Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Iran-Israel Spy Games - Jerusalem Dateline: Chris Mitchell Blog - CBN News

 

Perhaps it's another sign the growth of Iran's nuclear program might be reaching a showdown between Israel and Iran. According to Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C., an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program might come sooner than many people think. Kenneth Timmerman explained in a recent article entitled, "Iran Seeks Confrontation in Gulf."

"Peter Brookes, a former U.S. Navy officer and strategic analyst for the Heritage Foundation, believes that Israel is nearing a decision to unilaterally bomb Iran. Why now?

Simple, Brookes believes. Because Russia has finally set a date -- Sometime this spring -- for delivering the first load of nuclear fuel to Iran's nuclear reactor at Busheir, along the Persian Gulf coast. Israel has twice launched air strikes to cripple the nuclear programs of its declared enemies.

In June 1981, it struck the Osirak nuclear plant in Iraq. Last September, it struck a site in Syria which Brookes and other analysts believe was intended to house a nuclear weapons development program. In both cases, Israel struck before any nuclear material was present, "to prevent radiation from the reactor being spewed into the atmosphere after a strike," Brookes said last week. A similar motive could now prompt Israel to strike Iran in the coming weeks or months, before the Russian nuclear material is delivered to Busheir, Brookes believes."

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Iran-Israel Spy Games - Jerusalem Dateline: Chris Mitchell Blog - CBN News

Sunday, January 20, 2008

Intelligence Reports: Dismissing experts

 

It seems once this administration has decided to declare another country an enemy -- and, potentially, attack it -- little will change the course it has blindly set for itself. Not even the intelligence provided by one of its own agencies.

To wit, Newsweek reports that while President Bush has continued to label Iran a threat, he has been skirting the issue of what a National Intelligence Estimate report stated in December, that Iran suspended its nuclear program years ago. But the news magazine reports that behind closed doors, Bush whispers the sort of sweet nothings in Ehud Olmert's ears that make the Israeli prime minister weak in the knees. According to an insider quoted in the story, Bush "told the Israelis that he can't control what the intelligence community says, but that (the NIE's) conclusions don't reflect his own views." Bush doesn't seem to realize that nothing can prevent Iranian engineers from acquiring said "know-how." In fact, the genesis of Iran's nuclear program is the Atoms for Peace program, which it signed onto in 1957. The U.S. did nothing but help the program through the '70s, when it built Iran reactors and trained its engineers.

And the U.S. didn't seem to mind when in June 1974 the shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons "without a doubt and sooner than one would think." Regardless, Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapons program now.

But Bush seems to be leaning toward attacking Iran over what our own intelligence says is not a weapons program. It's almost as though he didn't learn a thing with his folly in Iraq.

Intelligence Reports: Dismissing experts

Friday, January 18, 2008

For Peace With Iran, Israel Should Get MAD - May 31, 2007 - The New York Sun

 

Iran is a fierce enemy but is not an illogical one. Underestimating the intelligence — and, yes, the wisdom — of the mullahs who rule the country is a serious error — one that the West, the Iraqis, and others have often made in the past. Time and again, the Iranians have proved that they get it when it comes to existential threats.

One important historical guideline comes from the bloody eightyear war against Iran begun in 1980 by Saddam Hussein, who, totally unprovoked and with Western help, initiated one of the bloodiest conflicts of the 20th century. A million people, twothirds of them Iranians, perished. With the active help of Western naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Iraqi forces wiped out Iranian ports, industrial complexes, and its whole offshore oil industry before the tide began to turn toward Iran's advantage.

For Peace With Iran, Israel Should Get MAD - May 31, 2007 - The New York Sun

Saturday, January 12, 2008

Iran Encounter Grimly Echoes ’02 War Game - New York Times

By THOM SHANKER

Published: January 12, 2008

WASHINGTON — There is a reason American military officers express grim concern over the tactics used by Iranian sailors last weekend: a classified, $250 million war game in which small, agile speedboats swarmed a naval convoy to inflict devastating damage on more powerful warships.

Iran Shows Its Own Video of Vessels’ Encounter in Gulf (January 11, 2008)

In the days since the encounter with five Iranian patrol boats in the Strait of Hormuz, American officers have acknowledged that they have been studying anew the lessons from a startling simulation conducted in August 2002. In that war game, the Blue Team navy, representing the United States, lost 16 major warships — an aircraft carrier, cruisers and amphibious vessels — when they were sunk to the bottom of the Persian Gulf in an attack that included swarming tactics by enemy speedboats.

“The sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability, both mentally and electronically, to handle the attack,” said Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps officer who served in the war game as commander of a Red Team force representing an unnamed Persian Gulf military. “The whole thing was over in 5, maybe 10 minutes.”

If the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, proved to the public how terrorists could transform hijacked airliners into hostage-filled cruise missiles, then the “Millennium Challenge 2002” war game with General Van Riper was a warning to the armed services as to how an adversary could apply similar, asymmetrical thinking to conflict at sea.

General Van Riper said he complained at the time that important lessons of his simulated victory were not adequately acknowledged across the military. But other senior officers say the war game and subsequent analysis and exercises helped to focus attention on the threat posed by Iran’s small, fast boats, and helped to prepare commanders for last weekend’s encounter.

“It’s clear, strategically, where the Iranian military has gone,” Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters on Friday. “For the years that this strategic shift toward their small, fast boats has taken place, we’ve been very focused on that.”

In the simulation, General Van Riper sent wave after wave of relatively inexpensive speedboats to charge at the costlier, more advanced fleet approaching the Persian Gulf. His force of small boats attacked with machine guns and rockets, reinforced with missiles launched from land and air. Some of the small boats were loaded with explosives to detonate alongside American warships in suicide attacks. That core tactic of swarming played out in real life last weekend, though on a much more limited scale and without any shots fired.

According to Pentagon and Navy officials, five small patrol boats belonging to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps charged a three-ship Navy convoy, maneuvering around and between an American destroyer, cruiser and frigate during a tense half-hour encounter. The location was where the narrow Strait of Hormuz meets the open waters of the Persian Gulf — the same choke point chosen by General Van Riper for his attack.

In the encounter last Sunday, the commander of one American warship trained an M240 machine gun — which fires upward of 10 armor-piercing slugs per second — on an Iranian boat that pulled within 200 yards of the American vessel. But the Iranians turned away before the commander gave the order to fire.

That was not the case in the simulation, sponsored by the military’s Joint Forces Command. The victory of the force modeled after a Persian Gulf state — a composite of Iran and Iraq — astounded sponsors of what was then the largest joint war-fighting exercise ever held, involving 13,500 military members and civilians battling in nine live exercise ranges in the United States, and double that many computer simulations to replicate a number of different battles.

General Van Riper’s attack was much more complex and sophisticated than anything that could have involved the Iranian boats last weekend. The broad outline of the 2002 war game was reported at the time, but in interviews since last weekend’s episode, General Van Riper and other officers have provided new details about the simulation.

In the war game, scores of adversary speedboats and larger naval vessels had been shadowing and hectoring the Blue Team fleet for days. The Blue Team defenses also faced cruise missiles fired simultaneously from land and from warplanes, as well as the swarm of speedboats firing heavy machine guns and rockets — and pulling alongside to detonate explosives on board.

When the Red Team sank much of the Blue navy despite the Blue navy’s firing of guns and missiles, it illustrated a cheap way to beat a very expensive fleet. After the Blue force was sunk, the game was ordered to begin again, with the Blue Team eventually declared the victor.

In a telephone interview, General Van Riper recalled that his idea of a swarming attack grew from Marine Corps studies of the natural world, where insects and animals — from tiny ant colonies to wolf packs — move in groups to overwhelm larger prey.

“It is not a matter of size or of individual capability, but whether you have the numbers and come from multiple directions in a short period of time,” he said.

Although Washington and Tehran continue to duel over details of the encounter, American officials say the Iranians may have been seeking to provoke a violent confrontation as President Bush was about to visit the region. Or, the officials say, they might have been hoping to test the American reaction. Yet there is no certainty that the encounter was ordered by the government in Tehran.

Pentagon officials on Friday said there were two encounters with small Iranian boats in the region last month. In one, a Navy warship fired warning shots and in the other a warning whistle was sounded. Both encounters ended without injury after the Iranian vessels turned away.

Regardless, American sailors have not forgotten how a small boat that hid among refueling and garbage vessels off a port in Yemen detonated alongside the American destroyer Cole in October 2000, killing 17 Americans and crippling the warship

Iran Encounter Grimly Echoes ’02 War Game - New York Times

Friday, January 11, 2008

Democracy Now! | Gareth Porter: Official Version of U.S.-Iranian Naval Incident Starts to Unravel And only Ron Paul questions the so called facts

 

AMY GOODMAN: Gareth Porter, what about the timing of this, on the eve of President Bush’s visit to the Middle East?

GARETH PORTER: Well, of course, there’s no doubt that the motivation for the Pentagon to blow this incident up was precisely the timing of President Bush leaving on a trip to the Middle East, in which one of his major purposes was to try to keep together a coalition of Arab states, which—a very, very loose and shaky coalition to oppose Iran and to support, hopefully, according to the administration’s policy, the US pressure on Iran through diplomatic and financial means, through the Security Council and through its allies in Europe. So this is definitely part of the reason, very clearly, that what was a very minor incident which did not threaten US ships, as far as we can tell from all the evidence so far, was turned into what was presented as a confrontation and a threat of war.

JUAN GONZALEZ: Gareth Porter, I’d like to ask you, I was watching the Republican debate last night on Fox News and was astonished to see one of the moderators spend quite a bit of time on this topic, questioning every one of the candidates as to whether they believe the Navy commander on the scene did the right thing by not blowing the Iranian boats out of the water. Surprisingly, only Ron Paul, the maverick, even questioned some of the facts of the incident as reported. Your response to this suddenly becoming a topic for the presidential debates?

Democracy Now! | Gareth Porter: Official Version of U.S.-Iranian Naval Incident Starts to Unravel

POLITICS-US: Official Version of Naval Incident Starts to Unravel

 

POLITICS-US: Official Version of Naval Incident Starts to Unravel
Analysis by Gareth Porter*


Credit:Press-TV
Image from Iranian video depicting the Jan. 7 encounter with U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz.

WASHINGTON, Jan 10 (IPS) - Despite the official and media portrayal of the incident in the Strait of Hormuz early Monday morning as a serious threat to U.S. ships from Iranian speedboats that nearly resulted in a "battle at sea", new information over the past three days suggests that the incident did not involve such a threat and that no U.S. commander was on the verge of firing at the Iranian boats.
The new information that appears to contradict the original version of the incident includes the revelation that U.S. officials spliced the audio recording of an alleged Iranian threat onto to a videotape of the incident. That suggests that the threatening message may not have come in immediately after the initial warning to Iranian boats from a U.S. warship, as appears to do on the video.
Also unraveling the story is testimony from a former U.S. naval officer that non-official chatter is common on the channel used to communicate with the Iranian boats and testimony from the commander of the U.S. 5th fleet that the commanding officers of the U.S. warships involved in the incident never felt the need to warn the Iranians of a possible use of force against them.
Further undermining the U.S. version of the incident is a video released by Iran Thursday showing an Iranian naval officer on a small boat hailing one of three ships.
The Iranian commander is heard to say, "Coalition warship 73, this is Iranian navy patrol boat." He then requests the "side numbers" of the U.S. warships. A voice with a U.S. accent replies, "This is coalition warship 73. I am operating in international waters."
The dramatic version of the incident reported by U.S. news media throughout Tuesday and Wednesday suggested that Iranian speedboats, apparently belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard navy, had made moves to attack three U.S. warships entering the Strait and that the U.S. commander had been on the verge of firing at them when they broke off.
Typical of the network coverage was a story by ABC's Jonathan Karl quoting a Pentagon official as saying the Iranian boats "were a heartbeat from being blown up".
Bush administration officials seized on the incident to advance the portrayal of Iran as a threat and to strike a more threatening stance toward Iran. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley declared Wednesday that the incident "almost involved an exchange of fire between our forces and Iranian forces". President George W. Bush declared during his Mideast trip Wednesday that there would be "serious consequences" if Iran attacked U.S. ships and repeated his assertion that Iran is "a threat to world peace".
Central to the depiction of the incident as involving a threat to U.S. warships is a mysterious pair of messages that the sailor who heard them onboard immediately interpreted as saying, "I am coming at you...", and "You will explode after a few minutes." But the voice in the audio clearly said "I am coming to you," and the second message was much less clear.
Furthermore, as the New York Times noted Thursday, the recording carries no ambient noise, such as the sounds of a motor, the sea or wind, which should have been audible if the broadcast had been made from one of the five small Iranian boats.
A veteran U.S. naval officer who had served as a surface warfare officer aboard a U.S. Navy destroyer in the Gulf sent a message to the New York Times on-line column "The Lede" Wednesday pointing out that in the Persian Gulf, the "bridge-to-bridge" radio channel used to communicate between ships "is like a bad CB radio" with many people using it for "hurling racial slurs" and "threats". The former officer wrote that his "first thought" was that the message "might not have even come from one of the Iranian craft".
Pentagon officials admitted to the Times that they could not rule out that the broadcast might have come from another source
The five Iran boats involved were hardly in a position to harm the three U.S. warships. Although Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman described the Iranian boats as "highly maneuverable patrol craft" that were "visibly armed," he failed to note that these are tiny boats carrying only a two- or three-man crew and that they are normally armed only with machine guns that could do only surface damage to a U.S. ship.
The only boat that was close enough to be visible to the U.S. ships was unarmed, as an enlarged photo of the boat from the navy video clearly shows.
The U.S. warships were not concerned about the possibility that the Iranian boats were armed with heavier weapons capable of doing serious damage. Asked by a reporter whether any of the vessels had anti-ship missiles or torpedoes, Vice Adm. Kevin Cosgriff, Commander of the 5th Fleet, answered that none of them had either of those two weapons.
"I didn't get the sense from the reports I was receiving that there was a sense of being afraid of these five boats," said Cosgriff.
The edited Navy video shows a crewman issuing an initial warning to approaching boats, but the footage of the boats maneuvering provides no visual evidence of Iranian boats "making a run on U.S. ships" as claimed by CBS news Wednesday in its report based on the new video.
Vice Adm. Cosgriff also failed to claim any run toward the U.S. ships following the initial warning. Cosgriff suggested that the Iranian boat's manoeuvres were "unduly provocative" only because of the "aggregate of their manoeuvres, the radio call and the dropping of objects in the water".
He described the objects dropped by the Iranian boat as being "white, box-like objects that floated". That description indicates that the objects were clearly not mines, which would have been dark and would have sunk immediately. Cosgriff indicated that the ships merely "passed by them safely" without bothering to investigate whether they were explosives of some kind.
The apparent absence of concern on the part of the U.S. ships' commanding officers about the floating objects suggests that they recognised that the Iranians were engaging in a symbolic gesture having to do with laying mines.
Cosgriff's answers to reporters' questions indicated that the story promoted earlier by Pentagon officials that one of the U.S . ships came very close to firing at the Iranian boats seriously distorted what actually happened. When Cosgriff was asked whether the crew ever gave warning to the Iranian boats that they "could come under fire", he said the commanding officers "did not believe they needed to fire warning shots".
As for the report circulated by at least one Pentagon official to the media that one of the commanders was "close to firing", Cosgriff explained that "close to" meant that the commander was "working through a series of procedures". He added, "[I]n his mind, he might have been closing in on that point."
Despite Cosgriff's account, which contradicted earlier Pentagon portrayals of the incident as a confrontation, not a single news outlet modified its earlier characterisation of the incident. After the Cosgriff briefing, Associated Press carried a story that said, " U.S. forces were taking steps toward firing on the Iranians to defend themselves, said the U.S. naval commander in the region. But the boats -- believed to be from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's navy -- turned and moved away, officials said."
That was quite different from what Cosgriff actually said.
In its story covering the Cosgriff briefing, Reuters cited "other Pentagon officials, speaking on condition of anonymity" as saying that "a U.S. captain was in the process of ordering sailors to open fire when the Iranian boats moved away" -- a story that Cosgriff had specifically denied.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in June 2005.

POLITICS-US: Official Version of Naval Incident Starts to Unravel

CIA: We said back in 1974 that Israel had nuclear weapons - Haaretz - Israel News

By Amir Oren, Haaretz Correspondent 

The Central Intelligence Agency, backed by bodies including the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Defense Intelligence Agency, determined in August 1974 that Israel had nuclear "weapons in being," a "small number" of which it "produced and stockpiled."
Israel was also suspected of providing nuclear materials, equipment or technology to Iran, South Africa and other then-friendly countries.

his top secret document, consigned to the CIA's vaults for almost 32 years, was suddenly released to the public this week, during U.S. President George W. Bush's visit to Israel and on the eve of his trip to the Persian Gulf.
A small part of the document was released in early 2006 under a Freedom of Information Request placed by scholars Avner Cohen and William Burr, but only as an attachment to a 1975 State Department paper ostensibly disputing the the portrayal of Israel's nuclear weapons as a fact.
This served the Department of State's effort to avoid addressing Israel's nuclear status in response to a query by Congressman Alan Steelman.
The Department of State, led in this exercise by officials Joseph Sisco, Alfred (Roy) Atherton and Harold Saunders, tried to depict the 1974 Special National Intelligence Assesment, "Prospects for further proliferation of nuclear weapons," as a CIA project, while in fact it was an agency-wide effort that included its own intelligence chief, William Hyland, as a senior member of the board that agreed to the conclusions.
The CIA was asked Thursday via e-mail about the strange coincidence of the document's release a mere month after the publication of its awkwardly worded NIE on Iran's nuclear weapons program. It did not respond by deadline.
The issue of an American double standard regarding the nuclear activities of Israel and Iran often comes up when senior American officials visit the Gulf, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates did last month.
In both the original 1974 document and the 1975 State Department paper (in which it was retyped), the entire intelligence community determined, "Israel already has produced nuclear weapons." This analysis was based on "Israeli acquisition of large quantities of uranium," in part covertly; on Israel's ambiguous efforts to enrich uranium; and on the huge investment in the "Jericho" surface-to-surface missile "designed to accommodate nuclear warheads." Short of a grave threat to the nation's existence, Israel was not expected to confirm its suspected capability "by nuclear testing or by threats of use."
While Israel's nuclear weapons "cannot be proven beyond a shadow of doubt," several bodies of information point strongly toward a program stretching back over a number of years, the document states.
The 1974 document describes the Jericho project, from its inception in France through its migration to Israel to the replacement of the original inertial guidance system by an Israeli design "based on components produced in Israel under licenses from U.S. companies."
Israel Aircraft Industries is responsible for the development of the missile and has constructed a number of facilities for production and testing north of Tel Aviv, near Haifa, at Ramle and nearby it "a missile assembly and checkout plant."
On Iran, the 1974 NIE said, "there is no doubt of the Shah's ambition to make Iran a power to reckon with. If he is alive in the mid-80's, if Iran has a full-fledged nuclear power industry and all the facilities necessary for nuclear weapons, and if other countries have proceeded with weapons development, we have no doubt that Iran will follow suit."
The Shah's ouster in 1979 (and death a year later) apparently slowed down Iran's nuclear project.
The authors of the NIE wrote that the U.S. helped France expedite its nuclear program, France in turn helped Israel, and much like France and India, Israel, "while unlikely to foster proliferation as a matter of national policy, probably will prove susceptible to the hue of economic and political advantages to be gained from exporting materials, technology and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons programs."

CIA: We said back in 1974 that Israel had nuclear weapons - Haaretz - Israel News

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

We can beat Iran - but not by fighting - International Herald Tribune

 

In a war game in 2002, Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper of the Marines was called from retirement to lead a surrogate Iranian force defending against a U.S. attack. The general was recruited for his special talent, devising creative ways to fight stronger, technologically superior opponents.

Using motorbike messengers to keep his communications secure from high-tech eavesdropping, he launched a surprise attack on the U.S. Navy from a fleet of small, fast missile boats.

The barrage was intended to saturate U.S. anti-missile radars, allowing at least a few missiles to reach their targets. This worked perfectly. A U.S. aircraft carrier and 15 other warships went to the bottom.

It was a rout of the Donald Rumsfeld theory of high-tech warfare. In response, the Department of Defense stopped the game, changed the rules, and pretended nothing had happened. By so doing, the department reprised the first act in the worst naval defeat in U.S. history.

For the last century, technological change has relentlessly degraded the value of capital ships. Too often, naval high commands deny that this process is happening. In a trial bombing attack in 1921, Colonel Billy Mitchell of the U.S. Army showed that relatively cheap aircraft could sink expensive battleships. The navy dismissed Mitchell's test as unrealistic and continued to do so until Dec. 7, 1941.

If President George W. Bush were to order an attack on Iran, this syndrome could be repeated. Iranian naval doctrine is to strike hard, once, before being destroyed. To deliver this strike, Iran's Revolutionary Guards began building a fleet like Van Riper's long before the general showed what damage it could do.

So we know that Iran would counterattack in response to a U.S. air strike, and we've learned from Van Riper that such an attack could succeed.

As for anti-ship missiles, there's no need to parse war game results to know what they can do. They've been sinking real warships in combat since 1982, when an Argentine fighter pilot fired just two at HMS Sheffield. Van Riper fired hundreds, shredding the fleet.

So if the United States were to attack Iran, things could go badly. Just as in 1921, the U.S. Navy can't bring itself to admit that its largest warships might be vulnerable. So, while we can't know for certain if U.S. carriers are really obsolete, it seems foolish to give Iran the opportunity to find out.

Tehran seems unimpressed by administration war talk, perhaps because it has confidence in its navy. Lots of other people are scared, though. Take oil traders. Oil prices used to have a tight relationship with Saudi spare capacity. When capacity went up, prices went down. After two years of escalating threats between Tehran and Washington, however, new capacity no longer calms the market.

Under the old market rules, prices would be $50, not $100. So war talk sends an extra $20 billion a year to Tehran. The Bush administration's bellicose rhetoric thus makes a mockery of the president's pledge to "do everything in our power to defeat the terrorists."

If it wanted to honor this commitment, the administration would stop saying things that drive up oil prices. As it is, the long parade of threats just makes the mullahs richer.

Yet they spend their $90 a barrel windfall faster than ever, trying to buy legitimacy with pork. Deeply unpopular, the Iranian regime now relies on constantly rising oil prices for survival.

Its spending has quadrupled in the last six years, a remarkable rise that's evolved in lockstep with oil prices. Here, at last, is our adversary's weakness: An oil price decline would be a mortal threat.

If Bush wants to hit the regime where it hurts, conciliation should become his byword. In the price collapse that would follow, he'd find a brand new Iranian appetite for negotiation.

This is because, unlike sanctions that might take years bite, a peace initiative would threaten the mullahs tomorrow. Talking peace, which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will certainly scorn, would also help reformers in the approaching Iranian elections.

So before the president begins another war whose risks may be greater than he thinks, General Van Riper should be heard. And if the president really wants to regime change, he should talk peace, now.

He doesn't even have to mean it. At today's oil prices, just the threat of peace will do.

Roger Stern is a national security and energy policy analyst in the Oil, Energy and the Middle East Program at Princeton University.

We can beat Iran - but not by fighting - International Herald Tribune

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

Bush drills for Middle East deals | csmonitor.com

Israel wants Iran destroyed before agreeing to any semblance of peace with the Palestinians. 

Although a lame duck, President Bush can use his trip to the Middle East this week to achieve better success with the region's main threat, Iran. He enjoys backing in Congress for his tough stand on Iran (unlike on Iraq). This bipartisanship may give him leeway to set a new course.

The nine-day, six-nation trip will deal with many issues, such as Mr. Bush's recent push for a Palestinian-Israeli peace deal. He now predicts an agreement by year's end.

But even that goal is hindered by Iran's dangerous meddling in the region. Israel has set forth a critical linkage: It wants Iran's threat all but removed before it will allow a Palestinian state to be created on its border.

Israel's concern for its security, of course, is understandable. Attacks on its civilians are all too real or possible from bomb-lobbing militant groups backed by Iran: Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hizbullah in Lebanon. And Iran is still capable of creating a missile and nuclear threat, even if it has apparently hit the pause button in making an atomic bomb, as US intelligence claims.

But the US must set its own path in deciding whether Iran's influence can really be eliminated or simply contained. After all, Iran is a regional giant in population, oil wealth, and potential for meddling.

With the Iran question as the real substance of the trip, Bush's talks with the main US Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, are critical. His Jan. 14 visit to the oil kingdom will be a key step toward a Middle East peace.

Unlike Bush, Saudi's royal Sunni rulers actually talk to Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite the fears of the dominant Sunni Arabs in the region toward Iran's Shiite and Persian revolutionaries. In a surprise to the US, Mr. Ahmadinejad attended last month's meeting of the once anti-Iran Arab club, the Gulf Cooperation Council. He was then invited by the Saudi king to visit Mecca.

Such a welcome mat for Iran, however, may simply be a traditional Saudi tactic of keeping one's enemy close. That differs from the US stand of keeping Iran contained and Israel's wish to see the Iranian threat removed.

If Bush's intent is to simply shore up the Arab alliance against Iran, he'll need to adopt their diplomatic subtlety. And he'll need to recognize that Arab states are not united in their concerns and tactics toward Iran. Some want American military equipment for defense against Iran. Others want a strong Sunni role in Iraq's government to prevent Iran's influence there.

Instead of US leadership in the Middle East, the time may be ripe for US followership, especially after Bush's mishandling of Iraq. And a Saudi-US alliance is also critical for final hammering of an Israeli-Palestinian deal.

That pact is necessary for success in Bush's longer-range agenda of more freedom and democracy in the region. It doesn't hurt that he'll speak of that goal again in a speech during his stop in the United Arab Emirates.

But as he has now learned, the region first needs to deal with Iran and other radical Islamists in Iraq and elsewhere, as well as Palestinian aspirations for an independent state of their own.

Firm progress on those issues would be some of the best legacies to leave the next US president

Bush drills for Middle East deals | csmonitor.com

A President’s Defender Keeps His Distance - New York Times

A President’s Defender Keeps His Distance

Reuters

Under a portrait of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, left, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad listened to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in Tehran last March.

 

TEHRAN — A rift is emerging between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, suggesting that the president no longer enjoys the ayatollah’s full backing, as he did in the years after his election in 2005.

In the past, when Mr. Ahmadinejad was attacked by his political opponents, criticisms were usually silenced by Ayatollah Khamenei, who has the final word on state matters and regularly endorsed the president in public speeches. But that public support has been conspicuously absent in recent months. .....

“Now that Iran is not under the threat of a military attack, all contradictions within the establishment are surfacing,” said Saeed Leylaz, an economic and political analyst. “The biggest mistake that Americans have constantly made toward Iran was adopting radical approaches which provided the ground for radicals in the country to take control.” .......

Liberal commentators, here and abroad, have long argued that hard-line policies in the West only strengthen hard-line politicians in Iran, and conversely that lowering the threat level enhances the position of moderates. With conservative politicians who supported Mr. Ahmadinejad in 2005 increasingly turning into his fiercest critics, and with Ayatollah Khamenei saying recently that Iran’s lack of contacts with the United States “does not mean that we will not have relations indefinitely,” the pundits would seem, for now, to be on the right track.

A President’s Defender Keeps His Distance - New York Times