacks inside Iranian territory by extremist groups, including Jundullah, America's own little al Qaeda. As Hedges notes:

Iran has endured our covert support for armed militant groups from the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) to the Free Life Party of Kurdistan to the repugnant Jundullah, also known as the Army of God, a Sunni fundamentalist group that operates with U.S. support out of Pakistan. Jundullah has carried out a series of bombings and ambushes inside Iran. The militant group has a habit of beheading Iranians it captures, including a recent group of 16 Iranian police officials, and filming and distributing the executions.

As you can see, bombings and beheadings and deathporn videos are not inherently evil; they can also be a force for good -- as long as they put to the service of America's ever-noble, ever-lofty foreign policy ideals.
With the appointment of Dennis Ross, the Obama Administration has given its response to Iran's gesture of slowing down the enrichment of uranium for its nuclear energy program. As Hedges wrote:

“For the US to shape a peaceful relationship with Iran will be difficult under any circumstances,” Stephen Kinzer, author of “All the Shah’s Men,” wrote recently. “If the American negotiating team is led by Ross or another conventional thinker tied to dogmas of the past, it will be impossible.”
...Obama has an opportunity to radically alter the course we have charted in the Middle East. The key will be his administration’s relationship with Iran. If he gives in to the Israel lobby, if he empowers Ross, if he defines Iran as the enemy before he begins to attempt a negotiated peace, he could ignite a fuse that will see our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolve into a regional conflagration. This may be the most important decision of his presidency. Let’s pray he does not blow it.

Well, he has "blown it" -- although the use of that phrase assumes that Obama ever intended to "radically alter the course we have charted in the Middle East." He gave zero evidence of such an intention throughout the campaign -- rather the opposite -- and so his appointment of Ross, and his reaction to the non-story about the IAEA inspection, do not constitute a "mistake" on his part, at least not on his own terms.
For example, the Obama administration has now fully embraced the subtle shift made by the Bush Administration regarding Iran's atomic ambition, from declaring that Iran will not be allowed to build a nuclear weapon to declaring that it will not be allowed to develop any nuclear program at all. This allowed the Bushists, and now the Obamaniks, to elide the uncomfortable fact that there is no evidence of any nuclear weapons program in Iran. As we noted here back in December 2007:

Anyone hoping that the "no nukes in Iran" NIE report might hobble the Administration's armed march toward Persia should take note of how George W. Bush moved the goal posts in his warmongering game during a press conference on Tuesday.
As the New York Times reports, Bush declared that Iran will not be "allowed" to acquire even the "scientific knowledge" required to build a nuclear weapon. Previous "red lines" which could trigger an attack had been based on Iran actually building a weapon; now even nibbling at the forbidden fruit of nuclear knowledge could serve as "justification" for a "pre-emptive strike" to quell the "danger." After all, as Bush rather illiterately told reporters, "What's to say they couldn't start another covert nuclear weapons program?" Better safe than sorry, right?
And at the very least, moving the goalposts in this manner will allow the Bush Regime to portray Iran as a dangerous, defiant menace for merely carrying on with its fully legal nuclear power program, as authorized by international treaty and monitored by the IAEA. Thus no matter what Iran actually does – or doesn't do – the Bushists will continue to use the "Persian menace" as fodder for the imperial war machine.

Now here is Obama's envoy to the UN, Susan Rice, speaking in February 2009:

The US envoy to the United Nations, Susan Rice, meanwhile said in a radio interview that the IAEA report "confirms what we all have feared and anticipated, which is that Iran ... remains in pursuit of its nuclear program."
"There's no ambiguity about that, and our aim is to combine enhanced pressures, and indeed the potential for direct engagement to try to prevent Iran from taking its program to fruition," Rice said in remarks to be aired later Friday on National Public Radio's All Things Considered program.

Note what is being said here. The United States is declaring its intent to prevent Iran from taking its "nuclear program" to fruition. Rice, following Bush, is careful not to say "nuclear weapons program," because Washington's own intelligence agencies affirm there is no evidence for such a thing. But, as Arthur Silber noted, this doesn't matter. The very notion of Iran having a nuclear program of any kind is now the issue -- an issue justifying "enhanced pressures." And considering that the United States is already maintaining a near-complete economic and diplomatic blockade of Iran -- and killing Iranians with terrorist attacks -- what could those "enhanced pressures" be, other than overt military action? As the saying goes, there is not a sliver of daylight between the Bush and Obama position on this point.
The Bush Administration said it was willing to contemplate and if need be countenance war if Iran continued to pursue its treaty-sanctioned, internationally inspected nuclear energy program. The Obama Administration has just said the same thing -- even after Iran had slowed its nuclear energy program as a gesture toward the "new approach" that Obama mentioned in the campaign. Obama has appointed a secretary of state who publicly vowed to "obliterate" Iran -- and its 70 million human beings -- if Tehran launched an attack on Israel. He has now given this secretary of state a special envoy who is one of the fiercest anti-Iran hawks in Washington.
As Stephen Kinzer notes, Obama has just made the task of shaping a peaceful relationship with Iran well-nigh impossible. A cynic might suspect that this was his intention all along.
But let us not be cynical in the still-blazing dawn of our new era. Let us give the new president every benefit of the doubt, and say that he is indeed committed to a peaceful relationship with Iran -- as long as Iran capitulates to all of America's demands, gratefully accepts American hegemony and cheerfully countenances America's blowing up and beheading of its citizens.
Still hard to see that sliver though, ain't it?

kenny's sideshow: Drum Machine: Spinning for War with Iran